As I discussed in an op-ed published at Al Jazeera America last week, it seems as though the Ukraine crisis is slowly solidifying into a ‘frozen conflict.’ This is bad for everyone:

Allowing the Ukraine crisis to metastasize into a frozen conflict effectively guarantees future conflict in the region. It leaves the government in Kiev with a long-term insurgency within its borders, costing it dearly and inhibiting the greatly needed reform of the Ukrainian state. In addition, it keeps Russia and the West locked in a diplomatic stalemate and sanctions war which benefits no one.

The intrinsic uncertainty of the situation in Eastern Ukraine continues to pose the very real threat of escalation. Last week saw tensions ratchet up as the OSCE reported large convoys of weapon and armor crossing the border, but fears of a new offensive by separatists proved unfounded. Such periods of heightened tension are likely to continue, along with consistent low-level violence which has become the hallmark of the conflict.

Some parts of the U.S. government are also keen to escalate the conflict by providing Ukraine with lethal aid. There is strong pressure from Congress to do so, and Sen. John McCain, widely expected to be the next chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, has promised to work closely with his colleagues on the Intelligence and Foreign Relations committees to arm Ukraine. Although the Obama administration has thus far limited aid to non-lethal and humanitarian supplies, there may be some support for lethal aid within the administration too. Deputy National Security Advisor Tony Blinken, during his confirmation hearings for Deputy Secretary of State, divulged that the White House is considering lethal aid to Ukraine, and that he believed such aid would discourage further Russian aggression.

Even ignoring the potential of such aid to escalate the situation, it is unlikely to help. Ukraine’s armed forces are weak, requiring substantial reform and retraining. Lethal aid to Ukraine will antagonize Russia while doing nothing to win back the separatist regions.

Ukraine’s other problems are myriad: The country is in major economic trouble, and the Ukrainian political system is characteristically dysfunctional. A high-profile visit to Kiev last week by Vice President Biden was turbulent, with American officials reportedly irate that competing factions cannot agree on the formation of a new government a month after Ukraine’s parliamentary elections. Ukrainian leaders also recently announced that they would hold a referendum on NATO membership, a move which is both asinine (NATO member states determine membership, not voters) and inflammatory.

At this point, there are few good solutions to the Ukraine crisis. The longer the current ‘ceasefire’ continues, the more likely we are to see escalation. It is increasingly baffling, therefore, that American and European leaders aren’t seeking a political solution to the crisis. No progress was made at the G20 summit in Australia, though leaders employed harsh rhetoric towards Russia. Nor does Ukraine appear to be a priority for the Obama administration, with reports indicating that one reason for Chuck Hagel’s departure as Secretary of Defense was his strong insistence that the White House pay more attention to Russia, which he considers a larger threat than ISIS. But the Wall Street Journal reports that such comments were not well received by the White House, with one official noting: “I can’t imagine us focusing more on Russia.”

Such thinking is short-sighted. As I argue in the article, we must seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Delay will only lead to escalation and further conflict. 

The United States is over-burdened militarily and effectively bankrupt financially, but Washington is determined to preserve every base and deployment, no matter how archaic. Case in point: the many military facilities in Okinawa. No wonder the Okinawan people again voted against being conscripted as one of Washington’s most important military hubs.

The United States held on to the island after World War II, finally returning the territory to Japan in 1972. Even now, the Pentagon controls roughly one-fifth of the land.

Opposition to the overpowering American presence crystalized nearly two decades ago after the rape of a teenage girl by U.S. military personnel. The bases remain because no one else in Japan wants to host American military forces.

After a decade of negotiation, Tokyo and Washington agreed in 2006 to shift Futenma airbase to the less populated Henoko district of Nago city. Few Okinawans were satisfied.

Three years later, the Democratic Party of Japan took power and promised to address Okinawans’ concerns. But the Obama administration proved to be as intransigent as its predecessor, thwarting the efforts of then-Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. 

Tokyo has since attempted to implement the relocation agreement, despite strong local opposition. However, earlier this month Naha Mayor Takeshi Onaga defeated Kirokazu Nakaima on an anti-base platform.

Onaga’s victory demonstrates the depth of popular feeling. Nakaima had flip-flopped in favor of the relocation plan in return for $2.6 billion in economic aid from Tokyo and enjoyed strong support from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Onaga campaigned against Tokyo’s attempt to buy off islanders and won handily.

The Abe government promised to move forward with its relocation plan, but faces early elections on December 14. Although the Liberal Democrats are expected to win, they likely will possess a smaller majority and will have a correspondingly harder time overriding local opinion against the bases.

“Okinawa has suffered a lot. Why do we have to suffer more?” Onaga asked before his election. There’s no good answer.

Nakaima cited Tokyo’s confrontation with China. Other advocates of America’s base presence pointed to North Korea. The Marine Corps highlighted all of the nearby places where the Marine Expeditionary Force could be quickly deployed.

But Washington should not be plotting new wars. The United States should leave day-to-day defense responsibilities to friendly Asian states, most notably Japan, and pull its forces back to America. Seven decades after the end of World War II, there’s no need for permanent U.S. garrisons in the region.

Devoting only one percent of its GDP to defense has allowed Tokyo to create a potent “Self-Defense Force.” Spending more would enable Japan to build a military well able to deter Chinese adventurism. South Korea needs no help in confronting the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Australia, Vietnam, Singapore, and other countries have been boosting their military outlays in response to increasing Chinese assertiveness. India is expanding its involvement in Southeast Asia, acting as another counter to Beijing.

As I point out in Forbes online: “Pulling U.S. forces back from Japan—there’s no reason to stop with the units deployed in Okinawa—would shift the basic responsibility for that country’s defense to Tokyo. Japanese citizens then could decide how to fill the gap. It’s not America’s place to tell its friends how much they should spend on what.”

A genuine “rebalancing” by America, not the fake transformation heralded by the Obama administration, almost certainly would impel Tokyo to do more, though exactly what would be a matter of debate. Such a shift would place greater pressure on Japanese officials to forge better relations with their neighbors, starting with South Korea.

Of course, the Japanese people could decide to do nothing, which would be their right. But the consequences of making that choice would be their own as well.

Washington’s defense commitments and force deployments should be adapted to circumstances. After nearly 70 years, Okinawans deserve relief. So do Americans, who pay to defend most of the globe.

MOSCOW—Red Square remains one of the globe’s most iconic locales. Next to the Kremlin wall is a small, squat, pyramidal building: Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov Lenin’s mausoleum.

Lenin is preserved within, dressed in a black suit, his face is grim and his right fist is clenched, as if he was ready to smite the capitalists who now dominate even his own nation’s economy. He is one of history’s most consequential individuals. Without him there likely would have been no Bolshevik Revolution, Joseph Stalin, Cold War, and Berlin Wall.

Of course, without Lenin there still would have been a Bolshevik movement. But it would have lacked his intellect, tactical skills, and, most important, determination. So feared was he by his enemies that he became Germany’s secret weapon against Russia, sent back to Russia to spread the bacillus of radical revolution.

Lenin pushed the Bolsheviks toward power as the authority of the moderate Provisional Government, which had ousted the Czar, bled away. Lenin was no humanitarian whose dream was perverted by his successors. He insisted on solitary Bolshevik rule, brooked no dissent even within the party, established the Cheka secret police, and employed terror against opponents.

Lenin was left helpless by three strokes. He died on January 21, 1924, just 53 years old. His body lay in state for four days, during which nearly a million people passed by.

Within a week of his passing the idea of preserving his body was broached. The mausoleum started as wood and turned into the current granite and marble structure in 1929.

Communist imagery, including Lenin’s mummy, came under attack with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Moscow’s anti-communist mayor backed burying the corpse and restoring Red Square to its pre-revolutionary state. Boris Yeltsin, the first president of non-Communist Russia, also proposed to bury Lenin. But Yeltsin’s health faltered and political strength weakened.

In 2001 Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, expressed fear that burial would suggest the Russian people had lived under “false values” all those years. He concluded in 2011 that the decision would be made when the time was right.

Yet the same year Vladimir Medinsky, then a leading member of Putin’s United Russia Party, proposed burying the corpse next to Lenin’s mother in St. Petersburg and turning the mausoleum into a museum. In 2012 Putin appointed Medinsky Minister of Culture, suggesting support for removing Lenin’s body. However, Putin failed to act and since has ignored the issue.

While Russia cannot escape its history, it should stop glorifying the country’s turn down one of humanity’s great deadends. Although an unjust despotism, Imperial Russia could have been transformed into some form of constitutional rule.

But by entering World War I the Czarist autocracy sacrificed that opportunity. The Provisional Government, led by liberal constitutionalists and democratic socialists, put the previous regime’s commitment to war before the Russian people’s interests.

Unfortunately, the victorious Bolsheviks suppressed free markets, stole private property, crushed political dissent, murdered political opponents, imposed materialist ethics, and exalted ruthless dictatorship. The result was a sustained assault on the history, traditions, ethics, and very essence of the Russian people. Although Russians finally were able to turn back from this deadly detour, the same old authoritarianism has been born again, repackaged to make it more palatable to Russians today.

As I point out on Forbes online, “Burying Vladimir Lenin would be a powerful symbolic gesture to close an era. That still might not help the West understand what Vladimir Putin is, but it would emphatically show what he is not. And that would be no small feat at a time of dangerously rising tensions between Russia and the West.”

Someday Russians will be free. Liberation will come only through the Russian people’s own efforts, however, not from the West. Only they can make their own future. The day liberty arrives will be the real Russian Revolution.

As U.S. relations with Russia go from bad to worse, even old agreements seem at risk. Such as the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty.

The 1987 pact essentially cleared Europe of mid-range missiles (between 500 and 5500 kilometers). But the State Department recently charged Moscow with violating the treaty.

The INF treaty has been to America’s advantage, since it does not cover U.S. military allies, such as Britain and France. Even more important, the U.S. has no potentially hostile neighbors with such a capability, while Russia faces China, India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.

Moscow officials have suggested that they may leave the agreement at some point. To forestall that possibility the U.S. and Moscow should seek to include China and other regional powers in the pact. 

Although relations between Moscow and Washington obviously are strained, the U.S. should approach Russia about amending the INF Treaty to allow deployments in Asia, unless otherwise agreed. The two governments should simultaneously propose that Beijing and its neighbors accede to the pact. 

Admittedly, winning signatures from other nations, especially China, would not be easy. The PRC believes its short- and medium-range missiles serve a significant security role. 

However, the PRC’s more aggressive approach to Asia-Pacific territorial issues has antagonized neighboring states. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in particular, are likely to become increasingly interested in developing countervailing missile capabilities. 

In the future the PRC may face a plethora of countervailing weapons deployed by several states. Then Beijing might view a ban as more to its liking. 

Negotiations over expanding the INF Treaty would make Beijing a full global partner on arms control, recognizing the country’s rising international status. Although the PRC has tended to view such limits as a means of maintaining U.S. “hegemony,” Washington could suggest accession as the best means to forestall any further increase in U.S. military presence in the region as part of the famed “pivot” or “rebalance.” 

Some analysts instead advocate responding to the PRC’s military build-up by withdrawing from the pact and introducing comparable missiles. As an alternative, David W. Kearn, Jr. of St. John’s University suggested enhancing U.S. offensive capabilities in the region and defensive responses to missile attacks. 

However, as I point out in China-US focus, “nearby nations should be responsible for maintaining regional security. American policymakers should use expansion of the INF Treaty as a means to reduce U.S. defense obligations.”

China’s growing missile force challenges America’s dominance in Asia—most directly the ability to project power—not America’s survival at home. The most likely contingency is an attack on Taiwan, which is quite different from a strike on the U.S. The Cold War justification for America’s extensive military presence in the region has disappeared.

America’s friends and neighbors, no less than China, have prospered and are able to defend themselves. That obviously is best for the U.S., since Beijing will always have an incentive to spend and risk more in its own neighborhood than will America. 

Restricting Washington’s role also would reduce the potential for a superpower confrontation over less than vital interests. Ironically, America’s conventional superiority inflates the danger of a great power confrontation. Explained Kearn: “in a crisis or a conflict, regional adversaries may have incentives to escalate (or threaten escalation) against U.S. forces in the region or U.S. allies to de-escalate the crisis and ensure regime survival once the United States has become involved.”

Expanding the INF Treaty to Asia would help reduce growing military tensions and dampen geopolitical competition, especially over territorial issues. Achieving this end won’t be easy, but it is an area where the U.S. and Russia can cooperate. While China might initially be wary of joining such an effort, a new arms control regime would ultimately offer Beijing significant benefits as well.

The haggling between Iran and the so-called P5+1—the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany—is scheduled to come to a close on Monday, November 24^th. The two parties each want different things. One thing that Iran would like is the removal of the economic sanctions imposed on it by the United States and its allies.

After decades of wrongheaded economic policies, Iran’s economy is in terrible shape. The authoritative Economic Freedom of the World: 2014 Annual Report puts Iran near the bottom of the barrel: 147^th out of the 152 countries ranked. And the “World Misery Index Scores” rank Iran as the fourth most miserable economy in the world. In addition to economic mismanagement, economic sanctions and now-plunging oil prices are dragging Iran’s structurally distorted economy down. So, it’s no surprise that Iran would like one of the weights (read: sanctions) on its economy lifted.

Just how important would the removal of sanctions be? To answer that question, we use the Institute of International Finance’s detailed macroeconomic framework. The results of our analysis are shown in the table and charts below the jump.

The trade and financial sanctions imposed since early 2012 have inflicted heavy damage on Iran’s economy. Indeed, we estimate that Iran’s real gross domestic product has contracted by a cumulative 8.6 percent during the past two fiscal years (2012/13–2013/14). We estimate the forgone annual economic output to be a whopping $79 billion. That is slightly more than twice the size of the Jordanian annual GDP of $36 billion.

Without an agreement, the Iranian economy will remain weak. On the other hand, a comprehensive agreement—one in which existing sanctions would be lifted gradually—would allow for steady increases in oil exports to their pre-sanction levels by the end of 2017 and a possible restoration of access to the global financial system. The economy would boom: indeed, the real GDP growth rates during the fiscal year 2015/16 and 2016/17 would jump by 4.1 and 4.6 percentage points, respectively. And for those two fiscal years alone, the cumulative GDP would be $125 billion greater than if the painstaking sanctions were left in place.

So, the economic benefits dangling in front of the Iranians are enormous. The unanswered question remains: what are the costs of coming to an agreement, as seen by the Iranians? The answer will be revealed on November 24^th.

The president has added ground forces to the battle in Iraq and the military has suggested introducing thousands more. His officials reportedly have decided to focus on overthrowing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the name of fighting the Islamic State.

The U.S. has been back at war in the Middle East for more than two months. The results?

The administration’s vast coalition of 60 nations is mostly a PR stunt. The Arab states have done little in the air and nothing afoot. Most flagrantly AWOL is Turkey.

Nor has the administration’s scattershot bombing campaign had much effect. By one count U.S. strikes have killed 464 Islamic State personnel. However, the estimated number of ISIL fighters trebled to as many as 30,000 just a couple weeks into Obama’s war.

Moderate Syrian rebels favored by the administration have been routed in that country’s north. Many fighters defected or fled while abandoning their heavy weapons provided by Washington.

The Free Syrian Army, the biggest Western-oriented insurgent group, also is losing fighters, largely to al-Nusra. Yet, explained former U.S. ambassador Robert Ford: some Syrians “are burning American flags because they think we are helping the regime instead of helping them.” Residents of Raqaa, the ISIL stronghold bombed by American forces, blame Washington for higher food and fuel prices.

Iraq’s Shiite majority has formed a new government—handing the Interior Ministry to a hardline Shia faction responsible for past atrocities against Sunni civilians. Moreover, last week reports emerged that the Islamic State and al-Nusra Front agreed to stop battling each other and even to fight together.

Through everything the Islamic State is unbowed, as Washington makes ever more enemies by intervening yet again in someone else’s quarrel.

The president already has doubled U.S. boots on the ground, sending in another 1500 advisers to Iraq. Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in September that as many as 15,000 U.S. troops might be needed to retake Iraqi and Syrian territory seized by ISIL. Last week he said that the administration was considering sending American personnel to cooperate with Iraqi troops in the battle for Mosul and to guard that nation’s border.

Equally foolish, administration officials reportedly want to shift their focus to wrecking the most competent military force opposing ISIL: the Syrian army. Focusing on Damascus would be twice stupid.

First, it would mean essentially doubling down on the policy of supporting the weakest faction in Syria, whose members have been defecting to the radicals. Second, it would entail targeting what today is the strongest force resisting the Islamic State. Then U.S.-supported insurgents would weaken the Assad regime, making a ISIL/al-Nusra victory more likely.

Like a second marriage, Washington’s latest Middle Eastern excursion represents the triumph of hope over experience. It is hard to point to a military intervention or other form of meddling which has worked well. As I point out on Forbes online, “Virtually every U.S. action has resulted in a worse reaction, including by al-Qaeda and now the Islamic State—the latter but one of many ill consequences of the Iraq invasion.”

Despite this extraordinary record, the administration would have us believe that it can simultaneously destroy ISIL, rid Iraq of sectarianism, replace Bashar al-Assad with a Syrian Thomas Jefferson, contain Iranian influence, and convince a gaggle of hostile Middle Eastern states to work together to further America’s ends. All we need to do apparently is put more ground forces into Iraq and better target Assad.

President Obama and others in Washington should learn from past mistakes, which are almost too many to be numbered. The most serious may be the belief that the U.S. can “fix” the Middle East. America can’t. It’s time to give up trying to do so.

Power is like quicksilver. It often slips through the fingers of those attempting to grasp it. Who is in power in North Korea? Maybe 31-year-old Kim Jong-un. Maybe not.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Kim disappeared from public view for 40 days. On his return Pyongyang only released undated still photos.

There’ve been no untoward troop movements or party conclaves in the North, though some other signs seemed conflicting. Whoever reigns, there is little reason to hope for nuclear disarmament. 

To the contrary, the North appears to be increasing production of fissile material, moving ahead on ICBM development, and upgrading rocket launch facilities. Even a seemingly secure Kim, the “Great Successor” whose father concocted the North’s “military first” policy, would hesitate challenging the armed services by trading away its most important weapon. 

Yet there are signs of change elsewhere. The economy appears to be growing, with more consumer goods evident, especially in Pyongyang. 

Moreover, Pyongyang appears to be adjusting diplomatic strategies yet again. The North released the three Americans it held, apparently without receiving anything in return. 

North Korea’s UN ambassador, So Se-pyong, indicated that the North was ready to return to the six-Party nuclear talks. In early October Pyongyang sent a high-ranking delegation to Seoul for the Asian Games, which proposed further talks, though the latter later foundered. 

Nothing suggests that the regime is close to collapse. 

In this situation there is little to recommend the administration’s continuing policy of isolating the North. In August North Korea’s deputy UN representative, Ri Tong-il, complained that “No country in the world has been living like the DPRK under serious threats to its existence, sovereignty, survival.” 

Of course, the North’s leaders are practiced cynics and their claims cannot be taken at face value. But even paranoids have enemies, it is said, and North Korea is surrounded by wealthier and more powerful adversaries. 

A more pacific U.S. approach might not change the Kim regime’s calculus. However, it’s hard to imagine a less threatening DPRK without changing America’s approach.

And that could come in part from diplomatic dialogue. Washington should offer to establish low-key diplomatic relations, perhaps a consulate. 

Such a shift would be even more effective if coupled with policy changes that would be in America’s interest in any case. Sanctions haven’t changed the DPRK and should be loosened.

Moreover, Washington should bring home its troops. The U.S. conventional presence is long outmoded: the South has around 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the DPRK.

Washington then could invite the North’s authorities to reciprocate. If Pyongyang failed to act, which would surprise no one, Washington would be no worse off. 

It also would be more difficult for Beijing to excuse North Korean misbehavior. Moreover, a troop withdrawal would eliminate the prospect that Korea unification would result in U.S. troops on China’s border, a Chinese nightmare which discourages Beijing from cooperating with Washington.

Even a more responsive North Korea is unlikely to be a particularly friendly actor. Nevertheless, there is more hope for internal improvements in human rights and external talks over the issue if the international environment is less threatening for Pyongyang. America’s earlier refusal to talk to the PRC gained nothing, while the famed Nixon opening helped create an atmosphere more conducive to post-Mao reforms.

Someday North Korea will pass away. As I wrote in National Interest online: “Until then the country is likely to remain a mysterious challenge, unsettling an entire region. Washington’s best approach would be to extricate itself from confrontation and pursue dialogue, while leaving South Korea and Japan free to develop their separate policies.” 

Every strategy toward the DPRK so far seems to have failed. Anything adopted is likely to be only a second best. However, today even second best would be a major step forward. It’s time for Washington to try something different.