Central bankers and other policymakers have increasingly focused on the prospect of CBDCs in recent years. What started as a theoretical concept quickly turned into reality when the central banks of China, Nigeria, The Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union each launched CBDCs. Yet, these actions should not be replicated by the United States.
In the simplest of terms, a CBDC is a digital national currency that is a direct liability of the central bank.2 Like paper dollars, a CBDC would be a liability of the Federal Reserve. But unlike paper dollars, a CBDC would offer neither the privacy protections nor the finality that cash provides. In fact, it’s precisely this digital liability—a sort of digital tether between citizens and the central bank—that makes CBDCs different from the digital dollars that millions of Americans already use.
By establishing a direct connection from the government to each citizen’s financial activity, CBDCs risk ending financial privacy, restricting financial freedom, undermining free markets, and weakening cybersecurity.3 Whereas current financial surveillance is done through the private sector under government mandates, a CBDC would put the financial information of Americans on government databases by default. With so much data in hand, a CBDC would then provide countless opportunities for the government to control citizens’ financial transactions. Furthermore, with each dollar that is held as a CBDC, the financial system will lose funding that could otherwise be used to issue loans. Finally, with each person that begins to use a CBDC, the system becomes an increasingly lucrative target for cyberattacks.
The problems do not end there. Across the jurisdictions that have already launched CBDCs, governments have consistently struggled to increase consumer adoption. For example, in China, The Bahamas, and Jamaica, what little adoption has been gained is largely because the governments have given out money as either stimulus, lotteries, or discounts in CBDC. In Nigeria, the government even went so far as to orchestrate a cash shortage when the CBDC adoption rate failed to get above 0.5 percent.4 Yet even after the resulting protests and riots, CBDC adoption only increased to 6 percent.5
The public seems to recognize these problems. Cato Institute research found that 66 percent of respondents viewed CBDCs negatively when the Federal Reserve requested public feedback in 2022 (Figure 4).6 In fact, when the Cato Institute surveyed a representative sample of 2,000 Americans in 2023, the results were largely the same.7 After considering the costs and benefits of CBDCs, 74 percent of respondents said that they were opposed to the US government creating a CBDC.