Former-Vice President and presidential candidate Joe Biden—the Democrats’ frontrunner—released his immigration plans this week, and they contain some interesting surprises. In particular, Biden states that he would allow states and localities to sponsor visas for immigrants—an idea that my colleagues and I have written of for the last several years. So far, Sen. Ron Johnson (R‑WI) and Rep. John Curtis (R‑UT) have introduced bills to create a state-sponsored temporary worker program.

But the idea is starting to gain some more traction among Democrats. Biden’s immigration platform states that it:

Creates a new visa category to allow cities and counties to petition for higher levels of immigrants to support their growth. The disparity in economic growth between U.S. cities, and between rural communities and urban areas, is one of the great imbalances of today’s economy. Some cities and many rural communities struggle with shrinking populations, an erosion of economic opportunity, and local businesses that face unique challenges. Others simply struggle to attract a productive workforce and innovative entrepreneurs.

As president, Biden will support a program to allow any county or municipal executive of a large or midsize county or city to petition for additional immigrant visas to support the region’s economic development strategy, provided employers in those regions certify there are available jobs, and that there are no workers to fill them. Holders of these visas would be required to work and reside in the city or county that petitioned for them, and would be subject to the same certification protections as other employment-based immigrants.

Unfortunately, Biden still endorses the idea that the “same certification protections” should apply to these city-sponsored workers. That undermines a key benefit of state and local control: the ability to innovate with the rules for eligibility. Not every state and locality has the same labor market needs, and so the main benefit of the idea is to allow a policy marketplace of competing ideas to develop. Nonetheless, Biden’s endorsement could pave the way for compromise with Republicans interested in more local control and Democrats who want to see more immigration.

Other good ideas in Biden’s plans include “increase[ing] the number of visas offered for permanent, work-based immigration based on macroeconomic conditions.” He notes—as I have on many occasions—that the employment-based green card limits of 140,000 aren’t responsive to the growth in the economy or employer needs, and he would update those numbers as well as exempt from the cap any PhD STEM graduates. He would also end the country caps on employment-based visas. He also endorses a temporary visa for family members of U.S. citizens caught in endless backlogs. Like other Democratic candidates, he supports a pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants.

He also would end many of the current administration’s problematic border and enforcement policies. Most notably, he would stop the public charge rule that is designed to keep out all low income immigrants who don’t speak English well or have college degrees, and he would end asylum policies—like capping the number of people who can request asylum at ports of entry—that encourage illegal immigration.

President Obama earned his nickname as the Deporter-in-Chief. It is possible that if Joe Biden becomes president, he could separate himself from that unfortunate legacy.

There are very few new arguments in the immigration debate. For generations, people have batted around similar versions of the same argument in favor or against different immigration policies such as how immigrants affect wages, voting, crime, and terrorism. There are other fringe arguments that crop up now and again, but we don’t usually address them because they are so rarely argued. However, the frequency of a formerly-fringe argument against immigration is rising: immigrants should be banned or their numbers significantly reduced because they litter a lot.

At the recent National Conservatism conference, University of Pennsylvania law professor Amy Wax argued in favor of restricting non-white immigration to the United States because she said they litter more. My colleague David Bier was heckled at the Conservative Political Action Conference in 2018 and asked about immigrant littering. Fox News Tucker Carlson has been bringing up immigrant littering over the years, most recently with the help of City Journal associate editor Seth Barron.

But do immigrants litter more?

Fortunately, there are data available to at least partially answer this question. The American Housing Survey (AHS) is a biennial longitudinal housing survey that asks about the amount of trash, litter, or junk in streets, lots, or properties within a half-block of the respondent’s housing unit. The answers are a “small amount of trash,” a “large amount,” and “no trash.” We constructed a scale from zero to one using a min-max normalization for all non-missing observations where a higher value indicates more trash in a neighborhood. We then take a weighted average of these scores using the weighting variable present in the AHS public use file for each metropolitan area.

The smallest geographical unit in the AHS was the Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) for 15 major urban areas in the United States that account for about 33 percent of the total U.S. population (around 58 percent of the foreign-born population and 30 percent of the native-born population). We linked the foreign-born shares of the CBSA populations from the 2017 American Community Survey (2013–2017, 5‑year estimates) to the AHS survey responses on the amount of litter and trash. We then ran a regression where the independent variable is the percent of the CBSA’s population that is foreign-born and the dependent variable is the response to the litter question.

We find no statistically significant relationship between the immigrant share of a CBSA’s population and the amount of litter (Table 1). Even after dividing up the population measure by noncitizens and naturalized immigrants, we found no statistically significant relationship. Table 1 reports robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. Figure 1 displays the statistically insignificant regression results from Table 1.

Table 1
Immigrant Population and Litter

Sources: ACS, AHS, and authors’ calculations.
 

Figure 1
Litter and the Percent Foreign-Born, by CBSA

Sources: ACS, AHS, and authors’ calculations.

If you’re going to go on television to complain about immigrants systematically littering in major cities, run a segment that claims as much, or make such a statement to support major changes in immigration law, you had better have some evidence supporting your position. Litter has played an outsized role in the immigration debate on both sides of the issue and could be a more serious problem at the border. But when it comes to the problem of litter in American cities caused by immigrants, we’re going to need to see some evidence.

Earlier today, Second Lt. Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani of the Royal Saudi Airforce murdered three people and injured eight others in a mass shooting at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida. Alshamrani was at the Naval Air Station learning how to fly. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies are currently investigating whether Alshamrani’s mass shooting was a terrorist attack, but they have not reached a conclusion yet.

According to the Global Terrorism Database, terrorism is the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In other words, whether a crime is terrorism depends upon the motivation of the attacker, and his motivation isn’t known yet.

It may well turn out that Alshamrani is a terrorist, as many politicians are already claiming, but we don’t know yet. If Alshamrani’s shooting turns out to be a terrorist attack, then that raises the total number of people killed by foreign-born terrorists on U.S. soil to 3,040, over the period from 1975 until December 6, 2019.

Using the same risk calculation I used elsewhere, this means that the annual chance of being murdered on U.S. soil in an attack committed by foreign-born terrorists during that 45-year time period is about 1 in 4 million per year. That’s the lowest chance since I’ve been tracking this.

A new development, in this case, is that Alshamrani was here as personnel in a foreign military. This means that he was likely here on an A‑2 visa for foreign officials and government employees, which includes foreign military personnel at U.S. facilities. This is important as many media reports say that Alshamrani was a student, which is influencing some pundits to argue for restrictions on student visas or to make inaccurate comparisons to Saudis who trained at Florida flight schools before attacking the Twin Towers and Pentagon in 2001. This is almost certainly not true.

If it turns out that Alshamrani was a terrorist, this would be the first attack carried out by a person who entered on an A visa. Since 1997, the U.S. government has issued about 2 million A‑2 visas and just under 5 percent of them have gone to Saudis. Thus, if it turns out that Alshamrani was a terrorist, there was one terrorist on an A‑2 visa for every 2 million visas issued during that time and three murders – a decent track record compared to other visas (see Table 10). Immigration attorney Charles Kuck told me that, “other than running the names through the standard background check systems, there is no additional vetting done on A‑2 visa holders.” I suspect that that will change regardless of whether Alshamrani is a terrorist.

There is much we don’t know about the mass shooting carried out by Second Lt. Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani of the Royal Saudi Air Force at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida. It’s unclear whether his shooting was terrorism or inspired by another motive. As more information becomes clear, I will be updating our terrorism research appropriately.

Reporter Michelle Hackman of The Wall Street Journal has a piece out today about the increase in worksite immigration enforcement over the last few years. Her story focuses on the number of cases initiated and how Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is focusing on immigration law while ignoring other offenses.

ICE also provided data to The Wall Street Journal showing that the number of administrative worksite arrests has also increased. Administrative arrests are for civil violations of American immigration law, such as illegal presence. Noncitizens are subject to administrative arrests, but not citizens, and it is the first step toward deporting an illegal immigrant.

Figure 1 puts the increase in administrative worksite arrests in historical context. Although the number is way up from its low point in 2016, it’s still less than half of the peak in 2008 when George W. Bush’s ICE arrested 5,184 people at worksites.

The Trump Administration is increasing immigration enforcement across the board, but from fairly low levels in 2016. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken a series of unprecedented actions to limit the ability of immigrants to request asylum in the United States. But among its earliest and most consequential decisions was to cap the number of migrants who it would process for asylum at ports of entry. This policy clearly violates federal law. More importantly, it forces asylum seekers to remain homeless in squalid and desperate conditions in dangerous Mexico border cities, leading many to cross illegally.

The American Immigration Council and Al Otro Lado have challenged the policy (the government calls it “metering”) in court, and the government has argued that it lacks the resources to process undocumented migrants who arrive at ports to request asylum. In other words, it is violating the law because it simply physically cannot follow it. The challengers argue that this is a mere pretext for keeping out asylum seekers, and administration officials comments seem to confirm that this is the intention.

The data support their contention that the Trump administration has artificially reduced the capacity of ports without any reduction in resources for ports. In response to a Freedom of Information Act request, CBP provided me the number of CBP Office of Field Operation (OFO) officers permanently assigned to southwest border ports of entry. CBP-OFO processes documented and undocumented travelers who apply to enter at ports.

Figure 1 compares the annual number of “inadmissible aliens” along the southwest border—generally those without proper documents proving pre-approval to enter, many of whom want to request asylum—to the number of CBP-OFO permanently assigned officers. As it shows, the Obama administration in 2016 processed 82,106 more undocumented migrants than in 2012 and 2013—more than double the earlier amount—despite 97 fewer CBP-OFO officers. The Trump administration added officers every year—increases of 692, or 11 percent—yet it cut port processing.

But the annual figures significantly understate the reductions in port processing under this administration. In the month of October 2016, the Obama administration processed 20,524 undocumented migrants at ports. In October 2019, the Trump administration processed just 9,733, 53 percent less than the peak processing month, as Figure 2 shows. The average CBP-OFO officer at a port of entry went from processing 3.1 undocumented migrants per month to just 1.4 per month, a 56 percent cut.

Nor is it a matter of undocumented aliens appearing in one region that cannot handle them. Figure 3 breaks down the numbers by CBP-OFO field office. In all four regions, the numbers have fallen in absolute terms: 57 percent in San Diego, 38 percent in Tucson, 44 percent in El Paso, and 56 percent in Laredo. Only El Paso sector—with the fewest migrants—had fewer officers in 2019 than 2016 (a 2 percent staffing drop). Laredo oversaw the processing of 4,884 fewer undocumented migrants in October 2019 as October 2016, despite 235 more officers (10 percent increase). San Diego allowed in 3,537 fewer, despite 120 more officers (6 percent increase). Tucson processing fell 1,428, despite 143 more officers (18 percent increase).

Figure 4 depicts the number of undocumented migrants processed at ports per officer for each field office. Again, relative to the officers available, the Trump administration is processing far fewer migrants than the Obama administration in all four field offices. Compared to October 2016, the average CBP-OFO permanently assigned officer processed 59 percent fewer in San Diego, 47 percent fewer in Tucson, 43 percent fewer in El Paso, and 60 percent fewer in Laredo than in October 2019. The average officer in Laredo went from handling 3.6 cases in October 2016 to 1.4 in October 2019.

The per-agent figures also highlight metering’s absurd justification. The average CBP-OFO permanently assigned officer processed just 1.4 migrants in the entire month of October 2019. The resource excuse strains the credulity of the court and the public.

These numbers actually understate the issue because CBP also temporarily transferred an unknown number of officers to deal with “overflow” operations. While we don’t know the numbers of officers, CBP revealed that it transferred $6.7 million in funds to deal with “overflow” operations at southwest ports of entry in 2016. In 2017 and 2018, it transferred $11.3 and $8.4 million, respectively, and in 2019, the number rose to $28.1 million by July 22—a fourfold increase over 2016. In other words, there were far more temporary resources available in 2019 as well.

Ultimately, the purpose of metering is make immigrants so miserable that they give up and go home, but while it undoubtedly does make them suffer all sorts of atrocities, it also drives many of them to cross illegally. This makes illegal immigration worse and results in unnecessary, dangerous crossings. A man and his daughter who were turned away at a port of entry ended up drowning in the Rio Grande River in July.

This fact also further frustrates the “resources” excuse because this summer CBP found ways to process vastly greater quantities of undocumented migrants who crossed illegally between ports of entry. At the same time, it claimed a total inability to increase the numbers at ports of entry. DHS continues to evade responsibility for causing illegal immigration and its deadly consequences.

Mexico’s government has touted to President Trump its efforts to reduce migration of Central Americans through its territory to the United States and took credit for the drop in arrests of migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border since June. Yet Mexican immigration enforcement fails to explain the drop in immigrants reaching the United States for three reasons: 1) most who try are still making it, 2) the effectiveness of Mexico’s enforcement is slightly worse than the median month since October 2014, and 3) the drop has occurred mainly among families and unaccompanied children, while Mexican enforcement has mainly targeted adults traveling alone.

Figure 1 shows the number of arrests of immigrants from Central America’s Northern Triangle—Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—by U.S. Border Patrol or Mexican authorities. The data reveal that Mexican enforcement is not only not unprecedented, but it is actually less effective than it was on numerous occasions in recent years. In September 2019, 61 percent of arrests occurred in the United States, indicating that most Central Americans evaded the crackdown. This is worse than the median month (59 percent) since October 2014, meaning Central Americans were less likely to reach the U.S. border in a majority of other months.

Figure 2 compares the likelihood of reaching the United States by the type of migrant. As it shows, the crackdown was more effective at stopping single adults than children with parents or unaccompanied children. More than 70 percent of unaccompanied children and children with parents made it to the United States in September 2019, compared to just 46 percent of single adults. Despite this focus on single adults, it was families and children whose numbers declined the most, falling 85 percent since May. Single adults have come down comparatively less: 64 percent. Many other months saw stricter enforcement.

Given these facts, it is more likely that other factors explain the absolute decline in arrests by the U.S. Border Patrol. The most important would be the inability of Central Americans to make asylum claims in the United States and the return of Central Americans into Mexican border cities under the “Remain in Mexico” policies. These actions—which have exposed numerous immigrants to crime, homelessness, and death—have likely deterred others from trying to seek safety in the United States.

Children and families are more likely to fear extended homelessness in Mexico, which explains why they were disproportionately affected by these policies. Single adults are also more likely to attempt to evade detection, so they are less influenced by changes in asylum policy. The United States has better alternatives to deal with this crisis than abandoning its asylum laws and treating asylum seekers like criminals. It should increase legal immigration and process asylum seekers at ports of entry.

Over the weekend, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) updated an earlier report on arrests and apprehensions of illegal immigrants who requested Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The updated report shows that of the 888,818 people who applied for DACA, 118,371 had been arrested at one time or another.

Many of those arrested were not approved for DACA, but some were because many arrests don’t lead to convictions. Those 118,371 people had been arrested a total of 202,025 times for all crimes and civil infractions, including violations of immigration law. Subtracting the number arrested for immigration infractions lowers the number to 95,343 DACA applicants being arrested. The DACA applicant arrest rate was 80 percent below the non-DACA applicant (all others) arrest rate.

The USCIS report does not provide arrest rates for DACA applicants or other populations in the United States. As a result, there is no standard of comparison for the number of arrests mentioned in the USCIS report. However, some data released in the report do allow for a back of the envelope comparison between the arrest rate for DACA applicants and the arrest rate for the population of all others.

Below, I will describe the comparative arrest rates and how I calculated them.

Comparing arrest rates requires making two simple assumptions. First, I assume that the youngest person arrested who was a DACA applicant was 13 years old and that arrest occurred in 1993 (DACA is only available to those born in 1981 or later). This is based on Table 6 of the USCIS report that breaks down arrests by age. Only 5,076 of the arrests were of DACA applicants age 14 or younger. Changing the year does not affect the direction of the outcomes.

Second, I compare the number of arrests and not the number of individual people arrested. This is because FBI crime data record the number of arrests, not the number of people arrested. Third, I don’t exclude any of the arrests counted in the USCIS document even though the FBI’s crime data doesn’t include immigration arrests in its national figures. That second choice biases the results against me because it increases the number of arrests of DACA applicants relative to the citizen population who cannot be arrested for immigration offenses.

From 1993 to 2018, about 344.9 million total criminal arrests were made in the United States. Of those arrests, 202,025 arrests were of DACA applicants. The arrest rate for DACA applicants was 874 per 100,000 DACA applicants per year from 1993 through 2018 (Figure 1). The arrest rate for all others was 4,491 per every 100,000 per year. In other words, the arrest rate for all others was about 5.1 times as great as it was for DACA applicants. DACA applicants had an arrest rate 80 percent below that of all others.

Table 1

Annual Arrest Rates of DACA Applicants and All Others per 100,000, 1993–2018

Sources: FBI, USCIS, and Author’s Calculations.

Note: Arrests per 100,000 for each subpopulation.

Even if all those arrests of DACA applicants took place from 2012–2018 (DACA was announced in 2012), their arrest rate would be 3,247 per every 100,000 DACA applicants per year. That is still below the arrest rate for all others of 3,429 per year during the same time. Excluding immigration arrests lower the relative arrest rates even more. For instance, excluding immigration arrests from the 1993–2018 period diminishes the DACA applicant arrest rate from 874 per 100,000 DACA applicants per year to 775 per 100,000.

No matter how you compare the arrest rate for DACA applicants to all others, the former group has a lower arrest rate. Since the USCIS report and this post just measure arrest rates, the criminal conviction rate is necessarily lower as there are more arrests than convictions – as I show in Texas. The USCIS report is just further evidence that illegal immigrants have a lower crime rate than native-born Americans.