Last week saw the launch of a project in which several of us at Cato were closely involved. The National Constitution Center commissioned a set of three “Restoring the Guardrails of Democracy” essays on how best to strengthen the institutional basis of American democracy. The essays were developed by separate teams: Team Progressive, Team Libertarian, and Team Conservative.

Team Libertarian consisted of Cato colleagues Clark Neily and Ilya Somin and me. Team Progressive consisted of law professors Ned Foley of Ohio State and Franita Tolson of the University of Southern California, while Team Conservative consisted of Sarah Isgur, Jonah Goldberg, and David A. French, all of The Dispatch.

Each essay carried a group byline but it’s not amiss to point out that of the three sections in the Team Libertarian report, I handled the section on election law and procedure, Clark Neily the section on the role of the jury, and Ilya Somin the section on the benefits of “foot voting” and choice between governments.

One of the fun conditions of the project is that we did not in any way collaborate with the other teams or get an advance look at what they were going to argue in their essays. So some recommendations overlap between teams, others conflict, and yet others simply don’t engage. For example, Team Libertarian reached a similar conclusion to Team Progressive on reform of the Electoral Count Act, but a conclusion mostly opposite from theirs on whether government should seek to regulate false statements about elections.

Participant Ilya Somin of Team Libertarian, who teaches at George Mason/​Scalia law and is a Cato adjunct scholar, has already written both an overview and a followup post at Volokh Conspiracy on the project. You can also watch a video panel on the launch featuring Clark Neily, Ned Foley, and Sarah Isgur, with Jeffrey Rosen of NCC moderating. The Team Libertarian paper is also on SSRN. 

I expect I’ll have more to say in future posts, but first I want to spend more time reading the three essays in each others’ light. In the mean time, have a look and feel free to spread the word with your reactions. The three essays, again, are here: Progressive, Conservative, Libertarian.

At the House hearing at which I testified, Congressman Chip Roy (R‑TX) asked, “How many people immigrate to other countries each year?” Center for Immigration Studies’ Robert Law—former chief of the Office of Policy and Strategy for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services—told him that the United States grants more green cards than “the rest of the world combined.” Fortunately, I was able to respond and explain that this is wildly inaccurate. The United States definitely does not permit more immigration than the rest of the world combined, and it is not close.

At the time, I explained that at least ten times more immigrants went to other countries than went to the United States during the most recent 5‑year period available, but new numbers from the United Nations (UN) show that even this figure was too generous to the United States. From July 2019 to July 2020, the UN estimates that the United States accounted for none of the growth in the global immigrant population: 0 percent of the net increase of 9 million immigrants worldwide were immigrants in the United States in 2020. According to the UN estimates (using Census Bureau data), the U.S. immigrant population stopped growing altogether from July 2019 to July 2020.

Figure 1 shows that in the 1990s, the U.S. did account for the majority of the growth in the world immigrant population (defined, for consistency across countries, as people living outside their birth country). From 1990 to 1995, nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of the growth in the global immigrant population came from U.S. immigrant population growth. From 1995 to 2000, it was 52 percent. It then dropped to a quarter from 2000 to 2005. By 2015 to 2020, it was down to 7.5 percent. But from 2019 to 2020, the United States stopped being a net contributor to world immigrant population growth.

Figure 2 shows the net increase in immigrants worldwide and the net increase in immigrants in the United States during each period since 1990. The increase in immigration outside of the United States was the main contributor to the decline in the U.S. share of global immigration. However, U.S. immigrant population growth also declined in absolute terms from a high of nearly 6.4 million from 1995 to 2000 down to 2.5 million from 2015 to 2020 (and a negative roughly 30,000 from 2019 to 2020).

The UN uses a slightly different definition of an “immigrant” than the U.S. Census Bureau. In order to allow for comparisons between countries that have different citizenship rules, the UN includes all people born outside of the country, even though some of those people may receive citizenship at birth, either by being born citizen parents or in an overseas territory. It also treats people born in territories as immigrants if they move to a home country (and vice versa). But these differences do not change the overall picture: accounting for them increases the U.S. share of global immigrant population growth by only about a half a percentage point.

It is also true that the UN data only measure the net increase in the immigrant population—that is, inflows minus outflows—not just the gross inflow of immigrants to the United States or worldwide. The UN does not have comprehensive data on flows of immigrants, but the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) does have data on flows for 37 countries from 2016 to 2019. These data show that the United States accounted for just 12 percent of the immigration flow among those countries in 2019, and that is without data for more than 150 countries including the Gulf States which lead the world in foreign-born share of their populations.

Robert Law did specify that he was talking specifically about permanent residents. But even if we limit this analysis, the United States does not come close to a majority of the flow of legal permanent residents worldwide. In fact, in 2020, U.S. immigrants accounted for just 14 percent of immigrants becoming permanent residents in just the OECD—down from 27 percent in 2009. At no point during this time did the U.S. share ever approach a majority of all permanent residents. Again, this dataset leaves out more than 150 other countries. The U.S. share of total legal permanent immigrants is almost certainly well below 10 percent worldwide.

The new data from the UN shows that the United States does not permit more immigration than the rest of the world combined. Indeed, the United States ranks low in terms of net immigration and foreign-born share of the population compared to other wealthy countries, and it is losing the race for talent around the world. Other countries are increasing immigration, and the United States has gone the opposite direction. Congress and the administration need to seize the opportunity to change this dynamic.

Unsurprisingly, airline fares generally rise and fall with jet fuel prices which, in turn, mirror global crude oil prices. Yet airline fares are part of the “core” Consumer Price Index (CPI), which supposedly excludes food and energy.

Futures prices for crude oil and grain have soared since last December when Russia began to amass troops around Ukraine. That rise in global commodity prices, in turn, has greatly increased costs of producing and distributing everything from plastics to fertilizer and meat. And, of course, so-called “core” transportation services, such as airfares.

In the CPI, airline fares rose 34.1% over the past 12 months, while energy prices rose by 41.6% and gasoline prices by 59.9%. All those prices reflect the impact of war and sanctions on global scarcity and soaring prices for oil and natural gas.

The core CPI excludes only gasoline, fuel oil, propane, kerosene, firewood and home electricity and gas bills. But that narrow list leaves many indirect energy costs in the core measure, such as airfare.

As former Fed Vice-Chair Alan Blinder noted, “food and energy prices seep into virtually all other prices, albeit in muted form. What product doesn’t include energy in its cost, either directly (to keep the lights on) or indirectly (via delivery trucks)?”

Airline fares in the CPI rose 12.9% in the month of May, then fell 2.5% in June. A proper measure of core inflation, such as the Dallas Fed’s Trimmed-Mean PCE inflation, would strip out both of those extreme monthly gyrations. But the core CPI does not.

Ahead of his trip to the Middle East, President Joe Biden wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post explaining his reasons for traveling to the region—specifically, Saudi Arabia. The President is going to ask Saudi Arabia for help with oil prices and, in exchange, possibly resume sales of offensive weapons to Riyadh that he halted early in his administration. Unfortunately, the reality is that such a decision would prove costly.

Biden notes that his tough approach to Saudi Arabia—including revealing the intelligence report on the Khashoggi murder, issuing new sanctions on those involved in Khashoggi’s killing, and rejecting 76 visas for Saudis involved in harassing dissidents abroad—is working. The President continues writing that these moves have “reversed the blank-check policy” the country inherited from the Trump administration.

One would assume that, if this toughness is working, the United States would see a regime sharing U.S. security interests while also showing basic human rights considerations. Saudi Arabia fails on both counts. From a security standpoint, Riyadh continues its involvement in Yemen and refuses to work alongside Washington to diplomatically stop the Ukraine crisis.

Biden only briefly hand-waves at human rights considerations in Saudi Arabia. He notes that “there are many who disagree with my decision to travel to Saudi Arabia,” but clarifies that his “views on human rights are clear and longstanding” and that his job is to “keep our country strong and secure.”

Biden’s views on human rights have been anything but clear. While condemning Iran for its numerous human rights violations, the President has remained silent on those in Saudi Arabia. If human rights in the country have improved, then Biden’s strategy is perhaps working. The problem is that this is not the case.

Between 2010 through 2019, the Human Freedom Index—published by the Cato Institute and Fraser Institute—finds that Saudi Arabia’s human freedom ranking decreased five spots. Per this index, between 2017 and 2019, the only country to have lower degrees of freedom of expression than Saudi Arabia every single year is Syria, with Bahrain also scoring lower in 2016 and 2015. Additionally, between 2015 and 2019, Syria is the only country that scores lower than Saudi Arabia in freedom of association, assembly, and civil society every year except in 2018, in which Bahrain also shows lower levels of freedom of association than Saudi Arabia

Making matters worse, one of Biden’s concessions will be a resumption of offensive weapons sales to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has used U.S. weapons to target and kill innocent Yemeni civilians while protecting its homeland since the Houthis took over Sanaa in 2009. As I note in my recent op-ed for the New York Daily News:

A recent report details the exact level of U.S. commitment. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project data suggests that the U.S. has armed the Saudi coalition in Yemen since 2009 and shows no signs of leaving. The United States continues to train the Saudi coalition on how to use American weaponry. The U.S. has participated in joint exercises with at least 80% of Saudi air squadrons in Yemen. Making matters worse, at least four of these trainings took place on American soil.

Washington has delivered an astounding number of weapons to Saudi Arabia since 2009, with over $23 billion in weapons delivered and Congress notified of over $140 billion worth. In essence, the United States has been sending weapons for Riyadh to use since this conflict began seven years ago, the end of the ongoing conflict is nowhere in sight, and Saudi Arabia’s human freedom is no better than it was when the conflict began.

Appeasing Saudi Arabia is a losing strategy that will only force Washington to further engage in a war that does not benefit U.S. interests while supporting an oppressive, authoritarian regime.

In 2017, Saudi Arabia quite literally rolled out the red carpet for Trump when he visited the country. One should ask if Biden will receive the same courtesy. Rather than learning from history, Biden seems convinced that the policies from the Obama and Trump administrations will finally work now that he is the one negotiating the deal.

Instead of Biden “reversing the blank-check policy,” the President’s attitude towards Saudi Arabia reeks with the same arrogance as his predecessors’.

Occupational licensing continues to get in the way of workplace flexibility for parents, especially mothers. Tennessee’s licensing requirement for would-be lawyers is an example of how occupational licensing holds parents back.

Under state law, Tennessee requires lawyers who wish to practice in the state to have worked full time as a lawyer for five of the last seven years in another state, or else sit for the bar exam. This means that lawyers with part-time work experience must either take time off to prepare and sit for another exam or else they are prohibited from practicing law in the state.

This rule may seem innocuous, but the requirement effectively makes it harder for lawyers with part-time hours to practice in Tennessee. Preparing and sitting for the bar exam is not an insignificant requirement: law students routinely spend months preparing for the exam and even take out loans to cover the thousands of dollars in forgone income, bar prep courses, exam fees, travel, and lodging necessary to successfully complete it.

The rule hits working mothers especially hard: of the 21.4 million voluntary part-time workers in 2016, 67 percent were women. Among these women, the most common reason for part-time work was family or personal obligations. Notably, most part-time lawyers are women, specifically mothers with children, according to LexisNexis.

Tennessee’s licensing rule holds some of these women back and contributes to the fear that many women have that they will be penalized for going part time or taking leave from work while their children are young. This is truly unfortunate and, in Tennessee’s case, ensures that the legal profession misses out on legal talent.

Lisa Blatt, described as a “legendary high court litigator” with “an unmatched win record” and one of the most successful lawyers today, relates the following story about how part-time work made her career possible in Reflections of a Lady Lawyer:

“…I was ready to quit practicing law entirely to spend more time at home. I also was mentally exhausted. Paul [my boss] suggested that, instead of quitting, I take a leave of absence. And he said something I will never forget: he told me I was good at my job. I took Paul up on his offer, took a half-year off, and returned to the office six months later, still on a part-time basis. Paul’s flexibility and understanding of the challenges facing working mothers saved my career. For the last eighteen years, I have remained part-time.”

If, in an alternate universe, Ms. Blatt had moved to Tennessee, she would be subjected to additional scrutiny or else disqualified from practicing law, and the legal profession would have lost out on a great talent. This would be highly unfortunate and avoidable; the American Bar Association and most other states do not require full-time work in order to be admitted to practice law.

Fortunately, the Network of enlightened Women (NeW) has filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Tennessee to try to get this regrettable licensing rule changed (details here). With any luck, the admission by motion rule requiring full-time work will be changed, and this will allow for greater flexibility for mothers, parents, and any other lawyer that chooses to work part time in the years to come.

After months of local resistance to the rezoning deadlines set by the state’s 2021 Planning and Zoning Law (AB 1398), the California Legislature is set to bend to the demands of the hundreds of cities that have been unwilling to update their housing plans to meet the state’s housing needs. 

The most recent iteration of the Planning and Zoning Law was signed by Governor Newsom on September 28, 2021 and requires local jurisdictions to develop a detailed forecast of their housing needs and set out plans for how they will provide that housing, including plans to remove barriers to new construction such as exclusionary zoning.

Cities had until February 2022 to submit their housing elements for approval to the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD). Those whose plans were approved now have until October to complete the rezoning process. Jurisdictions that fail to meet these deadlines will be ineligible to receive affordable housing grants from the state. Additionally, these cities will be required to submit revised housing elements in four years opposed to the usual eight-year timeline.

At the time of the February due date, some 190 cities had failed to submit their housing elements for approval, including a shocking 90 percent of Southern California municipalities who had missed the deadline. Instead, cities began complaining to the Legislature that the established timeline was unfair and began petitioning the state government to amend the timeline.

It looks as if the state government will cave to these demands and once more kick the housing can down the road. Legislation (AB 197/SB 197) has now been introduced, and is expected to pass, to give local governments until October 2022 to submit their housing elements for approval and until the fall of 2024 to complete their rezoning. This new timeline would not apply to all cities, however. Only the cities that had failed to meet the deadlines would be eligible for this added time.

While it was clear in February that Los Angeles was going to be unable to rezone for the over 250,000 housing units that are required of them by October of this year, the California Legislature has been too lenient with its local governments and has shown that housing is not truly its top priority. Without any consequences for refusing to comply with the state laws, there seems to be little reason for cities to prioritize adding housing units.

It should be noted that the California Legislature has made great progress to start to lessen the housing crisis within this legislative session. The Assembly has successfully passed three bills that are now awaiting approval from the Senate Committee on Appropriations. AB 2221 aims to accelerate the process of approving the development of Accessory Dwelling Units to add much needed density and variety of housing types. AB 2234 was introduced to require local governments to adhere to strict timelines when approving or denying building permits to increase government accountability. AB 2656 would prohibit erroneous claims of California Environmental Quality Act abuses from stopping housing developments. And, of course, last year, the state legalized duplexes statewide.

Still, as Cato’s Project on Poverty and Inequality in California has pointed out, housing reform is essential to any effort to reduce poverty in the Golden State. Simply put, California must build more housing. And that will require widespread zoning reform at both the state and local levels.

As Assembly member Richard Bloom (D‑Santa Monica), author of the Planning and Zoning Law, stated: “As the housing crisis grows in California, it is critical that every local government adopt a plan that meets the requirements of state law, that they do it on time, and that they carry out necessary rezones to make land available for the production of housing, particularly higher-density zoned land that can accommodate housing affordable to lower-income households.”

Without accountability measures in place, California citizens will not be able to access affordable housing. The California Legislature must take a stand against local governments that have resisted expanding their housing inventories.

As Scott Lincicome noted in this space last year, Cato scholars and the great majority of economists have opposed rent control policies, which tend to generate housing shortages while discouraging investment in new construction and maintenance, among other harmful effects. (They also interfere with free contract and property rights.) Amid bad news on the rent control front elsewhere, it’s welcome to read that Montgomery County in suburban Washington, D.C. has let its limitation on rent increases expire, though the county’s left-wing county executive, Marc Elrich, has talked of reviving it.

Rent control of course has significant distributive effects, shifting wealth to some incumbent tenants at the expense of some landlords and other losing parties. A new paper by Kenneth R. Ahern and Marco Giacoletti sheds light on some of those effects:

We use the price effects caused by the passage of rent control in St. Paul, Minnesota in 2021, to study the transfer of wealth across income groups. First, we find that rent control caused property values to fall by 6–7%, for an aggregate loss of $1.6 billion. A calibrated model of house prices under rent control attributes a third of these losses to indirect, negative externalities. Second, leveraging administrative parcel-level data, we find that the tenants who gained the most from rent control had higher incomes and were more likely to be white, while the owners who lost the most had lower incomes and were more likely to be minorities. For properties with high-income owners and low-income tenants, the transfer of wealth was close to zero. Thus, to the extent that rent control is intended to transfer wealth from high-income to low-income households, the realized impact of the law was the opposite of its intention.

There is nothing new in the observation that many apartment buildings are owned by families for whom a small rental operation can afford a shaky foothold in the middle class. More than forty years ago in what is now Cato Regulation magazine, Tom Bethell wrote:

One day I went to see Charles Isham, the executive vice-president of the Los Angeles-Western Cities Apartment Association. He owns two twelve-unit apartment buildings, one in Los Angeles and one in Santa Monica. Isham told me that the typical apartment owner in the Los Angeles area is the smallest of small businessmen, usually a husband and wife who have sunk their life savings into one apartment building, in one unit of which they also live. 

Many, Bethell noted, are members of racial minorities. Even then, Los Angeles and its neighboring governments were in the process of cutting off this particular route of upward mobility in a second way, through “no-growth” policies that discouraged construction of dense multi-family housing, especially when intended for rental rather than condominium use. 

You have to wonder whether any lesson is ever truly learned.