In an article in The Atlantic entitled “Consider the Possibility That Trump Is Right About China,” a former Trump administration national security official makes a wide range of arguments that probably deserve a rebuttal, but for now I’m going to focus on the following one:

Many of President Trump’s critics in the foreign-policy community put great stock in the ability of multilateral and international organizations to constrain the misbehavior of China and other states. These organizations, at their best, promote concerted action against commonly recognized problems. But Trump’s critics tend to view them mainly in their idealized form and as the central instruments to solve global problems and advance values shared by all. In practice, though, how international organizations perform is profoundly influenced by power relationships among member states.

One problem with this view is that it elevates international organizations to something beyond what they really are. The author talks about “the ability of multilateral and international organizations to constrain the misbehavior of China and other states.” That makes it sound like the organizations themselves have the power to act. But as people familiar with such organizations know, most of the power still lies with the states who created the organizations.

There is clearly a lot of confusion on this point, as just the other day, the economist Branko Milanovic tweeted this: “We are in a horrible position that *all* international agencies (WHO, Interpol, World Bank, UN, IMF, ILO, Unesco) have been politicized by global powers, deprived of funds & skilled people w/​integrity, populated by faceless bureaucrats & lost all credibility. We are back to 1918.” The reality, of course, is that we are not back to 1918, and instead we are where we have always been: International organizations are limited by what states want them to do.

When you apply all this to trade policy and an organization such as the World Trade Organization, you might hear a pro-Trump person say something like, “The WTO can’t constrain China.” That’s certainly true, but it misses the point. The WTO is an organization with a set of rules, and enforcement is up to the states who are members. There is no WTO prosecutor to seek out instances of Chinese protectionism and impose penalties in response. That’s up to the member governments. 

So if the United States wants WTO rules to rein in China’s behavior, the United States could, for example, file more complaints under the WTO’s dispute procedures, as I have argued that it should. Of course, there are limits to the enforceability of the rules, and limits to what the rules cover, but the rules can be helpful nevertheless. But they can’t help if you don’t use them. To paraphrase the great philosopher Wayne Gretzky: You lose 100% of the cases you don’t bring.

International organizations can’t discipline China’s behavior on their own. It takes an active approach by governments to make use of these organizations. The Trump administration doesn’t seem very interested in utilizing this option, which is one reason why it has had so little success in addressing China’s protectionist trade practices. (Another reason is that it has spent so much time attacking U.S. allies on trade, but I’ll leave that point for another post).

The trade balance is calculated as the difference between the value of U.S. exports and the value of U.S. imports. The United States “runs a trade deficit” when Americans purchase more goods and services from foreigners than foreigners purchase from Americans.

To be more precise, the trade deficit is the amount by which the total value of purchases of U.S. consumers, businesses, and governments from foreign suppliers exceeds the total value of purchases of foreign consumers, businesses, and governments from U.S. suppliers.

The trade deficit gets a lot of negative attention. It’s got a bad reputation—probably because it’s called a “deficit.” Sounds like something that needs fixing. But the truth is that the trade deficit has a lot going for it. It’s just, well, misunderstood.

Over the years, my colleagues and I have written extensively about the real meaning of the trade deficit; that it is not a reflection of trade policy; that it is to be expected for a country whose government issues the world’s primary reserve currency; and that the dollars that go abroad to purchase imports find their way back into the U.S. economy in the form of investment in equities, real estate, factories, other structures, equipment, and corporate and government debt; and that the only portion of that capital inflow from foreigners that current and future taxpayers need to repay is the principal and interest on government debt (which implicates fiscally irresponsible government, not trade).

President Trump, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, White House adviser Peter Navarro, and others in the administration don’t seem to get this. They see trade a zero sum game, with exports as Team America’s points, imports as the foreign team’s points, and the trade account as the scoreboard. The deficit on that scoreboard (the trade deficit) means that Team America is losing at trade and it’s losing because the foreign team—much like the Houston Astros—cheats.

The misguided objective of trade policy for the past three years has been to minimize imports and maximize exports. And the tools deployed in pursuit of these objectives—sweeping tariffs, withdrawal from a major trans-pacific trade agreement, wanton subversion of the international rule of trade law, and compelling partners into renegotiations of trade agreements under the barrel of a gun—have failed to eliminate (or even reduce) that trade deficit. In fact, between 2016 and 2019, the goods deficit increased from $735 billion to $853 billion. That said, the administration is likely to make progress toward that goal this year because U.S. trade deficits decline during economic contractions. 

But there’s a better way to think of the meaning of the trade deficit. Milton Friedman liked to point out that exports are things we produce but don’t get to consume, while imports are things we consume without having to produce. Yet, when Americans get more stuff from foreigners than foreigners get from Americans, it’s called a “deficit.” Go figure!

If you happen to use toilet paper, the following example may resonate.

In 2019, U.S. producers exported over 72 million kilograms (about 802 million rolls) of the supple utensil to be deployed by people in other countries. WHAT? HOW COULD THEY? DON’T THEY KNOW HOW MUCH WE LOVE TP IN AMERICA? Indeed, we do (no pun)!

According to Sta​tista​.com, the United States leads the world in toilet paper consumption, averaging 141 rolls of the fluffy stuff per person per year. So, the precious supply that U.S. producers exported last year could have sated the derrieres of some 5.7 million Americans. Juxtapose that stat against the wrestling matches you’ve witnessed in your grocer’s paper products aisle.

But here’s the thing. In 2019, not only was toilet paper shipped abroad. It was also imported—and in vastly more significant sums. Volumes of over 194 million kilograms or nearly 2.2 billion rolls were imported last year, satisfying the demands of approximately 15.6 million Americans. In other words, international trade in 2019 produced a net surplus of about 1.4 billion rolls of toilet paper (2.2 billion rolls imported minus 0.8 billion rolls exported) for people in the United States. Trade helped meet the toilet tissue demands of a net 10 million Americans. That’s 10 million fewer people poised to rumble in the aisles of Target and Walmart.

Unfortunately, the trade statistics aren’t recorded in a way that illustrates the facts that Milton Friedman shared with us. They record the dollars that changed hands, not the number of rolls put to good use. But at the end of the day (and, throughout the day), we know which paper ultimately serves the purpose we demand. 

Yet another sign of the marginalization of the World Trade Organization is the omission of any mention of it in the recent G20 statement on COVID-19. At a time when more international cooperation is urgently needed to control and conquer the spreading coronavirus pandemic, including in trade, the international institution established to oversee trade is increasingly shunted to the sidelines.

The G20 leaders acknowledged the importance of trade to addressing the pandemic in their statement at the conclusion of their emergency video conference on March 25. They promised to use “all available policy tools to minimize the economic and social damage from the pandemic.” Shockingly, however, they neglected to refer by name to the only global institutional tool they have for achieving that goal in trade. Six other international institutions were specifically cited – but not the WTO.

Going into this global fight for survival, the WTO was already badly damaged by the corrosive combination of Trumpian unilateralism and intensifying global economic nationalism. Now, because of the coronavirus, all WTO meetings have been suspended until at least the end of April. Those who see the WTO as necessarily central to world trade are left wondering what its role is now and will be going forward.

Among trade experts, ideas abound for using the WTO to help fight the pandemic. At the top of the list is the pressing need to roll back and refrain from export bans on medicines and medical supplies. At last count, 35 countries have imposed such bans. While these measures, depending on how they are applied, may be legal under WTO rules, they are inconsistent with the G20 aim to “coordinate responses in ways that avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.” They prevent limited drugs and supplies from going to where they are most needed to conduct effective coordinated global combat against the global virus, especially in the poorest countries where the outbreak may ultimately be the worst.

Making common sense also is an immediate end worldwide to all tariffs on imports of drugs and medical equipment. Many countries still impose import taxes on a whole range of medical-related goods that are needed everywhere during this pandemic. All countries must import at least some of these goods. No one country can produce all of these goods in the amounts they may eventually need. Tariffs rarely make sense, and these border taxes on imports of life-saving goods may make the least sense of all.

Other worthy ideas for WTO action that have been suggested include: promoting transparency in all national measures taken to fight the virus; waiving the “buy local” requirements that inflate the prices of government purchases in much of the world; improving trade facilitation to reduce the “red tape” costs for trading health-related products; eliminating non-tariff barriers that hinder trade in medicines and medical equipment; adopting international standards to help ensure the safety and quality of imported medical goods; giving the go-ahead to subsidies for producing the new medicines urgently needed to stop the coronavirus; reaffirming that WTO rules permit compulsory licensing of needed medicines by developing countries in these dire circumstances; and permitting health care workers to move more easily across borders.

Because the WTO operates by consensus, it can only act if all its members cooperate in deciding it should act. Generally, if even one member says “no,” nothing can happen. Quite rightly, the WTO is entirely a member-driven institution. As it stands, though, the members of the WTO are not driving it anywhere during the global crisis of this pandemic.

More than half a century in the making, the WTO was established 25 years ago to provide global solutions in trade, including in times such as these. “The virus knows no borders,” explained the G20 leaders. This transcendence of borders includes the interrelationships between the virus and trade. In trade as in all else, the G20 leaders are right in thinking we need “a united front against this common threat.”

Unavoidably, the WTO has postponed its biennial ministerial conference that had been planned for Kazakhstan in June. Yet, even with social distancing, self-isolation, and quarantines, WTO members can return the WTO to its rightful central role in world trade by pursuing these and other ideas for global solutions. They should begin by convening a virtual ministerial conference on how best to use trade to help defeat the coronavirus.

The U.S. oil industry has certainly seen better days. Surging production by Russia and Saudi Arabia along with a sharp drop in demand due to the COVID-19 pandemic have pushed global oil benchmark prices to nearly $20 per barrel. The last time oil prices were that low Bill Clinton was president. Tomorrow the heads of several U.S. oil producers will meet with President Trump to make their case for some type of relief.

One of the measures reportedly under consideration is a temporary waiver of the Jones Act. It would be an excellent move. Such a waiver would cost taxpayers nothing while bolstering the oil sector’s flagging fortunes. It would also help realize Trump’s stated goals of placing America first, confronting the DC swamp, and deregulating an overburdened economy. If a fivefer is such a thing, this is it.

Passed in 1920, the Jones Act restricts the waterborne transportation of goods from one U.S. point to another to vessels that are U.S.-flagged, U.S.-built and at least 75 percent U.S.-owned and crewed. U.S.-built ships, however, are up to five times more expensive than those constructed abroad while the operating costs of U.S. ships are significantly higher than those under foreign flags. There also aren’t many of them. Of the tens of thousands of ships in the world, a mere 99 comply with the Jones Act’s restrictions. This combination of high costs and limited numbers makes for extremely high shipping rates.

Perhaps no one can better attest to this than U.S. energy companies. Jones Act shipping rates are so high that shipping a barrel of oil from Alaska to the Gulf Coast has been shown to cost three times more than shipping the same oil on a foreign-flag ship to the U.S. Virgin Islands (which are exempt from the law) despite the latter voyage taking twice as long. Jones Act-compliant ships are so expensive that there are documented examples of oil being shipped to East Coast refineries from Saudi Arabia for three times cheaper than sending it from the Gulf Coast.

As a result, Americans buy more Saudi oil and less U.S. oil, which must be instead sold to more distant customers. Last year California refineries even bought oil from as far away as Nigeria instead of Louisiana largely due to transportation costs. This is costly, inefficient, and hurts the bottom line of U.S. oil producers.

Even those who profit from the Jones Act admit to its high costs and distortionary effects. “Jones Act is more expensive. Everybody knows that,” said the CEO of Overseas Shipholding Group, which owns a number of Jones Act tankers, in 2017. “If there was not a Jones Act, then there probably would be more movements of crude oil from Texas to Philadelphia.”

If President Trump wants to place a needed shot in the arm of U.S. oil producers, a Jones Act waiver would be just the ticket. But to issue such a waiver the president would have to show that it is in the interest of national defense. Under U.S. law waivers on purely economic grounds are not allowed.

Fortunately, this should not be much of an obstacle. As the Wall Street Journal reported last month, at least one motive behind Russia’s decision to ramp up oil production is to harm U.S. shale oil producers. That would make this a geopolitical play by Moscow aimed at a vital U.S. industry. Reduced dependence on Saudi crude would also have obvious national security benefits. One doesn’t have to squint too hard to see the rationale for issuing a Jones Act waiver.

Unfortunately, while the logic for such a waiver might be impeccable, it also seems improbable. After all, we’ve been here before. Last spring President Trump was said to be leaning in favor of granting a Jones Act waiver that would have allowed New England and Puerto Rico to bring in shipments of U.S. liquefied natural gas using foreign-flag ships (no ships capable of transporting bulk LNG exist in the small Jones Act fleet). Once word got out though, Jones Act supporters—among Washington’s most powerful special interests—who benefit from the law’s high costs and limited competition dispatched several senators to the White House to pressure the president against such a move. Trump folded, and the waiver was never issued.

But with the nation’s economy reeling, perhaps common sense will finally prevail.

Some people talk about trade as though it were an end in itself. It’s not. Trade is a means to an end.

We trade so that we can specialize. We specialize so that we can produce more. We produce more so that we can consume and save more. That is how we create wealth and raise living standards. Just like electricity or machinery or expertise, trade is a tool we use to leverage our physical, mental, and creative abilities to obtain more efficiently more of the things we need and want. When we remove barriers to trade, we create greater scope for specialization, which means we can produce more value.

Why would anyone want to throw sand into the gears of these machines? Before the Trump presidency, that would have been a rhetorical question. But this administration is hellbent on repatriating supply chains and exterminating imports and, like the Luddites before them, the Trump administration and its enablers are doing their best to destroy the machinery of trade. But before addressing some of the pressing life or death issues surrounding trade policy in the midst of this pandemic, let me borrow a passage about “why we trade” from a chapter I contributed to a cool new Cato Institute book titled Visions of Liberty, which was originated, organized, and edited by Aaron Ross Powell and Paul Matzko:

Imagine life without trade. Imagine a life of solitude. To attend to your own subsistence, you wake each morning before sunrise to make your clothes, build and repair your meager shelter, hunt and harvest your food, concoct rudimentary salves for what ails you, and toil in other difficult and tedious tasks. Forget luxuries. Forget leisure. All of your time would be consumed trying to produce basic necessities merely to subsist. Life would be nasty, brutish, and short.

Fortunately, most members of modern societies choose not to live that way. In fact, one of the defining features of modern society is that most of its members recognize—actively or tacitly—the benefits of institutions, such as cooperation. Most of us don’t attempt to make everything we wish to consume. Instead, we specialize in a few, or a couple, or just one value-added endeavor—one profession. What makes specialization possible is our commitment to the concept of exchange, which is the ultimate expression of cooperation.

The purpose of exchange is to enable each of us to focus our productive efforts on what we do best. Rather than allocate small portions of our time to the impossible task of producing everything we need and want, we specialize in what we do best, produce more of it than we need, and exchange that surplus for other things we need or want but haven’t produced.

The law of comparative advantage explains why this arrangement enables us to produce, and thus consume, more output than would be the case in the absence of specialization and trade. If Aaron can produce $100 worth of venison in eight hours but only $50 worth of clothing in eight hours, he has a comparative advantage producing venison. By specializing in venison production, Aaron forgoes $1 worth of clothing to obtain $2 worth of meat. But to forgo production of clothing, Aaron needs some assurances that he can obtain clothing by exchanging surplus venison.

Because Paul, who lives nearby, is more efficient at producing clothing than venison—he can make $40 of clothing but only $30 of venison in an eight-hour day—he specializes in clothing production and forgoes producing venison at all, knowing he can obtain it through exchange with Aaron. Paul has a comparative advantage producing clothing.

How do we know Aaron and Paul are better off by specializing and exchanging? By specializing, their combined output is $140 per day ($100 of venison and $40 of clothing). Had they chosen to live in solitude and not exchange, they could still produce $140 per day, but Aaron would have only venison and Paul would have only clothing. Any attempt by either man to produce a combination of these products would yield less total output. If each devoted four hours each to venison and clothing production, for example, their combined daily output would be $110. Aaron would produce $50 of venison and $25 of clothing; Paul would produce $15 of venison and $20 of clothing.

Moving from a two-person economy illustration, in the modern economy, we specialize in an occupation and exchange the monetized form of the output we produce most efficiently [our wages and salaries] for the goods and services we produce less efficiently. It’s the same concept on a grand scale. Enlarging markets entails the reduction or elimination of barriers that inhibit the free flow of goods, services, capital, and labor. The larger the market, the greater is the scope for specialization, exchange, and economic growth. Just as consumers have a greater variety and a better quality of items to purchase with their monetized output, producers have access to a greater variety and a better quality of inputs for producing most efficiently.

We trade so that we can move from subsistence toward abundance. When we restrict trade, we limit the scope for specialization. When we limit the scope for specialization, we produce and consume (and save) less than we could. When we restrict trade, we move in the wrong direction–from abundance toward subsistence. This is true regardless of the products or services being restricted and regardless of the reasons offered by policymakers for those restrictions.

Americans are much less free to trade today than we were before the Trump presidency. Since his inauguration, President Trump has imposed new tariffs on nearly half a trillion dollars of imports (that’s roughly one-fifth of all imports and two-thirds of imports from China). In 2017 (before the steel and aluminum, and China tariffs went into effect), U.S. imports from the world amounted to $2.3 trillion, with Customs and Border Protection taking $33 billion in duties. That amounted to an effective tariff rate of 1.42 percent.

In 2019 (the first full year that Trump’s tariffs were in effect), U.S. imports amounted to $2.5 trillion, with Customs taking over $71 billion. That $38 billion in additional taxes doubled the effective tariff rate to 2.85 percent, and came out of the pockets of these U.S. businesses and consumers. Among those businesses are producers of medical equipment and supplies, and parts thereof. But regardless of whether they produce medical products, all of those businesses reflect the benefits of trade. They channel the benefits of specialization to the whole economy, which take the form of more value added, which means more consumption and savings, which means more progress toward abundance. The tariffs they have been incurring impede that process and reverse our progress toward abundance.

So what should a president concerned about limiting the pandemic’s economic and human costs do about these trade restrictions? Obviously, he should lift them. Despite ongoing rumors that Trump would suspend duty collection for a period of three months to free up cash flow for businesses to enable them to keep more people on their payrolls, no such actions have been taken. Instead, rumors persist that Trump will sign an executive order mandating that federal agency procurement of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals be governed by “Buy American” provisions. Yes, the administration’s answer to medical supply shortages is not to lift the tariffs contributing to the shortage, but to compound the problem by limiting domestic access to foreign supply.

The Trump administration is not taking the pandemic seriously enough. Its protectionism contributes to the rising COVID-19 contraction and fatality rates.

Economic nationalism was on the rise before the spread of COVID-19, and worryingly, it may be picking up even more as a result.

Countries around the world are experiencing the biggest public health crisis in recent memory, and there are concerns about having the necessary supplies to deal with it. It is understandable that governments are afraid that they will be short of the medical care products they need.

The proper response, however, is not an “every country for itself” hoarding of these products. Instead, all countries should play a constructive role in addressing the problem, taking into account their current public health situation. As our colleague Scott Lincicome put it last week, the proper response by government here should be:

conducting international diplomacy and multilateral coordination of public health and economic issues in order to share best practices, ensure global medical collaboration on potential cures, and prevent counterproductive, “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies such as hoarding or export restrictions;

Unfortunately, there are signs that some governments are headed in the wrong direction. So far, 54 countries have implemented some form of export restriction on medical supplies.

There have even been actions to restrict food exports. To date, the United States has not joined in this approach, but a member of U.S. Congress recently proposed a full ban on certain critical medical supplies. With the number of cases surging quickly in the United States, proposals such as this one could gain support.

As Lincicome suggests, what countries should be doing instead is coordinating with each other, which will help them figure out who needs what products at a given moment. Each country is at a different stage of the COVID-19 crisis. Those who are in the midst of the crisis should be reaching out to tell the rest of the world what they need. And those who are in recovery or have not been hit too hard, such as China and Japan, should be helping those who need it.

There was speculation that China, a major producer of medical supplies, was restricting exports, but the evidence so far suggests that has not happened. After dealing with its internal crisis, China is now trying to export again: It approved the export of 5 million masks to South Korea; and a Chinese company recently signed a contract with the Italian government to provide 8 million masks. And as Reuters reported on Sunday:

A planeload of desperately needed medical supplies arrived in New York from China on Sunday, the first in a series of flights over the next 30 days organized by the White House to help fight the coronavirus, a White House official said.

A commercial carrier landed at John F. Kennedy airport carrying gloves, gowns and masks for distribution in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, three hard-hit states battling to care for a crush of coronavirus patients.

…

The first plane, funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, carried 130,000 N‑95 masks; nearly 1.8 million surgical masks and gowns, more than 10.3 million gloves; and more than 70,000 thermometers.

(Of course, there have also been restrictions on the import side, but those can easily be removed by the countries imposing them. Hoarding goods for your own citizens to use is at least understandable. Restricting your own ability to buy foreign products, through tariffs or Buy American provisions, makes no sense.)

Beyond products, people with expertise are crucial as well. The Economist recently noted the following:

veterans from the earliest battles of the pandemic are taking their knowledge to others. On March 12th eight Chinese doctors, led by Liang Zongang, a professor of cardiopulmonary reanimation, arrived in Italy on a charter flight that brought medical equipment supplied by the Chinese Red Cross. They were followed on March 18th by around 300 Chinese intensive-care doctors.

There has been a lot of blame thrown around relating to the origins of the coronavirus and the actions taken in the early months. All of that can be sorted out later in the interest of preventing this from happening again. Public health experts need to have access to the full details in relation to both the origins and actions of each government in response.

For now, though, we need to focus on getting through the current public health crisis. The best approach is for nations to coordinate the relief effort. (Our colleague Inu Manak wrote last week about how the WTO could play a role here.) China’s contributions have been very helpful, and the U.S. State Department recently announced its own efforts.

There will be opportunities for other countries to help as well. There could be a second wave of the virus in China, and there will almost certainly be a dangerous spread through the developing world. Any country with the resources to help should plan to do so.

In the meantime, export restrictions should only be used if absolutely necessary—if a country is in the worst stages of the crisis and cannot spare any supplies. Otherwise, we should let the need for these supplies dictate where they are sold.

National measures to address the challenges faced by COVID-19 have been proliferating at breakneck speed across the world. While there have been a number of important efforts to track these measures, international coordination has been lagging. Though the immediate crisis we each individually feel is close to home, it is shared among the entire world. Just as no person is immune from the virus, neither is any country. A global pandemic requires a global response. The good news is that we already have many mechanisms in place to collaborate on an international level, and now is the time, if any, to use them.

One area where coordination would be especially helpful at this time of crisis is in international trade. With many countries facing critical shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE), ventilators, and other medical supplies, keeping supply chains moving and markets open is integral. A new report issued by economist Simon Evenett from the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland found that 54 countries have imposed export restrictions on medical goods this year. While seven countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Myanmar, New Zealand and Singapore) affirmed “the importance of refraining from the imposition of export controls or tariffs and non-tariff barriers and of removing any existing trade restrictive measures on essential goods, especially medical supplies, at this time,” the United States has remained silent on this issue.

The Director-General to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Roberto Azevêdo, recently announced an effort to enhance transparency of measures countries are taking that may be trade disruptive. The WTO can actually play an important role here. While most people associate the organization with its dispute settlement mechanism, which allows states to challenge trade restrictive measures of other states through adjudication, there is much more to the WTO than dispute settlement. In fact, the transparency mechanism highlighted by Azevêdo is an important component of the daily interaction of WTO members in other areas, allowing countries to have quick knowledge of what others are doing. But this mechanism can be used in other ways too.

For instance, the new COVID-19 notifications could include not just the measures countries are taking, but also the supply shortages they face. Instead of one-off phone calls with individual leaders, this type of notification system could help in identifying the places where need is most critical, giving businesses and governments the information they need to coordinate an effective response. Such notifications can then be discussed within the Council for Trade in Goods (often comprised of ambassador-level diplomats), or at the General Council, the highest deliberative body of the WTO (after the Ministerial Conference, which was cancelled this year). These notifications can also be made part of the WTO’s innovative ePing system, which allows the public and private sector to be quickly alerted to new product requirements. The WTO could create similar alerts for medical goods shortages, so that governments and the private sector can respond without delay.

While some are arguing for more protectionism and autarky amidst the pandemic, these calls are both problematic and short-sighted. This line of thinking underpins the views of U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, who recently defended the administration’s wide use of tariffs, suggesting that it would encourage the diversification of supply chains, “and—better yet—more manufacturing in the U.S.” First, diversifying supply chains in good times is hard enough, and in the middle of crisis, foolhardy. Lifting these tariffs immediately makes economic sense and is the moral thing to do as Americans face mounting economic challenges (because China doesn’t pay the tariffs, we do). Second, pushing for “reshoring” or things like “Buy American” provisions is also harmful, and will undoubtedly raise costs for consumers and producers alike, and add additional stress to manufacturers trying to ramp up production amid shortages.

As my colleague Simon Lester recently explained:

We want to have good trading relationships with the rest of the world, because when (inevitably) something goes wrong with our own production, we want to be able to quickly get help from others. We are better off if this manufacturing knowledge is distributed around the world. We just want to make sure that we have sources of supply in countries that we can count on.

To ensure the steady stream of supply, we need international coordination, and the WTO is well placed to play a critical role in this effort. This week, Ambassador Alan Wolff, Deputy Director-General to the WTO, called for an “unprecedented level” of international cooperation in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, noting that “The WTO also serves as a venue for discussions, cooperation, coordination and negotiation, even if the discussions will for the time being largely not be face-to-face.” These functions must continue, and a special effort be made to identify the gaps in national responses so that medical products can be directed to places most in need.

Furthermore, as the pandemic spreads, not every country will have the capacity to tackle these challenges alone, and developing countries that rely on imports of medical goods, will be particularly affected by export bans if they continue. More than half of the WTO’s membership is made up of developing countries, and they have extensive experience in using the current notification system. Let’s not reinvent the wheel and make it harder for countries to get the help they need—the WTO’s transparency mechanism can be an essential tool in this regard. Therefore, instead of taking on the attitude of every country for itself, we must quickly recognize the global nature of this current crisis, and respond in kind.