ObamaCare’s Independent Payment Advisory Board is everything its critics say and worse. It is a democracy-skirting, Congress-blocking, powers-unseparating, law-entrenching, tax-hiking, fund-appropriating, price-controlling, health-care-rationing, death-paneling, technocrat-thrilling, authoritarian, anti-constitutional super-legislature. Its very existence is testament to government incompetence. It stands as a milestone on the road to serfdom.

The Congressional Research Service has now confirmed what HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius pretends not to know but what Diane Cohen and I explained here: 

[I]f President Obama fails to appoint any IPAB members, all these powers fall to Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius.

That’s an awful lot of power to give any one person, particularly someone who has shown as much willingness to abuse her power as Sebelius has. 

I would also like the Congressional Research Service to address a feature of IPAB that Cohen and I first exposed. According to the statute, we write: 

Congress may only stop IPAB from issuing self-executing legislative proposals if three-fifths of all sworn members of Congress pass a joint resolution to dissolve IPAB during a short window in 2017. Even then, IPAB’s enabling statute dictates the terms of its own repeal, and it continues to grant IPAB the power to legislate for six months after Congress repeals it. If Congress fails to repeal IPAB through this process, then Congress can never again alter or reject IPAB’s proposals.

You read that right. For more, read our paper, especially Box 3 on page 9.

CRS, I’m interested to know what you think. Take a close look at the law and get back to me.

Public opinion on gay marriage has changed a lot in recent years, perhaps more rapidly than on any other major issue. Yet as Jonathan Rauch noted last year, one demographic group has resisted that change: Republicans. As he wrote:

In moving as decisively as they have on gay rights, the Democrats are following the country.…

But the dissenters have not vanished. Rather, they have holed up inside the Republican Party. According to polling by the Pew Research Center, two-thirds of Democrats and almost 60 percent of independents call same-sex relations morally acceptable; only a bit over a third of Republicans agree. White evangelicals, in particular, are unique among major demographic and religious categories (including Catholics) in their fierce disapproval of homosexuality, and these days the vast majority of them (70 percent, according to Pew) are Republican or lean Republican.

To put the matter bluntly, the Republican Party is becoming an isolated bastion of anti-gay sentiment. That is not because Republicans and conservatives are immune to the general trend toward acceptance of homosexuality. It is because the trend is slower among Republicans.

But in today’s Washington Post there’s some interesting evidence of movement among Republicans. A strong majority of voters in Virginia, a state that passed a gay marriage ban in 2006, and 40 percent of Republicans now say “it should be legal for gay couples to get married.” Note the changes from 2006 in this Post graphic:

Note especially that column in the lower right. How has public opinion in Virginia changed since the 2006 amendment vote? Support for gay marriage (or opposition to a ban) has risen by 13 points. Independents are up only 3 points. Democrats are up by 7 points, perhaps because of the endorsement of President Obama. And Republican support is up 25 points.

Last year, I called the sudden silence of Republican leaders on gay marriage “the sound of social change.” It looks like they knew which way the wind was blowing in their own base.

Qatar is much in the news, as the small Persian Gulf sheikdom attempts to extend its influence. It promoted revolution in Libya and is doing the same in Syria. Of course, the ruling family is less enthused with Iranian revolutionaries and looks askance at Shia democracy protestors in Bahrain. (So does the U.S., of course, which is threatening to bomb the regime in Tehran and has said little about Bahrain’s Sunni monarchy as it busily represses the country’s Shia majority.)

However, Qatar also engages in more mundane activities, such as hosting the annual Doha Forum, which brings together world leaders to discuss important international topics. Qatar takes the event seriously. Explains the official website: “Held in the presence of His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar, who will preside over the opening ceremony on May 20th, the forum will commence with an address by His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.”

Lesser personages also participate, which explains why I’ve been invited to attend. I will be flying over this weekend. The conference begins on Monday and sessions will cover international politics and the global economy, Arabs and the changing world, global economic development, challenges facing new Arab democracies, international cooperation, human rights, and digital media.

I’m looking forward to the event and, frankly, even more to discussions outside of the formal sessions. It has been several years since I’ve been to Qatar, so it will be interesting to see how the country is adjusting to the Arab Spring. It also will be illuminating to compare Qatar to Dubai, another small but ambitious Gulf state, which I visited last week.

The Persian Gulf remains the fulcrum of important world events and potential American military intervention. In fact, my nephew has been deployed there in recent weeks, though hopefully will be returning home soon. Although travel to the region doesn’t turn one into an instant expert, it does help give a practical feel to events which too often are viewed primarily through the skewed prism of Washington.

Georgetown University’s Jennifer Daskal, and Stephen Vladeck, an associate dean in the College of Law at American University, have posted a working paper (.pdf) regarding the 12+ year old Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) at the Lawfare blog that is receiving, and deserves, some attention. The shorter version in today’s New York Times is receiving even more attention, presumably.

“After the AUMF” is written, in part, as a response to a Hoover Institution proposal (.pdf) that would replace the existing AUMF with, as Daskal and Vladeck describe it, “a new blanket framework statute authorizing the use of military force against as-yet-undetermined future terrorist organizations, and to delegate to the Executive Branch the authority to delegate those organizations against which such force may be used if and when the time comes.”

The crux of the Daskal-Vladeck critique rests on their claim that such a framework is unnecessary, and, worse, counterproductive. They explain that we should be trying to end, rather than extend, the war on terror, and that existing authorities (including many that have expanded since 9/11) are more than sufficient to protect the country against terrorist attacks. Should those authorities prove insufficient in the future (for example, if an as-yet-unknown terrorist organization materializes and plots attacks against the United States), Congress would retain the ability to pass a new AUMF–and would likely do so quite quickly, if past history is any guide. Lastly, they claim that the war frame, in general, undermines the nation’s counterterrorism goals by engendering hostility and resistance across a broad spectrum, from innocent civilians to heads of nation states, who resist being drawn into a never-ending war.

Although I am broadly sympathetic with the idea that we should move away from thinking of counterterrorism as a war, thus demanding a military response (about which I have written book chapters here and here), I believe that the most important of the Daskal-Vladeck objections revolves around the Hoover proposal’s apparent disdain for Congress, and its willingness to grant more power to the Executive Branch. The Hoover proposal claims that this would be an improvement over the current system, because it would give “the president the flexibility he needs to address emerging threats” and would “render more transparent and regularized the now very murky process by which organizations and their members are deemed to fall within the September 2001 AUMF.”

Elsewhere the Hoover paper claims that such a blanket predelegation of authority is required because “Congress probably cannot or will not, on a continuing basis, authorize force quickly or robustly enough to meet the threat.”

Daskal and Vladeck disagree. They counter that “no examples exist of cases where Congress either could not or would not provide the necessary authority–or why, in the interim, the President’s Article II authorities, criminal law, and other existing counterterrorism authorities weren’t sufficient to meet the threat.” On the contrary, the Congress has consistently demonstrated the ability and willingness to authorize wars quite quickly (too quickly, some might say), including within three days of the 9/11 attacks, and within five days of the supposed attack in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964. Thus, Daskal and Vladeck conclude, if a new terrorist group “were to emerge, nothing would or should stop Congress from providing a new, narrow and specific authorization to use force.”

They continue, with emphasis:

Proposals to delegate such future—and momentous—decisions to the President lack any historical precedent, and for good reason. It is Congress, not the Executive, that is given the authority under our Constitution to declare war. An authorization to use military force…should not be an ex ante delegation to the President to make unreviewable decisions to go to war at some future date. This is something our Founding Fathers understood well. Thus, proposals to delegate such a determination to the President threaten the carefully calibrated balance of powers enmeshed within the Constitution, essentially asking Congress to surrender one of its most important functions to the Executive.

This is an important and interesting discussion, and one that should not reduce to the predictable partisanship in Washington today. Some liberal Democrats agree with conservative Republicans that the president should be given more powers; other liberals and conservatives are joined in opposition to such suggestions. This timely–indeed, overdue–assessment of the powers that exist, and will be needed in the future, to deal with terrorist threats should and will be getting more attention in the weeks and months ahead.

When it comes to the press, the New York Times pretty much defines “mainstream.”

And Justin Gillis is the Times’ mainstream reporter on the global warming beat.

So it is somewhat telling, that his article on Tuesday, “A Change in Temperature,” was largely dedicated (although begrudgingly) to facing up to the possibility that mainstream estimates (i.e., those produced by the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) of climate sensitivity are too large.

Readers of this blog are probably well aware of the reasons why.

Despite our illusions of grandeur, this blog isn’t the mainstream press –although we do seek to influence it. Maybe we are being successful.

Throughout Gillis’ article are sprinkled references to “climate contrarians,” and even the recognition of the effort by such contrarians to push the new science on low climate sensitivity to the forefront of the discussion to change the existing politics of climate change.

Gillis writes:

Still, the recent body of evidence — and the political use that climate contrarians are making of it to claim that everything is fine — sheds some light on where we are in our scientific and public understanding of the risks of climate change.

We at the Cato’s Center for the Study of Science are at the leading edge of efforts to present a more accurate representation of the scientific of climate change through our testimony to Congress, public comments and review of government documents and proposals, media appearances, op-eds, and serial posts on this blog, among other projects. We emphasize that current regulations and proposed legislation are based on outdated, and likely wrong, projections of future climate impacts from human carbon dioxide emissions from the use of fossil fuels to produce energy.

Gillis recognizes the positives of a low climate sensitivity value:

“…tantalizing possibility that climate change might be slow and limited enough that human society could adapt to it without major trauma.”

“It will certainly be good news if these recent papers stand up to critical scrutiny, something that will take at least a year or two to figure out.”

“So if the recent science stands up to critical examination, it could indeed turn into a ray of hope…”

But, the “mainstream” is slow to change. And so despite the good news about climate sensitivity, Gillis closes his article by pointing out that, in his opinion, the political response to climate change has been “weak” (contrary to our view), and that therefore:

Even if climate sensitivity turns out to be on the low end of the range, total emissions may wind up being so excessive as to drive the earth toward dangerous temperature increases.

Clearly we still have work to do, but there are signs of progress!

Pitched as a cure for Europe’s woes, salvation for the multilateral trading system, and the last best chance to restrain the Chinese juggernaut, the stakes are high for the upcoming Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Of course the primary objective of the TTIP is to reduce nagging impediments to commerce between the United States and the European Union. But success is far from a sure bet.

Given the numerous bilateral trade frictions that have eluded resolution for many years, the goal of a “comprehensive” agreement by the end of 2014 — the current target — is simply not credible. Success would require negotiators to lay down their calculators and spreadsheets, disavow the “exports good, imports bad” mantra of mercantilist doctrine on which they were raised, and act on behalf of their citizens instead of their domestic producer lobbies.

That outcome would be too good to be true, but there may be a certain genius to the tight timeframe: it will demand that negotiators forego excessive posturing and will limit the potential for ever-shifting political calculations to subvert progress. Regardless, success can only take the form of a less comprehensive agreement or, perhaps, a two-phased agreement where the first phase meets the 2014 deadline by achieving accord on relatively agreeable matters, while the tougher issues are relegated to a later train.

A recent paper co-published by the Atlantic Council and the Bertelsmann Foundation presented the results of a survey of American and European trade policy experts about the prospects for a successful TTIP agreement. More than half thought the negotiations would produce a “moderate agreement,” and most thought the agreement would take effect by the end of 2015 or 2016.

The relatively low hanging fruit – according to the Atlantic/​Bertelsmann survey – includes the elimination or significant reduction of tariffs across multiple sectors. Averaging about 2 percent in the United States and 4 percent in Europe, tariffs are not huge impediments (on average), but their elimination would generate sizable gains because of the large volume of transatlantic trade. Agreeing to tariff cuts right away would inspire goodwill and inject momentum toward a successful outcome.

Ending restrictions on U.S. energy exports might also be among the terms of a 2014 agreement, but everything else that would reduce actual trade impediments is in the more-difficult-to-resolve category. “Regulatory process convergence across multiple sectors” and “significant convergence in regulatory regimes and standards for manufactured goods” were considered the most important issues in the Atlantic/​Bertelsmann paper. But they were also viewed as among the most difficult to resolve.

To be meaningful, a 2014 agreement must include some form of regulatory coherence or mutual recognition of standards or processes. Overcoming regulatory divergences is presumed to be the source of the greatest potential gains, as it is enormously costly whenever businesses are compelled to meet different standards to participate in different markets. Many differences likely can be bridged through mutual recognition or convergence without any adverse impact on public health or safety and without crossing any red lines related to cultural preference or tradition.

Agreeing to a common standard for the length of electrical cords on household appliances (currently three feet in the U.S. and one meter in Europe), for example, would reduce production costs for appliance manufacturers and free up resources for other productive endeavors on both sides of the ocean without any public safety implications. Mutually recognizing the effective equivalence of each other’s drug approval processes would eliminate logistical redundancies, while saving industry excessive delays and billions of dollars, and reducing mortality and morbidity rates. There are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of similiar regulatory processes and standards that could be bridged through such mutual recognition or convergence.

To increase the probability of bridging these differences as part of a 2014 agreement, negotiators should consider a “negative list” approach, whereby all regulations and standards are considered candidates for reform unless and until specific exemptions are requested. This would give negotiators a better sense of the magnitude of the differences, and the public a better look at who is protecting what. One revelation is likely to be that U.S. and European regulators, seeking to preserve their bureaucratic fiefdoms, are the primary obstacles to reform.

Even in this globalized economy with transnational production and supply chains and growing import-dependent constituencies, trade negotiations are still conducted according to the mercantilist conception that improved foreign market access is the prize and conceded import market access is the cost of an agreement. The economic imperative of reform too often succumbs to the political objective of “winning” the negotiation – or avoiding the perception of having been outdueled. That’s a real shame because the real benefits of trade liberalization come from reducing your own barriers to trade and not from better access to foreign markets. Remember the AMC Pacer, the Ford Pinto, the Chrysler K‑Car and other such “offerings” from Detroit in the 1970s before intensifying competition from Japan raised their game? Remember when the produce section of your grocery store was barrren in the winter? Remember when high-tech gadgets were luxury goods?

For real and enduring reform to take shape, the American and European publics must shed their complacency, challenge the status quo, and assert their rights to transact with whomever they choose, wherever they are located without having to contend with bureaucratic impediments designed to steer them to domestic sources. Success will have been achieved when the trade negotiator goes the way of the AMC Pacer.

George Will, Michael Gerson, and our own Gene Healy are among the columnists who reminded us — in the wake of the IRS and AP snooping scandals — of President Obama’s stirring words just two days before the IRS story broke:

Unfortunately, you’ve grown up hearing voices that incessantly warn of government as nothing more than some separate, sinister entity. . . . They’ll warn that tyranny is always lurking just around the corner. You should reject these voices.

No road to serfdom here. Just us folks working together, to protect ourselves from sneaky reporters and organized taxpayers.

And now lots of people are noting that a series of scandals in government just might undermine people’s faith in government. John Dickerson of Slate writes:

The Obama administration is doing a far better job making the case for conservatism than Mitt Romney, Mitch McConnell, or John Boehner ever did. Showing is always better than telling, and when the government overreaches in so many ways it gives support to the conservative argument about the inherently rapacious nature of government.…

Conservatives argue that the more government you have, the more opportunities you will have for it to grow out of control.

And Paul Begala, the Bill Clinton operative, notes:

This hurts the Obama Administration more than similar issues hurt the Bush administration because a central underpinning of the progressive philosophy is a belief in the efficacy of government. In the main almost all of the Obama agenda requires expanding folks’ faith in government, and these issues erode that faith.

“Faith in government” indeed. To paraphrase Oscar Wilde, putting your faith in government is, like a second marriage, a triumph of hope over experience.

But most particularly this week I’m reminded of Murray Rothbard’s comment in 1975 about what the era of Vietnam, Watergate, and stagflation had done to trust in government:

Twenty years ago, the historian Cecelia Kenyon, writing of the Anti-Federalist opponents of the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, chided them for being “men of little faith” – little faith, that is, in a strong central government. It is hard to think of anyone having such unexamined faith in government today.

Another 38 years later, it should be even more difficult to retain such faith.