I was glad to see James Pinkerton engage my criticism of Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal’s (R) endorsement of federal price controls for health insurance. I was even more pleased to see that Pinkerton has his own blog devoted to developing a Serious Medicine Strategy.

If I understand Pinkerton, his argument is essentially: it’s all well and good for some unelectable wonk in the “citadel of libertarian thinking” to “uphold ivory-tower free-market purity” by opposing price controls. But Republicans need “art-of-the-possible solutions” to win elections, and 90 percent of the public support those price controls. “Everyone has a right to his or her principled position,” Pinkerton writes, “but the majority has rights, too.”

Two problems.

First, Pinkerton suggests that libertarians oppose price controls for reasons that only matter to libertarians, and therefore may be safely ignored. Problem is, price controls hurt people. Were Pinkerton to explore the merits of Jindal’s proposal, he would soon conclude that imposing price controls on health insurance taxes the healthy, reduces everyone’s health insurance choices, and creates even greater incentives for insurers to shortchange the sick. (Turns out that what Larry Summers said about price controls applies to health insurance, too.) As John Cochrane explains, those price controls also block innovative products that would provide more financial security and better medical care to the sick.

But Pinkerton’s advice for Republicans is, essentially: “Do what’s popular now, even if it hurts people and voters end up blaming Republicans for it later.” How is that a good strategy?

Second is this idea that “the majority has rights.” Majorities don’t have rights. Individuals have rights. For example, you have the right to negotiate the terms of your health insurance contract with the individuals at this or that insurance company. Majorities may attain power, but that’s the opposite of rights. (See the Bill of Rights.)

Finally, a couple of important odds and ends. Pinkerton suggests it is “un-libertarian” to be “pro-life,” or to “support the police, the military, and other upholders of public order,” or to “support government restrictions on…euthanasia.” Writing from the “citadel of libertarian thinking,” I can assure him he is wrong. Might I suggest Pinkerton read the relevant chapters from The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism? (The health care chapter is a page-turner!) Also, I did not “denounce Jindal” any more than Pinkerton denounced me. I criticized his ideas, and I respect the man.

(Cross-posted at Politico’s Health Care Arena.)

The United States has been in Afghanistan for eight years and the end of our engagement there is not in sight. In this new video, Cato foreign policy experts tackle myths associated with the war in Afghanistan and offer solutions to American involvement there.

Watch:

Ted Galen Carpenter and Malou Innocent are authors of a new paper, Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan.

Today marks the eighth anniversary of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Cato foreign policy experts have been following and analyzing the war since the beginning. Here’s a round up of their assessment thus far:

• Why we must narrow objectives in Afghanistan. Before implementing a new strategy, we must first define victory.

• Why the Afghanistan strategy does not require more troops.

• Once we have defined our objectives, we need to follow an exit strategy.

• Why Pakistan also plays a crucial role in this effort.

• In today’s podcast, foreign policy analyst Malou Innocent discusses the future of policy in the region.

The U.S. sustainability standard currently requires ethanol production to emit at least 20% less CO₂ than the gasoline it is assumed to replace. In a new study, authors Harry de Gorter and David R. Just argue that sustainability standards for ethanol are, by definition, illogical and ineffective. Moreover, say de Gorter and Just, those standards divert attention from the contradictions and inefficiencies of ethanol import tariffs, tax credits, mandates, and subsidies, all of which exist whether ethanol is sustainable or not.

Further to Ilya Shapiro’s post this morning, let me also point you to a concise chronology of events culminating in the government’s robbery of Chrysler creditors.

The story is that of Richard Mourdock, Treasurer of the State of Indiana and the man responsible for stewardship of the state’s pension funds, some of which were victimized by the Obama administration’s pre-packaged and then forced-fed bankruptcy deal for Chrysler. I strongly urge you to read Mr. Mourdock’s testimony, which is at once revealing, sobering, compelling and, regrettably, a frightening sign of the times.

Mourdock will be speaking on this very topic at Cato, along with bankruptcy law expert David Skeel, on Thursday, October 15 at noon. Reserve your seat now.

Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Washington, and Anatol Lieven, a professor at King’s College London, discuss in the Financial Times how we can exit the Afghan quagmire:

The west should therefore pursue a political solution, open negotiations with the Taliban and offer a timetable for a phased withdrawal in return for a ceasefire. This should begin with the military pulling out of specific areas in return for Taliban guarantees not to attack western bases and Afghan authorities in those areas. If the Taliban refuses such terms, then military pressure should continue. The point should not be to eliminate the Taliban – which is impossible – but to persuade it to agree to a deal.

Lodhi and Lieven’s argument echoes one that David Axe, Jason Reich, and I made yesterday on For​eign​Pol​i​cy​.com.

… regime change, and democracy, are not necessary for counterterrorism. Propping up President Hamid Karzai’s Western-style government in Kabul does not make operations against al Qaeda any easier or more successful. If anything, it distracts from the conceptually simpler task of finding and killing terrorists. Without U.S. and NATO protection, Karzai’s regime would, sooner or later, probably fall to the Taliban. But U.S. observers should not equate that eventuality with “losing” the war. The war is against terrorists, not Islamist governments. The United States should be prepared to make peace, and amends, with a resurgent Taliban — and to encourage the group to excise its more extreme elements.

I admit talking to the Taliban sounds weird and scary. But my contention is that there is no shortage of Pashtun militants willing to fight against what they perceive to be a foreign occupation of their region. Certainly the Taliban does not enjoy support among the majority of Pashtuns—as Lodhi and Lieven point out—but neither did the IRA in Northern Ireland or the FLN in Algeria. The point is not exclusively about popularity (although that’s a critical component, along with local legitimacy), but the fact that these indigenous groups are willing to fight the United States and NATO indefinitely. Indeed, it is the western military presence that is driving support for the Taliban both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan.

Moreover, the notion that we must protect Pakistan from the Taliban is ludicrous. Pakistan’s intelligence service helped create the Taliban and they continue to protect the Afghan Taliban to keep India at bay. From this point of view, deploying more troops would be irrelevant to the fight against al Qaeda and counterproductive in our attempts to pacify the region. For more on what we should do, check this out.

In January 2009, Chrysler stood on the brink of insolvency. Purporting to act under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, the Treasury extended Chrysler a $4 billion loan using funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Still in a bad financial situation, Chrysler initially proposed an out-of-court reorganization plan that would fully repay all of Chrysler’s secured debt. The Treasury rejected this proposal and instead insisted on a plan that would completely eradicate Chrysler’s secured debt, hinging billions of dollars in additional TARP funding on Chrysler’s acquiescence. 

When Chrysler’s first lien lenders refused to waive their secured rights without full payment, the Treasury devised a scheme by which Chrysler, instead of reorganizing under a chapter 11 plan, would sell its assets free of all secured interests to a shell company, the New Chrysler. Chrysler was thus able to avoid the “absolute priority rule,” which provides that a court should not approve a bankruptcy plan unless it is “fair and equitable” to all classes of creditors. 

Cato joined the Washington Legal Foundation, Allied Educational Foundation, and George Mason law professor Todd Zywicki on a brief supporting the creditors’ petition asking the Supreme Court to review the transaction’s validity. We argue that the forced reorganization amounted to the Treasury redistributing value from senior, secured creditors to debtors and junior, unsecured creditors. 

The government should not be allowed, through its own self-dealing, to hand-pick certain creditors for favorable treatment at the expense of others who would otherwise enjoy first lien priority. Further, a lack of predictability and consistency with regard to creditors’ expectations in bankruptcy will result in a destabilization of existing and future credit markets. 

The Court will be deciding whether to hear the case later this fall. Thanks very much to Cato legal associate Travis Cushman for his help with the brief.