A new study, “A Tik-Tok-ing Timebomb,” that compares the use of political hashtags on TikTok and Instagram is being widely shared by those calling for a ban or forced sale of TikTok. The report, from the Network Contagion Research Institute, shows that political posts which run counter to Chinese national interests underperform on TikTok (owned by Chinese company Bytedance) relative to Instagram (owned by US-based Meta). For the authors, this suggests that Chinese authorities are algorithmically throttling content on TikTok that harms their international interests, such as posts about Tibet, the Uyghurs, and Tiananmen Square. 

However, the authors of the study made two remarkably basic errors that call into question the fundamental utility of the report.

First, the authors chose a flawed methodology that failed to account for how long each platform has existed. Instagram (launch 2010) is roughly twice as old as TikTok (international launch 2017). Thus, topics that were the subject of intense public discourse in the early 2010s, but which have not been heavily featured in the decade since, will naturally underperform on TikTok versus Instagram. Yet the authors did not adjust their data collection window to reflect this fact.

Second, the authors assumed that the same people use both platforms, which led them to miss the potential for generational cohort effects. In short, the median user of Instagram is older than the median user of TikTok. Compare the largest segment of users by age on each platform: 25% of TikTok users in the US are ages 10–19, while 27.4% of Instagram users are 25–34. That roughly decade-modal age gap will skew the ratio of topics covered on the two platforms. Simply put, older and younger users have different interests.

To see how these errors compounded to distort the study’s findings, let’s consider just one of the ten examples proffered by the authors. The study compares the frequency of three common hashtags related to Tibet and the Dalai Lama, finding a highly skewed ratio of 37.7 posts on Instagram for every one post on TikTok. That certainly appears suspicious given the longstanding Chinese censorship of domestic activists advocating for Tibetan independence.

But bear in mind that the study’s authors were not assessing only those posts uploaded in a discrete period, like, say, in the fall of 2023. No, they were comparing the total number of posts ever posted since the platforms were created (Instagram: 2010 / TikTok: 2017). 

Also, a quick peek at Google trends data show that public discourse about Tibet in the US has been in a general decline throughout the 2000s and 2010s, albeit punctuated by exponential spikes (as much as 15x) in April 2008 and December 2016, which corresponded to moments of intense Tibetan activism.

Both spikes predated the international rollout of TikTok but happened at a time when Instagram already had hundreds of millions of users. It isn’t surprising that six years’ worth of TikTok posts from a time of relatively low US interest in Tibet would be swamped by 13 years of Instagram posts from a time of intense US interest in Tibet.

Furthermore, even if one were hypothetically able to restrict the data on the Tibet hashtag to only posts made after the creation of TikTok, one would still expect to run into generational cohort effects. To put it simply, knowledge of and interest in a topic tends to persist. Millennials who were in college in 2008 during the Tibetan uprising are going to be more likely to be interested in — and thus post about — Tibet today than are members of Generation Z, some of whom were still in diapers in 2008.

None of what I’ve written here proves that TikTok did not or could not manipulate its algorithm to downgrade content unfavorable to the CCP. But it strongly suggests that this particular study is poorly designed and should not be used as serious evidence of algorithmic manipulation by TikTok. Frankly, I’m surprised by just how sloppy it is.

A better study would choose a discrete time frame (such as when both platforms actually existed) and assess the ratio of posts in that time frame on controversial issues of importance to the Chinese government. If someone does that study, I’d like to see a copy.

Even then, however, it’s important to remember that these platforms aren’t synonymous and any outcomes might be skewed by platform-specific differences. For example, why should we expect the ratio of non-political and political content to be similar? That assumes a constant level of political interest between those who use the two platforms. But that is hardly a guarantee given generational differences between their user bases, the downstream contrasts from being photo-first versus short-form video-first formats, and other platform-specific divergences.

Regardless, the fact that many major news organizations missed these basic flaws in the study and then ran credulous coverage of the report is an indictment of mood affiliation in journalism, especially when they are tasked with covering social media platforms with which they compete for the public’s attention.

Crossposted from the author’s Substack newsletter. Click through and subscribe for more content at the intersection of policy, media, and history.

In early November, Nate Silver published his analysis of the 2024 College Free Speech polling done by the College Pulse and the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) earlier this year. And boy is his analysis sobering. 

Students in the past led the charge for free expression, championing disfavored perspectives. Today a majority of students would reject speakers with disfavored views on some of the biggest issues in our society.

In the poll, only 29 percent of students said a speaker who viewed transgender people as having a mental disorder or who viewed “Black Lives Matter” as a hate group should be allowed to speak. Only 43 percent said an advocate for the abolition of abortion should be allowed on campus. 

On the other hand, 65 percent of students would allow a speaker calling for the abolition of the Second Amendment so guns can be confiscated; 57 percent would allow a speaker who argued that religious liberty is used as an excuse to discriminate against gays and lesbians; and 72 percent would allow speakers with the view that structural racism maintains inequality by protecting White privilege. 

Such disparate views toward speech were largely driven by a divide between students on the left—who were permissive of progressive speakers but hostile to conservative speakers—and conservative students—who were fairly consistent in their support for speakers regardless of political viewpoint. 

But this polling contains other worrisome findings that transcend the viewpoints of speakers, such as that only 37 percent of students think it is never acceptable to shout down a speaker; only 55% think it is never acceptable to block other students from attending a speech; and 27% of students believe that violence can rarely, sometimes, or always be an acceptable answer to stop a campus speech. 

As Silver rightly notes, there is also plenty of blame to go around with both conservatives and progressives also calling for restrictions on certain types of speech or certain types of speakers. 

The threat to a culture of free expression is rising. While some may write off this threat as a passing fad that doesn’t threaten American First Amendment liberties, it is only a matter of time before a culture of silence and cancellation work their way into our laws and jurisprudence. As George Orwell wrote, “The point is that the relative freedom which we enjoy depends on public opinion. The law is no protection. Governments make laws, but whether they are carried out, and how the police behave, depends on the general temper in the country. If large numbers of people are interested in freedom of speech, there will be freedom of speech, even if the law forbids it; if public opinion is sluggish, inconvenient minorities will be persecuted, even if laws exist to protect them.” 

FIRE’s polling highlights the ongoing challenge to a culture of free expression in the US as well as concerns about cancel culture. These issues are discussed further in FIRE President Greg Lukianoff’s recently coauthored new book The Canceling of the American Mind: Cancel Culture Undermines Trust and Threatens Us All―But There Is a Solution (Cato will host a book discussion Dec 6, 2024) on how cancel culture is a symptom of a larger problem— Americans are using cheap yet powerful tactics to de-platform those they disagree with rather than engage in difficult conversations. Thankfully, the Canceling book provides ideas for how we can restore a culture of free expression on college campuses and beyond through better citizenship 

FIRE’s polling and Nate Silver’s analysis are cause for concern. Support for expression is fading, even among those who have historically needed and utilized free expression the most. As Americans debate a variety of contentious issues, cancellation and censorship must be resisted. As Canceling makes clear, we must build a culture of free expression if we are to continue to enjoy the many benefits of free expression. 

Free speech scholars and advocates have written about the general decline in freedom of expression that has occurred over the past two decades. Despite great technological advances that make communicating immensely easier—social media, encrypted communications, and ubiquitous computers and cell phones—many governmental policies and public opinion around the world have soured on the importance of expression.

In this recession of free speech, the Future of Free Speech project, a collaborative venture between the Justitia think tank and Vanderbilt University, has released a report that examines the importance of free speech as a “safety valve” to prevent social conflict. Among the issues studied in the report is the common belief today that “extreme” or disfavored speech around contentious topics can lead to violence and social conflict. This belief can even be seen in the glib slogans “silence is violence” or “words are violence.”

By ascribing actual violence to mere differences of opinion, this view argues that allowing such expression will lead to more violence. In other words, free speech can normalize and spread beliefs that will produce more violence. It can allow more dissension within a society that ultimately erupts into violent conflict.

But the Future of Free Speech report, by executive director Jacob Mchangama and Christian Bjørnskov challenges that narrative. Rather than producing more violence, greater expression—not merely defined as First Amendment or other legal protections, but also the ability to safely and freely express oneself in practice—is often correlated with less societal conflict and violence.

Speech can function as a safety valve that allows individuals to express frustrations and vent their anger without resorting to violence. Speech allows policymakers to understand the views of their constituents in order to legislate effectively. For instance, it allows civil society to form and address the sources of social conflict, as seen in the struggle for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s, where civil society helped guide peaceful protests and expression to overcome the evils of segregation and Jim Crow.

Censorship, on the other hand, can even create more conflicts as it limits legitimate avenues for discussion, according to the report. The study finds that speech “restrictions will lead to more conflict, a consequence that to some extent may be driven by government misuse of restrictions. Such problems are more often than not ignored by the legal and political literature on the topic.”

In other words, government abuse of its censorial powers increases the frustration of those who are silenced and potentially leads some to turn to conflict and violence.

The Future of Free Speech report discovered that among democracies and multiparty autocracies with relatively strong protections for citizens’ rights, freedom of expression is strongly and significantly associated with less social conflict. Simply, in democratic and relatively less authoritarian states, greater freedom of expression means less social conflict and more restrictions on expression may result in more conflict.

However, researchers also found that “it appears that increasing the freedom of expression is associated with more conflict in single-party regimes.” This is possibly due to autocratic governments channeling expression against already socially disfavored groups that are unprotected or even targeted as enemies of the state. Additionally, the brutal repression and lack of expression in communist states may result in very little outward conflict, but such repression also crushes human flourishing.

Indeed, the safety valve justification is not the only reason to treasure freedom of expression. Other reasons include:

• self-governance and government accountability;
• individual liberty and fulfillment;
• the search for truth and knowledge in the marketplace of ideas;
• understanding what others believe;
• promoting tolerance;
• and that censorship may be ineffective or even backfire.

The next time you hear an expert or policymaker say we need to restrict speech to reduce conflict and violence, know that this is not a tradeoff we need to make.

In light of the horrendous acts of terrorism against Israel and the ongoing conflict in Gaza, many critics are saying we need to limit speech and silence others in the name of safety and to stop alleged misinformation. Citing the conflict, the EU is for the first time invoking—and already abusing—the Digital Services Act to cow social media companies into removing protected speech.

Yes, we should stop activity that is violent or directly incites people to imminent violence. But undesirable opinions are not violence. Words are not violence, and we can have safety and liberty so long as we reject the idea that free expression is dangerous.

George Orwell’s 1984 is one of our society’s most frequently referenced illustrations of what life would be like under an authoritarian government. Actual government policies that are viewed as illiberal in varying degrees are often tied to this novel by opponents, an easy and effective way to call out government overreach and control. In the book 1984, citizens of the fictional nation Oceania are under constant government surveillance, including in their own homes. Devices called telescreens display propaganda and record peoples’ actions, allowing the government to monitor people even in what should be the most private place they know—their homes. This type of behavior is meant to be an extreme example of what can happen when a government gains too much power, and opposition to such surveillance has been assumed to be overwhelming and obvious. But is it?

Featured Study

Poll: Only 16% of Americans Support the Government Issuing a Central Bank Digital Currency

Countries around the world are exploring the possibility of adopting central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), which are digital national currencies. The Federal Reserve, the United States’ central bank, is also considering whether the United States should follow suit. The Cato Institute 2023 CBDC National Survey finds that few Americans—only 16%—support the adoption of a CBDC.

Read the Survey Report

In a newly released Cato Institute 2023 Central Bank Digital Currency National Survey of 2,000 Americans, we asked respondents whether they “favor or oppose the government installing surveillance cameras in every household to reduce domestic violence, abuse, and other illegal activity.” Not surprisingly, few Americans—only 14 percent—support this idea. Three-fourths (75 percent) would oppose government surveillance cameras in homes, including 68 percent who “strongly oppose,” while 10% don’t have an opinion either way.

However, Americans under the age of 30 stand out when it comes to 1984-style in-home government surveillance cameras. 3 in 10 (29 percent) Americans under 30 favor “the government installing surveillance cameras in every household” in order to “reduce domestic violence, abuse, and other illegal activity.” Support declines with age, dropping to 20 percent among 30–44 year olds and dropping considerably to 6 percent among those over the age of 45.

We don’t know how much of this preference for security over privacy or freedom is something unique to this generation (a cohort effect) or simply the result of youth (age effect). However, there is reason to think part of this is generational. Americans over age 45 have vastly different attitudes on in-home surveillance cameras than those who are younger. These Americans were born in or before 1978. Thus the very youngest were at least 11 before the Berlin Wall fell. Being raised during the Cold War amidst regular news reports of the Soviet Union surveilling their own people may have demonstrated to Americans the dangers of giving the government too much power to monitor people. Young people today are less exposed to these types of examples and thus less aware of the dangers of expansive government power.

It is also possible that increased support for government surveillance among the young has common roots with what Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt describe in the Coddling of the American Mind: young people seem more willing to prioritize safety (from possible violence or hurtful words) over ensuring robust freedom (from government surveillance or to speak freely).

Other demographics also differ in their tolerance of government surveillance in their homes. African Americans (33 percent) and Hispanic Americans (25 percent) are more likely than White Americans (9 percent) and Asian Americans (11 percent) to support in-home government surveillance. Democrats (17 percent) are also more likely than Republicans (11 percent) to support it but not by a wide margin. This issue divides Democrats between those who identify as “very liberal” in which only 9 percent support and “liberal” who are more than twice as likely to support (19 percent). Notably the issue doesn’t divide men (15 percent) and women (13 percent) who were about equally likely to support.

We asked this question as part of our survey on Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) in order to see whether there is a relationship between opinions on the government issuing a central bank digital currency and government installing cameras in homes. It appears that the two opinions are correlated. Interestingly, more than half (53 percent) of those who support the United States adopting a CBDC are also supportive of government surveillance cameras in homes, while only 2 percent of those who oppose a CBDC feel the same. This suggests there may be a common consideration that is prompted by both issues. Likely, it has to do with willingness to give up privacy in hopes of greater security.

It is important to emphasize that the overwhelming majority of Americans across demographic groups oppose the government surveilling people in their homes. Nevertheless, it is relevant to note the higher acceptance among younger generations to trade freedom and privacy for some added security and protection.

If these trends continue, the United States may confront a very different privacy landscape in the future. It is possible that at some point, the American public will be open to extreme government overreach in a world that feels scarier and more dangerous than before, whether or not it is. Thus, it is important to impart the learnings of the past (and present) about what can happen when government amasses too much power. Without explicitly telling younger generations about the risks and dangers of government surveillance they will forget these lessons and may find themselves repeating devastating mistakes of the past.

Washington, D.C.– Only 16% of Americans support the U.S. government adopting a Central Bank Digital Currency or “CBDC,” according to the new Cato Institute 2023 CBDC National Survey Report. The national survey of 2,000 Americans conducted by YouGov found that twice as many Americans—34%—oppose adopting a CBDC, while 49% don’t yet have an opinion. Nevertheless, the survey finds that Americans are more concerned about a CBDC’s risks than they are enthusiastic about its benefits.

The poll was conducted as officials at the Federal Reserve, the United States’ central bank, are considering whether the U.S. should adopt a central bank digital currency. While Americans regularly use digital dollars via credit cards, debit cards, etc, those dollars are a liability of the private commercial bank that issues them, like Bank of America or Wells Fargo. Conversely, a CBDC would be a liability of the government’s Federal Reserve, rather than a private bank. Thus, a CBDC would create a direct link between citizens and the government’s central bank.

When Americans learn of the potential benefits and risks of a CBDC they express stronger opinions about whether the U.S. should adopt one. Strong majorities of Americans would oppose adopting a CBDC if it meant that the government could control what people spend their money on (74%), that the government could monitor their spending (68%), that a CBDC would lead to the abolishment of all U.S. cash (68%), that a CBDC would attract cyberattacks (65%), that the government could charge a tax on those who don’t spend money during recessions (64%), or that the government could freeze the digital bank accounts of political protesters (59%). Americans were marginally opposed (52%) if a CBDC would cause some people to stop using private banks, resulting in some banks going out of business.

Americans express tepid support for a CBDC’s potential advantages. A plurality would support one if it reduced the risk of money laundering and fraud (42%) or if it meant that the government could ensure welfare payments were spent on their intended purpose (40%). Americans are about evenly supportive or opposed if a CBDC made instantaneous financial transactions possible (27% favor), made it easier for people without bank accounts to gain equitable access to the banking system (33% favor), or helped the Federal Reserve combat economic recessions (32% favor). In nearly each of these scenarios, about a quarter to a third of Americans still don’t have an opinion about a CBDC.

Both Republicans and Democrats are wary of CBDCs, but opposition is greater among Republicans. Before any benefits or costs are mentioned, a majority (53%) of Republicans oppose the government issuing a CBDC. On the other hand, a majority of Democrats (56%) are undecided and 22% oppose. Few Republicans (11%) and Democrats (22%) support adopting a CBDC. Additionally, strong majorities of both Democrats (71%) and Republicans (82%) would oppose a CBDC if the government could control what people spend their money on and when. Majorities of Democrats (61%) and Republicans (82%) would also oppose if the government could see what people buy with the digital currency.

Most Americans are more concerned about CBDC’s potential risks than enthusiastic about the benefits when considered together: 76% of Americans say the “government should not issue a central bank digital currency because it would potentially allow the government to monitor what people buy and potentially control how they spend their money.” About a quarter (24%) say that the “government should issue a central bank digital currency because it would reduce financial crime and other illegal activity and would increase access to the financial system.”

Nearly 8 in 10 Americans (78%) say they would not use a CBDC if one were offered, while 22% say they would. Some are more inclined to use a CBDC than others. Democrats (29%), Black Americans (39%), men (28%), and Americans under 35 (40%) were more likely than Republicans (16%), Hispanic (26%) or White Americans (18%), women (17%), and Americans over 55 (8%) to say they would use a CBDC.

Americans are satisfied with their own bank (89%) and trust private banks more than the government to “handle [their] money appropriately” (79%). Further, 85% of Americans would prefer to keep their money with a private bank rather than in an account operated by the Federal Reserve (15%).

The survey also found that a CBDC is about as popular as 1984-style in-home government surveillance cameras. Only 14% of Americans support the government installing surveillance cameras in every household “to reduce domestic violence, abuse, and other illegal activity.” But strikingly–a majority (53%) of Americans who support a CBDC also support the government installing in-home surveillance cameras to reduce abuse and other illegal activity. This suggests that some of the psychology behind support for a CBDC springs from an above average comfort level with trading some personal autonomy and privacy for societal order and security.

The topline questionnaire, full methodology, and report of the survey findings can be found here. If you would like to speak to Dr. Ekins on the poll’s results, please contact pr@​cato.​org or 202–789-5200.

69% worry their kids and grandkids won’t be able to afford a home, 64% would support building more homes if it helped making housing more affordable

The Cato 2022 Housing Affordability Survey, a new national poll of 2,000 U.S. adults, finds that 87% of Americans are concerned about the cost of housing. With housing prices up more than 40% nationally since 2019 and interest rates on the rise, it’s no surprise that 76% of Americans say that now is a bad time to buy a house. Moreover, more than two-thirds (69%) worry their children and grandchildren won’t be able to afford a home. For most Americans, it seems like a dream that is slipping out of reach.

READ THE FULL REPORT HERE

Americans are modestly supportive (51%) of zoning reforms that would allow more building of homes, condos, and apartments in their community. However, support rises more than 20 points to 72% in favor if construction made housing more affordable for young people and young families.

Democrats, Renters, and City Residents are Most Supportive of Zoning Reform

A slim majority (51%) of Americans support building more homes, apartments, or condos in their community, an action that has the potential to decrease housing costs. While nearly two-thirds (63%) of Democrats support more home construction in their community, majorities of Republicans (61%) and independents (53%) oppose it. In a similar fashion, 65% of renters support more home building while a majority (57%) of current homeowners oppose it. In addition, those who live in big cities are more supportive of additional housing (61%) than those who live in suburbs (47%) and those who live in rural areas (37%).

People Support More Construction if it Helped Kids and Grandkids Buy Homes

Americans become more supportive of building additional housing if it makes homes more affordable for “people” (64%), young people and young families (72%), people of color (67%), and people with low incomes (63%).

Republicans are especially persuaded by the idea that additional housing will help make homes more affordable for young people and young families. While only 39% of Republicans support building more homes generally, 64% support building if it makes housing more affordable for young people and young families. Democratic support rises even higher to 82% if more construction made it easier for young people to move in. Emily Ekins, the Director of Polling explained, “The data indicates that a bipartisan consensus for zoning reform emerges when people consider the needs of future generations–especially their kids and grandkids.”

86% of Americans Prefer Owning a Home to Renting, 89% Favor a Single-Family Home

For most Americans (86%), owning their own home is preferable to renting. This includes 90% of Republicans and 84% of Democrats. Most Americans also idealize the single-family home: 89% of Americans, including 86% of Democrats and 95% of Republicans, would prefer living in a single-family home to living in a condo or townhome.

But people differ in where they want that single-family home to reside. Republicans (58%) would prefer a single-family home in the countryside, while Democrats would prefer a single-family home in a city (22%) or the suburbs of a city (34%). In addition, 62% of Republicans prefer a home that is larger and further from other homes, at the expense of proximity to schools, stores, and restaurants, compared to only 36% of Democrats.

Americans are deeply concerned about the cost of housing in the United States. They are also pessimistic about the options future generations will have to buy their own homes. However, the public is open to zoning reforms that would make it easier to build single-family homes, townhomes, and condos–especially if it helps young families move in.

READ THE FULL REPORT HERE

Methodology

The Cato Institute 2022 Housing Affordability Survey was designed and conducted by the Cato Institute in collaboration with YouGov. YouGov collected responses online August 17–23, 2022, from a national sample of 2,000 Americans, 18 years of age and older. Restrictions are put in place to ensure that only the people selected and contacted by YouGov are allowed to participate. The margin of error for the survey is +/- 2.39 percentage points at the 95% level of confidence.

Pollsters and pundits were surprised by the 2022 midterms that didn’t deliver a Republican Red Wave. Republicans were expected to sweep the House and likely gain control of the Senate. But that’s not what happened. Republicans failed to take the Senate and may only barely garner a House majority. As of this writing, Republicans have only won 217 seats—1 seat shy of a majority—with 11 undecided races. What happened? Our analysis shows that Republican Senate and gubernatorial candidates who said that President Biden did not actually win in 2020 were more likely to lose than Republicans who accepted the election results.

Midterms historically have favored the political party opposite the President’s party. In fact, out-parties have gained seats in 17 of the past 18 midterm elections. Given President Biden’s low approval rating hovering at about 42%, it appeared especially likely that Democrats would lose seats. Further, the economy has not been doing well with high annual inflation, high interest rates, and high gas prices. And most Americans (58%) think we’re currently in a recession. Also, Americans said they trusted Republicans more to handle the issue they cared most about: inflation (59% were “extremely concerned” about this). Issues like abortion, where voters trust Democrats more, appeared to matter less to voters than the economy.

Candidate quality problems may help explain, in part, why Republicans didn’t have a better night. For one, polls show that more voters wanted a Republican-controlled Senate than wanted to vote for their state’s Republican candidate in states with key Senate races. It’s worth noting that Republicans lost or got fewer votes in all four of the key toss-up Senate races in Arizona, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Georgia.

Our analysis sheds light on what voters did not like about their particular Senate candidates. In our analysis of Republican candidates for Senate and Governor, we find that candidates who did not accept the 2020 election results may have paid a penalty at the ballot box.

We use FiveThirtyEight’s database of candidates’ stances on the 2020 election to categorize Republican candidates who “fully denied” and “questioned” the 2020 results compared to Republican candidates who did not question or challenge the validity of the election. We then examined what percentage of each category won their races.

Republican Senate Candidates

Of Republican Senate candidates who “denied” or “questioned” the 2020 election results, 42% won their elections compared to 67% of Republicans who did not deny or question the results. If Republican candidate Herschel Walker loses the Georgia Senate run-off, the share of winning denying/​questioning Senate candidates would fall to 38%. If he wins, the share would rise to 46%. If we only compare Republican Senate candidates who fully refused to accept Biden as President, then 50% won compared to 60% who did not refuse to accept Biden’s win.

Republican Gubernatorial Candidates

Forty-four percent (44%) of Republican gubernatorial candidates who “denied” or “raised questions” about Biden’s 2020 win were elected. In contrast, 53% of Republican gubernatorial candidates who did not challenge the 2020 election results won their races. One governor’s race, in Alaska, remains outstanding. Only 29% of Republican gubernatorial candidates who fully refused to accept Biden’s victory were elected, compared to 54% of everyone else.

Several states had voters elect a Republican Governor but not the Republican Senator, or visa versa. In the 3 states where there was this kind of split ticket voting, the Republican candidate who did not challenge the 2020 election results won 100% of the time. The Republican candidate who denied or questioned Biden’s win won 0% of the time.

Republican House Candidates

The House has a more complicated story. Raising doubts about the 2020 election may have helped Republicans in non-competitive House districts but may have cost them in competitive districts where they had to appeal to independent and Democratic voters. Among all House races, 65% of Republicans who denied or questioned the 2020 election results won compared to 39% of other Republicans. Comparing Republicans who fully denied the 2020 outcome shows a starker picture: 73% of Republicans who fully denied the outcome won, compared to 38% who did not fully deny.

We examined Republican House candidates in the most competitive House races according to Cook Political Report’s “Tier 1.” In these competitive districts, only 22% of Republicans who fully denied Biden’s victory won their races compared to 29% of Republicans who did not. Among the second most competitive tier, “deniers” won 50% and “non-deniers” won 43% of their races. Among the less competitive third and fourth tiers deniers won a higher share of their races than non-deniers. Among tiers 3 and 4, “deniers” won 67% and 78% respectively and “non-deniers” won 35% and 39% respectively.

Claiming that Biden did not legitimately win the presidency may have helped Republican candidates in non-competitive safe districts. After all, these candidates primarily had to appeal to Republican voters who don’t believe Biden won fairly. However, this rhetoric likely made it difficult for other Republicans running in competitive or statewide races in which they had to appeal to Democrats and independents who don’t believe Biden won due to voter fraud.

Conclusion

Political pundits and Republican officials are trying to determine why the expected Republican Red Wave petered out. Surely, the overturning of Roe vs. Wade and the resurgent salience of the issue of abortion played a significant role. Indeed, abortion was the number two issue affecting vote choice according to exit polls. Notably, Republicans regardless of their stance on the 2020 election did relatively poorly in toss-up/competitive House races. It is likely that abortion played an important role in subduing a Red Wave. Other explanations for Republican underperformance simply blame an electoral map more favorable to Democrats this election cycle. While these seem to be important factors, we cannot overlook the role that poor candidate quality may have played.

Claiming Biden did not legitimately win the presidency appears to have had a polarizing effect. It may have helped shore up support among the base of Republican voters while also coming across as unserious and perhaps juvenile to independent swing voters who do not doubt the legitimacy of the 2020 election.

Our analysis illustrates that in statewide races, Republican candidates who denied or questioned the 2020 election underperformed. Could Republicans currently be surfing a tidal wave into Congress had they not nominated candidates who repeated 2020 voter fraud claims? Accepting the 2020 election results may have helped them persuade independents and Democrats to vote for them. But perhaps many feared doing so would hamper enthusiasm among their Republican base. What is clear is that claims of 2020 voter fraud are a polarizing cause that likely cost Republicans. Is this the only factor to blame for the lackluster Republican performance? No. Other issues, such as abortion, played a large role. But these data do provide some indication that Republicans may have had a better night had they not nominated candidates who dabbled in election denialism.