In October 2014, Cato published the book, Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, which Christopher Preble and I edited. I also contributed a chapter, “Nuclear Alarmism: Proliferation and Terrorism,” and this is now being made available online as part of Cato’s Project on Threat Inflation.

The chapter argues that the obsession with nuclear proliferation over the last three-quarters of a century has been unwarranted. The few countries that have acquired the weapons have used them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats, and that continues to be the case. Moreover, nuclear proliferation has proceeded at a remarkably slow pace and the nuclear club has remained a small one, confounding the somber prophesies of generations of alarmists: even the supposedly optimistic forecasts about nuclear dispersion have proven to be too pessimistic. When North Korea first tested a nuclear weapon in 2006, alarm had been voiced that this would unleash a proliferation cascade, or, in the words of Mohammed El-Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that it would signal “the beginning of the end of our civilization.” These predictions have gone unfulfilled. There was little sign of the warned-about cascade in 2014, and that remains so today: thus far, no country in the region has altered its commitment to remain a nuclear-weapons-free state.

Sadly, however, nearly six years after the book’s publication, hysteria about nuclear proliferation remains about as strong as ever, and in result, so do the destructive consequences of the anti-proliferation regime. In recent years, it has been focused on North Korea—evolving into a full-fledged food fight between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and President Donald Trump in 2017.

The chapter argued that alarmed anti-proliferation efforts, as in the U.S. war in Iraq, have proved to be exceedingly costly, leading to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. In an important sense this has continued for the North Korean case. Indeed, a recent United Nations report contends that “widespread food shortages and malnutrition,” caused in part by efforts to deal with the Covid 19 pandemic in which the border with China has been cut off, are currently being exacerbated by the sanctions.

Moreover, the U.S. government’s demand that North Korea relinquish its nuclear weapons and the sanctions that accompany that demand stand in the way of a highly desirable development. Specifically, there is a reasonable prospect that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is genuine about wanting to see his country become developed—he has already instituted some notable, if limited, reforms. In this atmosphere, it seems likely that relations between the North and South can gradually be normalized, a development that could become permanent. This does not mean unification is in the offing, nor does it mean that the regime and the privileged elite in the North will cease to exist or even necessarily be weakened. But the prospect of armed conflict in the area would decrease substantially following normalization. In turn, the plight of the North Korean people—the chief victims of the current stalemate—would markedly improve.

Given the current state of tensions and distrust, the removal of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is essentially a nonstarter for the North under just about any condition, and the sanctions seem to be having little or no effect except to make the North Korean people even more miserable. Whatever happens, the regime is likely to remain in control while passing on any negative consequences to its people. In addition, the sanctions include a set of secondary sanctions on other countries that hamper efforts in the South to reach out to the North at this crucial time. The sanctions, then, are doubly foolish. I have written a Cato Policy Analysis paper on this issue, published on the occasion of the 70^th anniversary of the start of the Korean War.

If destructive concerns about nuclear proliferation have not abated since 2014, there does seem to have been something of a diminishment in hysteria about nuclear terrorism. As the chapter notes, it was once widely predicted that, because al-Qaeda operatives used box cutters so effectively on 9/11, they would, although under siege, soon apply equal talents in science and engineering to fabricate nuclear weapons and then detonate them on American cities. For example, President Barack Obama urged in a speech on April 11, 2010, that “The single biggest threat to U.S. security, short term, medium term and long term, would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon.” A popular estimate was that such a disaster might well happen by 2014—the year of the publication of A Dangerous World?

In contrast, the chapter argues that, given the decidedly limited capabilities of terrorists, this concern was substantially overwrought: terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. That lack of action may be because, after a brief exploration of the possible routes, they—unlike generations of alarmists—have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful.

At any rate, concern about atomic terrorism seems to have declined. This is particularly impressive in that the period since the publication embraced the alarming rise and fall of Islamic State, or ISIS, in the Middle East, an especially vicious group that occupied territory, had a great deal of (confiscated) wealth, was competently organized and run, and seemed to have worldwide allure. The group generated very considerable alarm at its peak: a poll conducted in the spring of 2016 asked the 83 percent of its respondents who said they closely followed news stories about ISIS whether the group presented “a serious threat to the existence or survival of the US” and fully 77 percent agreed, more than two-thirds of them strongly. Additionally indicative, perhaps, is an episode in 2015 in which a woman in Salem, Illinois, misunderstood a telephone message stating that retired minister Michael Ice and his wife were coming to her church, and called the Sheriff to report with alarm that “the ISIS” were coming.

Polls suggest that there has not been much change in the degree to which people voice concern about international terrorism. But, despite the alarming experience of ISIS, it does seem that the once-routine concerns about the atomic terrorist have waned some.

There is an ongoing debate about how to overcome groupthink in US foreign policy and make necessary changes to America’s strategy in the world. Most recently, Cato’s own Emma Ashford wrote in Foreign Affairs about the so-called “blob,” a reference to an insular foreign policy elite and the resultant policy inertia it creates.

Earlier this month, David C. Kang, professor of international relations at the University of Southern California, lamented one example of the narrow parameters of debate on one of the recurring priorities in U.S. foreign policy, North Korea:

Kang is generally right, but last week a card-carrying member of the blob landed on precisely this point. In an interview with PBS, Robert Gates, former defense secretary and CIA director, argues that the quest for denuclearization of North Korea is futile and implies it is distracting policymakers from more realistic objectives.

We need to come to the realization that the North Korean leadership is probably never going to give up their military — their nuclear capability. I think they see it as essential to their survival.

At what point do we recognize that the North is not going to give up its nuclear weapons and decide that some minimal number is acceptable, as long as we are able to have complete access to North Korea, to be able to verify an agreement and numbers of weapons and so on, and kind of anywhere/​anytime inspections, so that we know they cannot expand that capability, and we know where the weapons that they have are?

We have to come to grips with the reality these guys aren’t giving these things up, period.

That rare dissent from the broad policy consensus that North Korea is a dangerous, even suicidal, dictatorship that plans to use its nuclear weapons offensively and thus must be denuclearized, was quite refreshing. Especially so because today the Cato Institute is publishing a paper by senior fellow John Mueller with a very similar thesis. Mueller contends that the U.S. demand that North Korea relinquish its nuclear weapons stands in the way of normalization of relations and hinders progress on other discreet issues.

North Korea considers the weapons to be vital to its fundamental security — especially to deter any U.S. attempt to overthrow its regime by force. Accordingly, abandoning or at least downplaying the nuclear weapons issue is essential to make any progress toward normalization.

The upside to a normalization on the Korean peninsula is enormous, while the downside risk is marginal. If the effort fails — most likely because the North Korean regime, unlike similar ones in China and Vietnam, will prove to be unwilling or incapable of taking the required steps of economic reform — no one will be much worse off than they are now. Accordingly, U.S. policy should focus on the possibilities for normalization by relaxing or removing sanctions, stopping the threats, and letting South Korea take the lead in the process. Any demand that North Korea give up its nuclear weapons can, and should, wait.

Read Mueller’s Policy Analysis in full: “Nuclear Anti‐ Proliferation Policy and the Korea Conundrum: Some Policy Proposals.”

This past June, the U.S. State Department inspector general who was fired by President Trump, revealed that the administration discouraged him from investigating arms sales to Saudi Arabia, which the administration has pursued despite intense opposition in Congress in light of Saudi Arabia’s disastrous war in Yemen and the murder of Washington Post journalist, Jamal Khoshoggi. These investigations also carried particular weight because of the sheer volume of sales from Washington to Riyadh. According to data from the Security Assistance Monitor, the United States delivered over $34 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia since 2002 and the two countries have agreed to sales worth $5.08 billion in 2019 alone.

Meanwhile, the administration is preventing investigations into a country that uses American-made weapons to commit human rights abuses in Yemen, funds unsavory extremist groups, and opposes U.S. diplomacy abroad.

Our recent article in Strategic Studies Quarterly suggests that this situation is not unique.

Power, Profit, or Prudence?

Our study seeks to determine the relative impact of strategic, economic, and risk factors in explaining U.S. arms sales since 2001.

The traditional view, echoed both by most scholarly research and Washington’s policymakers, is that strategic considerations explain why the U.S. sells more weapons to certain partners than others. They argue that arms sales are a tool for strengthening the military capability of allies and strategic partners to increase regional stability abroad.

A competing view is that economic motives drive arms sales. This has been echoed by President Trump. Referring to an arms deal with Saudi Arabia, he noted that the sale, “will create hundreds of thousands of jobs, tremendous economic development, and much additional wealth for the United States.” Critics of arms sales often argue that in fact it is the narrower, profit motives of defense contractors that explain the pattern of U.S. arms sales, and that they often outweigh other considerations.

Finally, by law, the United States must consider the possible negative consequences of every arms sale before approving it. The 1976 Arms Export Control Act, the 1997 Leahy Law, and the 2008 Foreign Assistance Act all require in various ways that the U.S. government give consideration to risks. Even the Trump administration’s update of the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy emphasizes avoiding civilian casualties made by American weapons.

To understand what factors shape U.S. arms sales, we collected data concerning arms purchases, ally status, bilateral trade, military expenditures, and risk indicators for 183 countries, 169 of whom purchased U.S. weapons at some point since 2001.

Overall, we find strong evidence for the impact of strategic considerations. Between 2002 and 2019, for example, we find that American allies purchased $135 billion of weapons compared to $75 billion for non-allies. Even controlling for other factors, we find that the United States sells over twice as much to allies as non-allies.

We also find evidence that economic considerations are crucial to determining where Washington sells weapons. Holding other variables at their means, moving from the lowest to highest value for bilateral trade leads to a predicted increase of $491 million in arms sales. Utilizing a similar process, but replacing trade with military expenditures, we find that the country who spends the most on their military will receive an additional $372 million in sales.

Unfortunately, however, we do not find any evidence that risk considerations help shape arms flows. Leading customers include both low-risk nations like Japan and Australia and high-risk nations like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. This is reflected in our analysis where risk fails to reach statistical significance in any of our models.

These findings are concerning. Out of the 74 allies that bought weapons, fourteen of them ranked in the riskiest category for one of the indices making up our risk index. We find an even more extreme result for the 95 non-allies who bought weapons: over half are in the riskiest category for one of our indices.

Balancing the Costs and Benefits of Arms Sales:

Without question, analyzing the costs and benefits of an arms deal is difficult given that reasonable minds may disagree on which benefits and risks matter most, as well as on how likely each of them is to be realized. What also makes it difficult to balance benefits and risks is the fact that most of the benefits come in the short term, while the downside risks will emerge over a much longer time frame.

Regardless, recent history should give observers pause. The United States has seen weapons sold to risky customers misused, lost, stolen, and used by terrorist groups against Americans and its partners. During the Trump administration American weapons have enabled autocrats and amplified conflicts, including Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, and heightened tensions with Russia and China.

Moving forward the United States can do more to reduce the risks from selling weapons. As we argue in our article, a simple start would be to stop selling weapons to the 62 countries that are not American allies and which have one or more red flags with respect to key indicators of risk such as poor human rights records, high levels of political violence and terrorism, etc.

Editor’s note: In 2014, Cato released A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security an edited volume of papers originally presented at a Cato conference the previous year. In each chapter, experts assessed and put in context the supposed dangers to American security, from nuclear proliferation and a rising China to terrorism and climate change.

As part of our Project on Threat Inflation, Cato is republishing each chapter in an easily readable online format. Even six years after its publication, much of the book remains relevant. Policymakers and influencers continue to tout a dizzying range of threats, and Americans are still afraid. We invited each author to revisit their arguments and offer a few new observations in light of recent events. You can view previous entries here, here, here, and here, as well as on the Project on Threat Inflation homepage.

This week’s entry comes from Mark G. Stewart, a professor of civil engineering at the University of Newcastle, and frequent Cato contributor. His latest book, Climate Adaptation Engineering: Risks and Economics for Infrastructure Decision-Making (Elsevier 2019), deals with many of the same subjects as his chapter in A Dangerous World?

A January 2019 report prepared by the Department of Defense opens with “The effects of a changing climate are a national security issue with potential impacts to Department of Defense (DoD) missions, operational plans, and installations.” This is a sensible statement of fact — all potential threats need careful consideration. What is striking about this report is the measured and methodical approach it takes to existing and future climate vulnerabilities facing the US military. Adaptive planning, installation resiliency, climate resiliency, and adaptation strategies feature prominently in the DoD report. My chapter echoes many of these sentiments — climate change impacts will gradually accrue over time, the military can adapt to changing circumstances, and bespoke adaptation can ameliorate many of the effects of climate change. One example cited in the DoD report was that the risk of flash flooding at Fort Hood, Texas, was dealt with by replacing the two most dangerous low water crossings with bridges. The report also recommends that new developments should be constructed at a minimum elevation of 10.5 feet above sea level. These practical actions are what we call “climate adaptation engineering” — my 2019 book on this topic delves into how this can be achieved using rational and measured assessment of impacts, risks, costs and benefits.

The report also notes that climate impacts are already “fully integrated into planning efforts” and capacity-building efforts “will adapt to a variety of trends and projections.” The impact of climate change on DoD’s operations seems modest. For example, increased maritime traffic in the Arctic will require additional search and rescue resources, and “further military support to civil authorities to enable peaceful opening of the Arctic as access increases” with “enhanced opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners.” To be sure, there will be challenges for national security. However, many will be manageable given that the timeframe for climate impacts is decades into the future.

With an annual budget of $700 billion I predicted that the DoD have ample resources to deal with a changing climate and shifting priorities over time. Tellingly, the DoD report closes with “resources for assessing and responding to climate impacts are provided within existing DoD missions, funds, and capabilities and subsumed under existing risk management processes.” Hence, the conclusion from my chapter that annual military expenditures may need to increase by about $3 billion (or 0.4 percent of budget outlays) still holds, and it is reasonable that this cost can readily be absorbed into the existing DoD budget.

Unlike the rhetoric of some commentators and activists, there is no mention in the report of climate change being an existential threat to the United States.

Much of this chapter still holds today. Most doom and gloom climate change predictions are based on unmitigated CO₂ emissions to 2100. Many developed countries have already reduced their emissions, and the 2016 Paris Agreement is a step in the right direction to further reducing emissions. There is room for optimism that the world is less dangerous than we fear.

I thank Chris Preble, John Mueller and the Cato Institute again for inviting me to be part of their stimulating project and welcome any comments.

-Mark G. Stewart

Given the reaction from advocates of Washington’s foreign policy status quo in Europe (and nearly everywhere else in the world), one might think that President Trump’s reported decision to order a modest drawdown of 9,500 U.S. troops stationed in Germany was a crime akin to Gen. Benedict Arnold’s defection to the British during the American Revolution. NATO partisans portray the move as a betrayal of America’s democratic European allies, an impulsive, dangerous gesture, and a geostrategic gift to, wait for it…Vladimir Putin. Council on Foreign Relations scholar Philip Gordon summarizes the foreign policy establishment’s indictment succinctly. “President Donald J. Trump’s order to withdraw nearly ten thousand U.S. troops from Germany betrays a close ally, undermines confidence in Washington, and makes Europe and the United States less safe.”

All of the arguments against the move are deeply flawed. First, it was not an impulsive move, reflecting Trump’s supposed pique at German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s refusal to attend the forthcoming G‑7 summit in the United States. U.S. officials have complained for years about Berlin’s anemic defense spending and its free-riding on America’s security commitment. In August 2019, U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell warned explicitly that a partial or total withdrawal would take place unless Germany boosted its spending and accepted more responsibility for NATO’s collective defense effort. Washington’s growing impatience with allied free-riding predates the Trump administration, as blunt comments from two of President Obama’s secretaries of defense (Robert M. Gates and Chuck Hagel) confirmed.

Second, a withdrawal of 9,500 troops has little operational military significance; Washington still plans to retain 25,000 military personnel in Germany. It’s worth recalling that during portions of the Cold War, the United States had nearly 400,000 troops in Europe—most of them in Germany. If reducing force levels from that level to 34,500 didn’t drastically alter the military equation, it’s difficult to see how another 9,500 would have such a deleterious impact.

Third, the move is hardly a great boon to Putin. Yet that is the go-to smear whenever Trump or anyone else suggests even the slightest reduction in the U.S. commitment to NATO or a less confrontational posture regarding Russia. Critics keep accusing President Trump of being “Putin’s puppet,” despite abundant evidence that U.S. policy toward Moscow has grown tougher, not milder, under Trump

The tone in a new analysis by Politico’s David M. Herszenhorn was typical. His article asserted that Trump had “stunned” Germany and the other NATO allies, with a unilateral move “seen as benefit to Russia.” Later in the article, Herszenhorn favorably quoted Retired Lieutenant Gen. Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. Army Europe. Hodges contended that Russia would be a main beneficiary of the withdrawal — and that a softening of the U.S. military posture was unjustified. “The Kremlin has done nothing to deserve a gift like this,” he said. “No change in behavior in Ukraine or Syria or along NATO’s eastern flank or in the Black Sea or Georgia, Yet they get a 28 percent reduction in the size of U.S. military capability that was a core part of NATO’s deterrence.” Even by the usual standards in both the foreign policy establishment and the mainstream media when opposing a change in Washington’s European policy, such arguments constitute a knee-jerk endorsement of the NATO status quo.

Opponents of Trump’s modest troop drawdown need to look at a calendar. It reads 2020, not 1950 or even 1989. There is no totalitarian Soviet threat, and the Red Army is not poised to pour through the Fulda Gap in Germany and try to sweep to the Atlantic. Today’s Russia is a pale shadow of the USSR in terms of population, economic output, and military power. Indeed, the nations of the European Union collectively have a population nearly three times larger, and a GDP nearly ten times larger. The European countries are more than capable of providing for their own defense, if they choose to spend the necessary funds. Germany and its neighbors need to stop whining like weak security dependents of the United States. That act is getting very, very old.

As China prepares to take over Hong Kong⁠—effectively ending the era of “one country, two systems”⁠—other countries are struggling with how to respond.

One of the best responses has come from Great Britain. In a column for The Times, Prime Minister Boris Johnson proposed a path to British citizenship for nearly 3 million Hong Kong residents. Johnson writes:

Many people in Hong Kong fear that their way of life — which China pledged to uphold — is under threat. If China proceeds to justify their fears, then Britain could not in good conscience shrug our shoulders and walk away; instead we will honor our obligations and provide an alternative.

The Washington Post reports that, “China’s Foreign Ministry said Wednesday that Britain has no jurisdiction over Hong Kong. Britain must ‘step back from the brink’ and ‘stop interfering in Hong Kong’s affairs and China’s internal affairs.’”

While Boris Johnson’s plan is light on details, it provides a template for other countries’ responses to China’s increasingly authoritarian takeover of Hong Kong. The threat of losing millions of talented citizens could motivate the Chinese government to ease its grip. Other countries should follow Great Britain’s lead and provide a safe haven for individuals whose lives and liberties are under threat by the Chinese Communist Party.

Editor’s note: In 2014, Cato released A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security an edited volume of papers originally presented at a Cato conference the previous year. In each chapter, experts assessed and put in context the supposed dangers to American security, from nuclear proliferation and a rising China to terrorism and climate change.

As part of our Project on Threat Inflation, Cato is republishing each chapter in an easily readable online format. Even six years after its publication, much of the book remains relevant. Policymakers and influencers continue to tout a dizzying range of threats, and Americans are still afraid. We invited each author to revisit their arguments and offer a few new observations in light of recent events. You can view previous entries here, here, and here and on the Project on Threat Inflation homepage.

This week’s entry comes from Christopher Fettweis, a professor of political science at Tulane University, and the President of the Board of the World Affairs Council of New Orleans.

In “Delusions of Danger,” I made the case that fear in the United States is out-of-proportion to the dangers it faces. In the time since I wrote, I have tried to explain why this is so, where that fear comes from and how the nation can be reassured. Then my country elected Donald Trump to be its president, and I was tempted to delete the whole project and join my cousins in the drywall business.

Donald Trump is a manifestation of American fear. He is the nightmarish personification of everything that scares us, from immigrants to crime to job loss, and he stokes those fears on a daily basis. Even the COVID-19 crisis has provided opportunities for him to remind us of dangers, this time those emanating from China, the WHO and (apparently) arms control treaties. Trump’s entire existence is defined by his enemies, who for his supporters become the enemies of the nation. Voices of reason are easily drowned out by the cacophony of madness. Fear will be the defining feature of American politics as long as we are led by Donald Trump.

The COVID-19 crisis had the potential to mitigate American fears. We could have used this opportunity to recognize our common humanity, to realize that we faced the same challenges and work together toward solutions. Empathy toward the plight of others, whether in China or Iran, could have grown. A better, more rational, less fearful world could have emerged from this ongoing tragedy. Unfortunately we are led by a man incapable of thinking in such directions.

Perhaps it is not, however, time for despair and drywall. Surely it is possible for U.S. foreign policy to emerge stronger and wiser after Trump leaves office. It may prove useful for this country to have its fundamental assumptions challenged, in order to examine its most sacrosanct beliefs and evaluate their value. Trump is the equivalent of what political scientists call a systemic shock, and there is no reason to believe that what follows him will be worse. Perhaps the wreckage he leaves behind can be reconstructed in new ways; perhaps the final chapter in the story of this most pathological of administrations will be a positive one, a happy ending in which the assumptions that drive our decisions can be re-thought. The first few post-Trump years will be crucial: Do we return to the same fearful delusions that led to war after war (and to Trump), or do we seek to improve U.S. policymaking? Can we learn from our hideous national mistake?

Cato’s Project on Threat Inflation could not have come at a better time. With it and the establishment of the Quincy Institute, momentum is building toward more rational foreign policy, and perhaps a better post-Trump world. I worry that restraint will be wrongly tainted with the Trump stench – an odor that will not wash off easily – but that is the subject for another essay. Much of what ails American foreign policy in the short term can be cured with one election. Long-term trends, however, will not change unless acted upon by a force. Such a force may be growing in DC policy circles, but whether it can overcome the power of fear remains to be seen.

-Christopher J. Fettweis