This has been a tough month so far for President Obama and his policies.
After the “shellacking” that he, his party, and his domestic policies suffered at the hands of American voters last week, his international economic policies were no more popular among his counterparts at the G20 summit this week in Seoul, South Korea.
Even the sympathetic editors at the New York Times declared in a front‐page (print edition) headline this morning: “Obama’s Economic View Is Rejected on World Stage: China, Britain and Germany Challenge U.S.—Trade Talks with Seoul Fail, Too.”
The other leaders at the summit were right to reject the president’s demands that China be singled out for its currency policies, as I’ve written before, and the South Korean government was right to reject his demands for changes in the U.S.-Korea trade agreement that has been waiting for more than three years for congressional approval.
Although not perfect, the U.S.-Korea agreement is a solid step forward. As my Cato colleague Doug Bandow wrote in a recent study, the agreement would sharply reduce trade barriers between our two nations while deepening our commercial and security ties with a key democratic ally in the Asian Pacific.
The Koreans rightly refused to substantially alter the sections of the agreement relating to automobiles. The agreement would eliminate tariffs on all automobile trade between the two countries. Ford, Chrysler, and the United Auto Workers union oppose the deal, claiming that it does not address non‐tariff barriers that allegedly hinder U.S. exports to the Korean market.
As I posted in this space a few days ago, there are perfectly normal market reasons why Americans buy a lot more Korean cars than vice versa. The real agenda of Ford, Chrysler, and the UAW is not to gain greater access to the Korean market, but to prevent any greater access of their Korean competitors to the U.S. market.
The talks in Seoul this week reportedly foundered on the specific U.S. demand that Korea relax its emission and mileage standards so that U.S. automakers can more easily modify their cars for the Korean market. How ironic. It has become part of the Democratic mantra on trade that agreements must strengthen the environmental and labor standards of our trading partners. Yet here U.S. negotiators were strong‐arming the Korean government to weaken its own standards while the Obama administration seeks to impose higher mileage and emission standards on cars sold in the United States.
There is still time to save the U.S.-Korea agreement and to present it to the potentially more trade‐friendly Congress that will convene in January. But for now, President Obama has chosen to serve the narrow interests of two domestic automakers and their union rather than the overall economic and strategic interests of the American people.
