There are hints of possible interest in acquiring nuclear weapons in both South Korea and Japan, especially since the rise of Donald Trump. Such a policy shift would be neither quick nor easy. Yet the presumption that the benefits of nuclear nonproliferation are worth the costs of maintaining a nuclear “umbrella” is outdated.

Since the development of the atomic bomb America has been committed to nuclear war. Many Americans probably believed that meant if their own nation’s survival was in doubt. But Washington always has been far more likely to use nukes on behalf of its allies.

The cost of America’s many commitments is high. The U.S. promises to sacrifice thousands if not millions of its own citizens for modest or even minimal interests.

Unfortunately, war is possible. Deterrence often fails, and Washington might have to decide if it will fight an unanticipated nuclear war or back down.

Friendly proliferation might be a better option. I write in Foreign Affairs: “Instead of being in the middle of a Northeast Asia in which only the bad guys—China, North Korea, Russia—had nukes, the U.S. could remain out of the fray. If something went wrong, the tragedy would not automatically include America.”

There obviously remain good reasons for the U.S. to be wary of encouraging proliferation. Yet opening a debate over the issue may be the most effective way to convince China to take more serious action against the DPRK.

Friendly proliferation might be the best of a bad set of options.

The recent abortive military coup in Turkey has led not to a restoration of democracy and the rule of law in that country, but to an acceleration of already worrisome trends toward a dictatorship with Islamist overtones. When the would-be junta made its play for power, the Obama administration quickly expressed support for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s beleaguered government, as did most of Turkey’s NATO partners. When the coup attempt collapsed, leaders of those governments breathed a sigh of relief that the Alliance did not have to confront the embarrassment (or worse) of a member state governed by a military dictatorship.

That sense of relief was short lived. In a matter of days, Erdogan purged not only hundreds of high-ranking military officers, (a step for which there was at least reasonable justification), he went after other institutions that had long impeded his attempts at increasingly autocratic rule. Nearly 3,000 judges were removed and arrested. He even fired 21,000 teachers from the country’s school system. The extent and speed of the systematic purge confirms that Erdogan simply used the attempted coup as a pretext for a plan long in place. The United States now confronts the problem of a NATO ally that is a dictatorship in all but name.

The frustrations with Turkey should have been building for years, if not decades. After all, U.S. officials were under pressure to look the other way as Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and continued to illegally occupy the northern portion of that country ever since. Washington offered no more than feeble protests when Ankara established the puppet Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the occupied territories and moved in tens of thousands of settlers from the Turkish mainland. Such indifference makes U.S. expressions of outrage over Russia’s annexation of Crimea seem more than a little hypocritical.

More recently, Erdogan has systematically eroded the foundations of not only Turkey’s democratic institutions, but even the secular orientation put in place by modern Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, after World War I. The crackdown on a free press and the harassment of political opponents has grown steadily worse over the past two or three years. Even before the post-coup purges, those authoritarian trends had reached alarming levels. Today’s Turkey more closely resembles Putin’s Russia than it does a genuine Western democracy.

When the nation’s vital security interests are truly imperiled, it is sometimes necessary to make common cause with even sleazy allies. Britain and the United States had to cooperate with Josef Stalin’s murderous Soviet Union to counter Adolf Hitler. But such moral compromises need to be extraordinary exceptions, not done casually. As Turkey sinks into blatantly authoritarian rule, the primary justification for retaining a close security relationship is Ankara’s relevance in sustaining Washington’s hyper-interventionist policy in the Middle East. Since the evidence is overwhelming that that policy is a disaster and should be rescinded, U.S. officials also ought to reconsider its ties to Turkey. 

As part of that process, Washington should, as it applies to Turkey, immediately repudiate the provision in article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that considers an attack on one member as an attack on all and obligates the United States to render assistance. It is bad enough for U.S. leaders to risk the lives of the American people to defend a liberal democratic ally that is not essential to the security of the republic. It is much worse to incur such a risk to defend a thinly disguised dictatorship that is not essential to America’s security. Yet that is the situation we now face with Turkey. We need to adopt a much more cautious relationship with an increasingly unsavory regime. 

The Pentagon awaits authority from Congress to repurpose military bases. Fears of the potentially harmfully economic effects on local communities when bases close largely explain Congress’s intransigence. The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process was created in the late 1980s to allow closures to occur without forcing individual members to vote for them. It was a dodge, to be sure, but it worked: in five successive rounds, the military was able to eliminate some of its excess infrastructure and overhead.


But the problem hasn’t gone away. The Pentagon estimates that its physical footprint will exceed its needs by more than 20 percent by 2019.


A few Democrats in Congress are trying to help.


“We need to provide the Department of Defense flexibility to find savings and efficiencies wherever it can in order to support our warfighters,” explained Rep. Adam Smith (D‑Wash.), top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee. “That is especially true now, as Congress continues to strain the military by funding it through short-term budget agreements. We should not be making the military cut training and supplies while at the same time refusing to let DOD save money that we know is not being used productively.”


Smith has a point. But base reuse is about much more than allowing the military to allocate its resources wisely. Transitioning bases to non-military uses allows local communities to do so, too.


While the Democrats are in Philadelphia this week for their nominating convention, they should take a trip to visit one of the bases closed during the BRAC process – now known as The Navy Yard. POLITICO has a great profile of the place here. I wrote about it in this new book.


As I explain over at The Skeptics:

the C in BRAC is misleading. Bases aren’t closed. Properly managed, and with a little bit of luck, most former military facilities are repurposed for other chiefly nonmilitary pursuits. And some make the transition quite quickly.


Of the fifteen instances of defense conversion that I’ve studied so far, Philadelphia’s Navy Yard is one of the most impressive.…


[…]


Philadelphia has a lot of things going for it, but I hope city officials make a point of bragging to visitors from the nation’s capital this week about what has happened to their former military base. They might even give them a tour. If they do, it could weaken opposition in Congress to another round of base closures, which is so desperately needed. Indeed, the opponents might come around to the view that the opening of a nearby base is precisely the boost that a flagging local economy needs.

Here’s an idea. Six other Democrats co-sponsored Rep. Smith’s latest bill that would allow a new BRAC: Reps. Sam Farr (Calif.), Susan Davis (Calif.), Jim Cooper (Tenn.), Madeleine Bordallo (Guam), Jackie Speier (Calif.) and Beto O’Rourke (Texas). I’ll bet that a few of them will be in Philly.

Last month, Rep. O’Rourke tried to attach an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that would have lifted the ban on base closures, but it was soundly defeated, 263–157. 53 Democrats, listed below, voted no. I’m guessing that they’ll be at the convention, too.


Perhaps Smith and his six co-sponsors could escort a few of them down to the Navy Yard? I think they’ll all like the trip.

Now a study has attached numbers to what we’ve known for a long time: giving attention to terrorists encourages terrorism. A study by Michael Jetter, professor at the School of Economics and Finance at Universidad EAFIT in Medellín, Colombia, and research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Labour in Bonn, Germany, finds a clear link between the number of news articles devoted to an initial terrorist incident and the number of follow-up attacks. A New York Times article about an attack in a particular country will increase the number of ensuing attacks in the same country by between 11 percent and 15 percent.

The simple solution is disallowed by our fundamental law of free speech. But consumers can demand less aggrandizement of terror incidents from the media and politicians. The practice in journalism of declining to name rape victims could be extended in modified form to terror organizations and leaders.

There is no reason to keep information about terrorists and terror groups secret, but more muted references to them will decrease the success of attacks by reducing the awareness of potential recruits, for example. Potential terrorists are susceptible to discouragement through diminished public information because many have a room temperature IQ (on the Celsius scale).

In our edited volume, Terrorizing Ourselves, Chris Preble, Ben Friedman, and I included two chapters that relate to this topic: “The Impact of Fear on Public Thinking about Counterterrorism Policy: Implications for Communicators,” by Priscilla Lewis, and “Communicating about Threat: Toward a Resilient Response to Terrorism,” by William Burns.

As expected, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled against China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Philippines was exultant. Beijing responded angrily.

Territorial disputes pose a perennial international problem. Great powers, including the U.S., typically refuse to be bound by the decisions of others when they believe important interests to be at stake.

The existing order in the Asia-Pacific was established at a time when China was unable to effectively assert its claims or defend its territory. Understandably, Beijing is dissatisfied with the status quo.

Nor is Beijing the first rising power to challenge a system seemingly biased against it. The young American republic responded truculently in border disputes with both Great Britain and Mexico, even invading the latter and seizing half of that country.

In recent years the PRC has challenged territorial claims of Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Manila lacks an effective military and turned to the arbitration panel for support. The decision reaffirmed the position of the Philippines and nearby states, which will embolden them to take a tougher position against China.

Unsurprisingly, Beijing rejected the ruling and promised “to protect its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.” The PRC also won’t be inclined to step back.

The U.S. insists it takes no position in the ongoing disputes, but Washington has clashed with China over the former’s right to collect intelligence. If war erupted in the region, America’s alliance with Japan and ambiguous commitment to Manila could drag the United States into combat with nuclear-armed China.

All parties have an obligation to dampen tensions. They should start by recognizing that none of the disputed claims are worth war.

The resources in surrounding waters could be substantial but still would pale compared to the cost of conflict. In peacetime navigation would continue largely unimpeded. Wartime navigation would depend upon on the capabilities of the respective navies.

Calls on the U.S. to confront China are misguided. The PRC’s stake in securing its coast is vital and the waters beyond substantial.

America’s interests are more diffuse and distant. Dominating China’s borders might be theoretically desirable but isn’t necessary to protect American security. Navigational freedom is important but not directly threatened. Peaceful dispute resolution by others is welcome but not a matter for the U.S. military.

Of course, many in Washington believe that the sight of a few American ships would deter aggressive action by China. Alas, the PRC is not likely to respond by abandoning interests viewed as essential. Rather, it would do what the U.S. almost certainly would do if similarly provoked: increase military outlays.

Although the U.S. will remain wealthier and more powerful than China for years to come, the former cannot forever afford to maintain military forces strong enough to have a reasonable certainty of defeating the PRC in the latter’s home waters. Once the entitlement tsunami begins to overwhelm the federal budget, Americans will sacrifice Scarborough Reef and the Senkakus to protect Social Security. In contrast, Chinese citizens likely would spend and risk whatever is necessary to ensure the disputed territories remain Chinese.

As I point out in National Interest: “the best outcome for Washington would be for events to take their natural course, that is, the PRC’s neighbors rearm and coordinate to counter Beijing’s aggressiveness. The participation of both India and Japan would make a serious regional coalition possible.”

Only mutually agreed solutions, not disputed legal rulings, can settle the region’s territorial disputes. In fact, the PRC peacefully resolved 17 of 23 previous border disputes.

Overall the parties should to “seek common ground while reserving differences,” as Wu Shicun of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies put it. The U.S. and its friends should demonstrate that China’s interests would be respected by adapting to changed circumstances.

The tribunal decision may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for America’s allies. Despite the court ruling, they still will have to negotiate to settle the issue. 

Turkey was convulsed by an attempted coup last week. Nominally democratic but in practice increasingly authoritarian, the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has initiated a broad crackdown that goes well beyond the military. He has the makings of becoming another Vladimir Putin—except supposedly on America’s side, but even that no longer is so sure.

Turkey’s dubious evolution should remind Americans how hard it is for U.S. officials to play social engineers to the world. Instead of constantly meddling in hopes of “fixing” other nations, Washington should step back when its interests are not vitally affected, which is most of the time. The physicians’ injunction, “First do no harm,” would be a good principle for American foreign policy.

Ankara joined NATO during the Cold War. Containment of the Evil Empire was the principal objective. That policy should have expired with the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Friendship rather than alliance should have become America’s objective.

Unfortunately, Washington decided to use its new “unipower” status to attempt to micro-manage the Middle East. Successive administrations launched a succession of ill-considered interventions.

Washington oft relied on bases in Turkey. The one time Ankara said no, in 2003, America’s deputy defense secretary suggested that the military straighten out the civilian government.

However, Erdogan transformed Turkish politics. He started as a reformer and won support in the U.S. and Europe. They looked at Turkey as the model of a moderate, democratic Islamic state.

But around 2010 the Turkish experiment began to go sour. Erdogan dropped his liberal veneer. He seemed to mutate into a corrupt and authoritarian throwback to Turkey’s seamy past. He also pushed a more fundamentalist Islam into the public sphere.

Erdogan went AWOL on foreign policy as well. He decided he wanted to overthrow his former ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and sought to drag the U.S. into that conflict. But until recently Erdogan turned a blind eye to the Islamic State’s use of Turkey as a base and transit route to Syria.

Then last fall Ankara risked a confrontation with Russia, shooting down one of the latter’s warplanes for briefly violating Turkish airspace. Erdogan recently decided to repair that relationship. Washington found itself uncomfortably tied to his increasingly erratic and repressive role.

Although last week the U.S. backed Erdogan as the legitimately elected president, conspiracy theories involving Washington were rife in Turkey. Some Turks couldn’t believe it wasn’t intervening again.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship shows how hard it is to stop meddling once you start. Washington is constantly (and usually futilely) involved, attempting to reshape the Mideast. That requires Turkish assistance. Which in turn requires friendship with whatever government is in power, no matter how antithetical to U.S. values.

As I pointed out in Forbes: “Washington is never going to be isolated from the world. But it should stop attempting to forcibly transform the world. In Turkey the U.S. has found itself forced to embrace a man who cannot be trusted to support people’s liberty at home or fight Islamic radicalism abroad. So why is America still supporting him?”

The failed coup attempt in Turkey – and President Erdogan’s harsh crackdown in response – has provoked reassessment of Turkey from a number of perspectives. Most obviously, the episode indicates that Turkey is both less stable and even less democratic than most people imagined not long ago. Though the United States has long criticized Erdogan’s authoritarian proclivities, it is rapidly becoming clearer that Erdogan’s vision is the remaking of Turkey’s secular democracy into an Islamic republic. For Europe, Turkey’s instability will aggravate concerns about Syrian refugees (over two million of whom are living in Turkey) and reignite debate about the wisdom of welcoming Turkey into the European Union.

But Turkey’s domestic politics also have important implications for American foreign policy. In the short run, instability in Turkey will cause discomfort for its NATO allies and likely cause problems in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). More fundamentally, however, Turkey provides a cautionary tale about the dangers of relying on authoritarian regimes to help conduct foreign policy.

One immediate concern is the physical security of several dozen American B61 tactical nuclear weapons “purportedly” housed at Incirlik air base in southern Turkey. Turkey has long played host to the weapons as part of the American effort to extend nuclear deterrence to its NATO allies. During the coup activists flew sorties from Incirlik, prompting the Turkish government to cut off power to the base. Eventually, Turkey also arrested the head of the base. Regardless of whatever electronic safeguards might exist to keep the weapons from misuse, this experience should serve as a wake-up call. As Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists noted, “You only get so many warnings before something goes terribly wrong. It’s time to withdraw the weapons.”

Another worry is that the turmoil in Turkey will hamper its contribution to the fight against ISIS. Given its location, Turkey plays an important role in the American response to ISIS. The United States relies on the air bases in Incirlik and Diyarbakir to fly bombing missions in Syria. The coup forced only day’s interruption in the Incirlik-based air campaign, but the episode raises concerns about what might happen should more unrest follow.

More generally, the coup raises further doubts about Turkey’s interest in engaging ISIS. Despite sharing a border with Syria and Iraq, Turkey has always seemed to be a bit conflicted when it comes to its priorities. Turkey, for example, has failed to secure its border with Syria, enabling ISIS to move stolen goods into Turkey and thereby fueling its rise. In addition, Turkey won’t support the Syrian Kurds who are fighting ISIS (and who are U.S. allies) because Turkey’s longstanding “Kurdish problem” means that Erdogan is just as concerned about making sure the Kurds do not carve out an independent territory on the border as he is about ISIS. Thus, at the best of times, the United States has been frustrated with Turkey’s performance.

The wake of a failed military coup, of course, represents something far from the best of times. Observers like former NATO supreme allied commander Admiral James Stavridis have argued that the loss of civilian confidence in the Turkish military and the fallout from the purges will have “a chilling effect on military readiness and performance.”

It is important to realize, however, that none of these short-run problems are Turkey’s fault. Instead, they are the result of flawed American grand strategy. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially after 9/11, the United States has adopted a strategy of liberal hegemony that places a heavy emphasis on military intervention and the role of the United States in managing regional security regimes. This strategy, in turn, makes it necessary to rely on “partners” and “allies” that can enable American military power projection.

The only reason the United States has to worry about the security of nuclear weapons in Turkey is the mistaken belief that NATO still needs American help to provide for its members’ security. In reality, however, Europe enjoys a much larger population and economy than Russia, and NATO forces – even without the United States – are far better trained and equipped than Russian forces. The fact is that the United States no longer needs to belong to NATO, much less deploy nuclear weapons on European soil.

The question is somewhat more complicated when it comes to fighting ISIS, but the same lesson applies. The only reason Turkish air bases matter to the United States is their utility for conducting air campaigns in the Middle East. Though there are certainly some situations where such campaigns might be necessary, the American experience in the Middle East since 9/11 has made it clear that traditional military means are a poor (and probably counterproductive) strategy for fighting terrorism. If the United States were not so devoted to military intervention, the need for Incirlik and other bases in the Middle East would disappear.

International politics is a full contact sport. Difficult trade-offs are often required and sometimes cooperating with authoritarian regimes is necessary. But the need to do so will be greatly reduced if the United States can succeed in adopting a more restrained approach to foreign policy. If the United States can wean itself from the need to try to solve every problem through the use of military force, there will be no reason to soft-pedal human rights and other violations in Turkey. Cutting fewer deals with authoritarian regimes will also help limit their legitimacy while strengthening American calls for greater liberty and democracy. Most importantly, the United States will be free to align its foreign policy more closely with its own democratic values.