…the world’s best soccer players can’t go down to the National Mall and kick a ball around.
Barcelona plays Manchester United at FedEx field on Saturday in a friendly rematch of last May’s UEFA Champions League final, which Barcelona won 3–1.
Sign up to have blog posts delivered straight to your inbox!
…the world’s best soccer players can’t go down to the National Mall and kick a ball around.
Barcelona plays Manchester United at FedEx field on Saturday in a friendly rematch of last May’s UEFA Champions League final, which Barcelona won 3–1.
Over at Downsizing the Federal Government, we focused on the following issues this past week:
Follow Downsizing the Federal Government on Twitter (@DownsizeTheFeds) and connect with us on Facebook. We have a new poll up on the Boehner budget plan.
The same week U.S. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta declared “we’re within reach of strategically defeating al-Qaeda”—an assessment that many believe reflects the efforts of seven years of CIA drone strikes—former director of national intelligence Dennis Blair called America’s “unilateral” drone war in countries like Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia a mistake. “Because we’re alienating the countries concerned,” Blair said, “because we’re treating countries just as places where we go attack groups that threaten us, we are threatening the prospects of long-term reform.”
Given that our Nobel Peace Prize–winning president has drastically escalated the use of these flying, robotic hitmen, there seems to be some confusion at the White House.
Speaking to attendees at the Aspen Security Forum, Blair said drone strikes in Pakistan should be launched only when America had the full cooperation of the government in Islamabad and “we agree with them on what drone attacks” should target. As explained elsewhere, this author accepts the efficacy of America’s drone war, but with enormous reluctance. That said, part of Blair’s assessment seems wildly out of touch. Why would Washington wait for permission from Islamabad to hunt al Qaeda?
First, individuals either within or with ties to Pakistan’s spy agency have collaborated with insurgents that frequently attack U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan. That doesn’t speak well for Blair’s call for joint cooperation. Second, we’ve known for years that elements within Pakistan have thwarted — on several occasions — foreign-led attempts to find and take out terrorists. Even someone who is not wildly enamored with drones understands the argument for employing them unilaterally when confronted with uncooperative governments. Policymakers, however, should be weighing the ability to keep militant groups off balance against the costs of facilitating the rise of more terrorists, particularly in a country as volatile as Pakistan.
A statement even more out of step than Mr. Blair’s came from Michael E. Leiter, former head of the National Counterterrorism Center. Earlier this week at the Aspen Security Forum, Leiter contended that assessments that al Qaeda was on the verge of collapse lacked “accuracy and precision” and that al Qaeda’s leadership and structure in Pakistan “is still there and could launch some attacks.” He also raised concerns about the possible long-term effects of intensive CIA paramilitary operations on conventional espionage and analysis for issues like China: “The question has to be asked: Has that in some ways diminished some of its strategic, long-term intelligence collection and analysis mission?”
Leiter’s comments are troubling due to the basis for his concern about the effectiveness of counter-terrorism. To emphasize why the growing consensus that al Qaeda is “on the ropes” is premature, Leiter noted that the failed plot to blow up a vehicle in Times Square in May 2010 was carried out by an American trained by the Pakistani Taliban. This statement is misguided in what it implies. By no means can America ensure that terrorists never come from Pakistan, or anywhere else. Such an aim epitomizes our overreaction to terrorism. It gives planners in Washington not only a convenient justification to prolong the wars we’re already in, but also an open-ended rationale to intervene anywhere else. Let’s remember that the United States is already fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is threatening to launch a third against Iran, bombs remote villages in nuclear-armed Pakistan, and has expanded operations into Somalia, Yemen, and possibly elsewhere. This is especially concerning given the current construction of a not-so-secret U.S. air base in the Middle East for more targeted strikes in Yemen.
Unfortunately, the president’s choice to replace Mr. Leiter, Matthew Olsen, said at his confirmation hearing this week before the Senate Intelligence Committee that he would define the strategic defeat of al Qaeda as “ending the threat that al Qaeda and all of its affiliates pose to the United States and its interests around the world.” This, too, is problematic. U.S. policy toward “ending the threat” from al Qaeda has been mainly through wars and intervention, and one of the many unintended consequences of American intervention has been the radicalization of Western-born Muslims.
Take, for instance, Somalia, where Washington has repeatedly tried and failed to bring order. Over the past two years, as many as 20 Somali-American men have disappeared from the Minneapolis area. Many analysts fear these men were recruited to fight alongside al-Shabab (“The Youth”), the militant wing of the Islamist Somali government the United States and Ethiopia overthrew in 2006. In describing Shirwa Ahmed, a naturalized American of the Somali diaspora believed to be the first U.S. citizen to carry out a terrorist suicide bombing, FBI director Robert Mueller said, “It appears that this individual was radicalized in his hometown in Minnesota.” Somalia is a classic case of how American intervention is forever self-perpetuating.
Debates over drones should not be cut and dry. Scholars, no matter the subject, should be “intellectually honest.” Supporters of counterterrorism can and should feel comfortable having reservations about the tactics employed, given Washington’s tendency for threat inflation. Drones may well become America’s new permanent wartime footing. Sadly, we will have learned nothing from 9/11 if drones provide policymakers a more antiseptic avenue for satiating their endless appetite for intervention.
Today POLITICO Arena asks:
Is it the Senate’s turn to take a crack at the debt ceiling?
My response:
Speaker Boehner has both the Constitution and convention on his side — “money bills” arise in the House. In fact, the Constitution is his strongest ally in his struggle to win the support of recalcitrant Tea Party members. They revere the document, after all, and no one has put the point better than Charles Krauthammer in this morning’s Washington Post.
Boehner’s bill, just to be clear, is a far cry from what this debt-ridden nation needs. As my colleague Chris Edwards put it yesterday, even the revised plan “doesn’t cut spending at all.” It “cuts” only from the CBO baseline, which assumes constantly rising spending. If Congress were serious about addressing our deficit and debt problems, Edwards says, it would have “to start abolishing programs, privatizing activities, and making other lasting reforms.”
Absolutely. But now step back and look at the larger context at the moment. As Krauthammer says,
We’re in the midst of a great four-year national debate on the size and reach of government, the future of the welfare state, indeed, the nature of the social contract between citizen and state. The distinctive visions of the two parties — social-democratic vs. limited-government — have underlain every debate on every issue since Barack Obama’s inauguration.
And the terms of that debate have shifted radically since the Tea Party came on to the scene. The “cuts” in the Boehner plan are modest, to be charitable, but there are no new taxes, which in an earlier day would have been taken as essential. And the focus in Congress and in the nation, as long as the Tea Party keeps up the pressure, is not on new programs but on eliminating old ones — when that is possible.
But right there we bump up against constitutional realty. As Krauthammer puts it, “you cannot govern from one house alone.” We’re light years beyond living under the substantive Constitution, which authorizes only limited government, not the out-of-control welfare state that got us into this mess. But we still live under the procedural Constitution, which means that Reid and Obama can block Boehner’s modest plan. Posturing aside, that’s not likely at this late date. Yet if Tea Party members overplay their hand, they play right into Obama’s hand, politically, going into 2012, when the battle over real change will be waged.
No war — and that’s what we’re in — was won in a day. It took 80 years for John Locke’s ideas about liberty to find their way into the Declaration of Independence. It took another 90 years for those ideas to bring an end to slavery. The limited-government ideas that the Tea Party has brought back to the surface are just now being felt in Congress. This is no time to abandon them. But neither is it a time to set the course of events back, perhaps irretrievably, by employing them unwisely. Take what you can, and live to fight another day, on the battlefield that lies just ahead.
Sen. John McCain has exhibited personal courage, but his geopolitical judgment is uniformly awful. Over the last 30 years there has been no war or potential war that he has opposed. In 2008 he wanted to confront nuclear-armed Russia over its neighbor Georgia, which started their short and sharp conflict. It would have been ironic had the Cold War ended peacefully, only to see Washington trigger a nuclear crisis in order to back Georgia as it attempted to prevent the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from doing what Kosovo did with U.S. military aid: achieve self-determination (by seceding from Georgia).
Now Senator McCain is banging the war drums in Libya. But he seems to have trouble remembering who are the good guys and who are the bad guys.
Although now crusading against Moammar Qaddafi, two years ago he joined Sens. Joe Lieberman and Lindsey Graham in Tripoli to sup with the dear colonel. There the three opponents of tyranny whispered sweet nothings in the dictator’s ear, offering the prospect of military aid. After all, the former terrorist had become a good friend of America by battling terrorists.
Andrew McCarthy reported on the sordid tale from the WikiLeaks disclosures:
A government cable (leaked by Wikileaks) memorializes the excruciating details of meetings between the Senate delegation and Qaddafi, along with his son Mutassim, Libya’s “national security adviser.” We find McCain and Graham promising to use their influence to push along Libya’s requests for C‑130 military aircraft, among other armaments, and civilian nuclear assistance. And there’s Lieberman gushing, “We never would have guessed ten years ago that we would be sitting in Tripoli, being welcomed by a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi.” That’s before he opined that Libya had become “an important ally in the war on terrorism,” and that “common enemies sometimes make better friends.”
Obviously, that was then and this is now. Along the way Senator McCain and his fellow war enthusiasts realized that Qaddafi wasn’t a nice guy after all. Who knew? I mean, he had only jailed opponents, conducted terrorist operations against the United States, and initiated a nuclear weapons program. So earlier this year they demanded that the United States back the rebels, the new heroes of democracy.
Until now, anyway.
Anyone who has covered civil wars won’t be surprised to learn that the insurgents aren’t always playing by Marquess of Queensbeerry rules. Indeed, the opposition is united only by its hatred of Qaddafi. It includes defectors, including Qaddafi’s former interior minister who was just assassinated under mysterious circumstances; jihadists and terrorists, some of whom fought against U.S. forces in Iraq; tribal opponents of Qaddafi; and genuine democracy advocates devoted to creating a liberal society. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the good guys will win any power struggle certain to follow Qaddafi’s ouster.
The Obama administration claimed to enter the war to protect civilians. Yet NATO has occasionally threatened to bomb the rebels if they harm civilians. Reports of summary executions and looting by insurgent forces have emerged. Now Senator McCain has written the opposition a letter—more polite than sending a drone, I suppose—demanding that the Transition National Council stop being mean to former Qaddafi supporters.
Reports the British Independent newspaper:
In his letter to the TNC, dated 20th July, Senator McCain, writing as “your friend and supporter,” pointed out “recent documentation of human rights abuses committed by opposition figures in the western Libyan towns of al-Awaniya, Rayayinah, Zawiyat al-Bagul, and al-Qawalish”. He continued: ” According to Human Rights Watch, a highly credible international non-governmental organisation, rebel fighters and supporters have damaged property, burned some homes, looted from hospitals, homes and shops, and beaten some individuals alleged to have supported government forces.
“I am confident you are aware of these allegations.… It is because the TNC holds itself to such high democratic standards that it is necessary for you and the Council to take decisive action to bring any human rights abuses to an immediate halt.”
Who would have imagined that a civil war could be nasty and that not everyone who opposes a dictator is a sweet, peace-loving liberal? Certainly not John McCain.
The point is not that Qaddafi is a nice guy. The world would be a better place if he “moves on,” so to speak. But there’s no guarantee that a rebel victory will result in a liberal democracy dedicated to international peace and harmony. And there’s nothing at stake that warrants involving the United States in yet another war in a Muslim nation—the fifth ongoing, if one counts the extensive drone campaigns in Pakistan and Yemen, along with Iraq and Afghanistan.
When Senator McCain urges Washington to bomb or invade the sixth Islamic state, which is inevitable given his past behavior, it would be worth remembering how he has managed to be on every side of the Libya issue, supporting tyranny before he opposed it. When it comes to war, the best policy is to do the opposite of what he advises. Only then will America find itself finally at peace.
Previously I’ve offered suggested readings for understanding the financial crisis. Part II focused on “popular” works. What follows is my list of suggested books, written mostly by academics, that give a more scholarly analysis of the crisis. Also see my Part I. They are, by definition, less accessible than the popular works, but they do generally offer consistent frameworks for understanding the crisis and rely more on explaining underlying forces, rather than focus on individuals. All of these are also written for general audiences. Again this is a highly selective list based upon the writings I’ve found insightful.
1. Getting Off Track, by John Taylor. (4 stars) Short and focused on role of monetary policy in driving housing bubble. While incomplete, a must-read.
2. The Rise and Fall of US Mortgage and Credit Markets, by James Barth. (4 stars) No better single source of data on U.S. mortgage markets and their connection to the crisis. Great reference, a book I come back to repeatedly.
3. This Time is Different, by Carmen Reinhart and Kennethy Rogoff. (5 stars) Read now, do not delay.
4. Fault Lines, by Raghuran Rajan. (4 stars) Solid analysis of the bubble and its political economy. Weak when he ventures into “safety net” discussions, but still a great read.
5. What Caused the Financial Crisis, edited by Jeff Friedman. (4 stars) A collection of essays by different scholars (from John Taylor to Joe Stiglitz). Editor’s intro/overview alone is worth the price of the book.
6. A Call For Judgment, by Amar Bhide. (3 stars) More a corporate finance take on the crisis, interesting and unique read, but also narrowly focused.
7. A Failure of Capitalism, by Richard Posner. (1 star) One of the least original books from one of the most original thinkers. Reminds you that Posner is at heart a micro guy, way off when it comes to macroeconomics (and finance). Skip this one.
8. The Origin of Financial Crises, by George Cooper. (3 stars) Brief and insightful take, focused on monetary and credit policy. Far from only thing you should read, but worthwhile addition.
9. Financial Fiasco, by Johan Norberg. Published by Cato, written by Cato scholar, what more do I need to say.
10. Too Big to Save? by Robert Pozen. (4 stars) Scholarly take from a major player in the financial markets. Somewhat best of both worlds. Lots of useful data.
11. Subprime Solution, by Robert Shiller. (3 stars) Policy solutions don’t really flow from the analysis, but Shiller’s insights into bubbles are always interesting.
12. The Housing Boom and Bust, by Thomas Sowell. (3 Stars) Breezy read from ever entertaining Sowell, but also far too narrow in focus to serve as a primary source.
13. Slapped by the Invisible Hand, Gary Gorton. (3 stars) Too narrow a focus on “shadow banking” but also no better analysis of its role. So if you are going to read several, add this one.
14. Guaranteed to Fail, various NYU professors. (3 stars) Good data and analysis of our mortgage finance system and its role in the crisis.
There are way too many great journal articles to mention, most of which aren’t accessible to the lay reader, but several recent issues of the Journal of Economic Perspectives have contained great reading material on the crisis. Some of these articles are free for download (others are not).
divMany advocates of promiscuous military intervention angrily reject the claim that America is an “empire.” Granted, the U.S. doesn’t directly rule its imperial dependents. But Washington policymakers do insist on maintaining a military presence wherever and whenever possible, irrespective of America’s defense needs.
The Obama administration’s attempt to pressure the Iraqi government into “inviting” the U.S. to remain is almost comical. Rather than requiring Baghdad to demonstrate why a continuing American presence is necessary, U.S. officials have been begging to stay. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates said: “I hope they figure out a way to ask.” His successor, Leon Panetta, recently blurted out: “dammit, make a decision.”
However, it is Washington that should make a decision and bring home America’s troops.
The U.S. continues to garrison Europe, Japan, and South Korea, decades after American forces first arrived. All of these international welfare queens could defend themselves. Despite President Bill Clinton’s promise that American troops would spend just a year occupying the Balkans, an area of minimal security interest to the United States, some troops remain to this day. And uber-hawks talk about maintaining a permanent presence in Afghanistan, as distant from conventional U.S. defense interests as any nation on the planet.
But right now Iraq is exciting the most concern, since the United States is supposed to withdraw its combat forces by year-end. Gen. Jeffrey Buchanan, the top military spokesman in Iraq, said Washington “has committed to an enduring partnership with Iraq,” but it would be easier if the Iraqis spoke up “while we have troops here and infrastructure here.”
From start to (almost) finish, the Iraqi operation has been a tragic fiasco. The United States invaded to seize non-existent WMDs. American forces destroyed the country’s system of ordered tyranny, turning the country into a bloody charnel house, killing hundreds of thousands and forcing millions to flee. Washington’s occupation transferred democracy to Iraq without the larger liberal culture necessary for democracy to thrive. U.S. intervention empowered Iran while destroying Baghdad’s ability to control its own borders.
Yet President Obama wants to stick around, meddling in Iraq’s domestic affairs and defending it in foreign matters.
The United States should not have invaded Iraq. Washington can’t undo the ill effects of the war, but it can avoid the costs of a permanent occupation.
America’s job in Iraq is done. The Iraqis should be left in charge of their national destiny. All U.S. troops should be withdrawn. Washington should stop collecting increasingly dangerous dependencies for its empire.