The following is an excerpt from an article I wrote on extended deterrence in Northeast Asia under the Biden administration. The Stimson Center’s China Foreign Policy Project published the article on June 30, 2021.
Effective extended deterrence requires careful consideration of U.S. strategic goals in Northeast Asia. Developments in the region will put pressure on U.S. President Joseph Biden and his administration to strengthen extended deterrence to allies. Still, an approach that sets unachievable expectations and misinterprets the drivers of nuclear escalation could inflame arms races and damage strategic stability.
Walking the tightrope of effective extended deterrence will require the Biden administration to think carefully about how conventional military strategies can generate or attenuate the danger of nuclear escalation. As Northeast Asian states, friend and foe alike, rapidly improve their military firepower, the goal of preventing nuclear attack will increasingly depend on how states plan and posture for conventional war.
The rest of the article can be found on the Stimson Center’s website: https://www.stimson.org/2021/walking-the-tightrope-u-s-extended-deterrence-in-northeast-asia-under-president-biden/.
