In a joint press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, President Obama stated that he was considering sending weapons to the government of Ukraine. Noting that Russia had already annexed Crimea and was now backing separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine, the president warned that “the West cannot stand and simply allow the borders of Europe to be redrawn at the barrel of a gun.”

Such sentiments might have more credibility if the Western powers, including the United States, had not engaged in similar conduct. But Washington and its NATO allies have indeed redrawn borders, including borders in Europe, through military force. Two incidents are especially relevant. Turkey, a leading member of NATO, invaded Cyprus in 1974 and amputated some 37 percent of that country’s territory. Turkish forces ethnically cleansed the area of its Greek Cypriot inhabitants and, in the years that followed, desecrated a large number of Greek historical and religious sites.

Ankara subsequently established a client state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the occupied territories. Turkey has steadfastly refused to atone for its illegal invasion and occupation, much less disgorge the land that it conquered. Yet except for some token economic sanctions imposed shortly after the invasion, which were soon lifted, Washington has never even condemned the aggression that its NATO ally committed. 

One might assume that it would be awkward for U.S. leaders to excoriate Vladimir Putin’s regime for annexing Crimea or setting up puppet states in the occupied Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which Moscow did after a short, nasty war in 2008) when a NATO member is guilty of similar behavior. But such flagrant inconsistency has apparently caused American officials little difficulty.

The other, even more blatant, case of redrawing European borders by force was the 1999 Kosovo war and its aftermath. The United States and its NATO allies launched an air war against Serbia lasting 78 days to compel Belgrade to withdraw its security forces and relinquish control of the rebellious province. A UN Security Council resolution ratifying that action still recognized Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo but mandated international control and governance of the territory for an indefinite period. A NATO occupation force became the instrument of that control, despite Russia’s misgivings.

In early 2008, the Western powers encouraged and then formally recognized Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from (a now democratic) Serbia. Russia, China, and other countries strenuously objected to that decision, both because it bypassed the UN Security Council and set what they believed was a worrisome precedent in the international community. Indeed, nearly half of the member-states of the UN (including several members of the European Union) still refuse to recognize Kosovo’s independence. 

Given those precedents, it is astonishing for Obama or any other Western official to assert that redrawing European borders by force is unacceptable. Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine deserve condemnation, but the West’s hypocrisy is nothing short of breathtaking.

After a grueling seventeen hours of negotiation, German, French, Ukrainian, and Russian leaders emerged with a compromise agreement aimed at ending the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Although similar to last September’s failed Minsk accords, the new deal provides more details on timing and implementation, which may help a ceasefire to hold. After so many prior failures, strong skepticism is understandable. But if U.S. and European leaders actually commit to the specifics of the deal, it can provide Ukraine with much-needed time to rebuild, reform and address its dire economic problems.

The all-night negotiations between leaders in Belarus showed how far apart the parties were on a number of key issues, including whether the deal should rely on the boundaries laid out in the Minsk I ceasefire, or on the current situation in Eastern Ukraine. Since rebel forces have made substantial territorial gains since September, neither side is keen to concede on the issue. Other issues, including which side will control border crossings into Russia, and the withdrawal of foreign fighters and equipment, proved equally thorny.

Admittedly, the deal still leaves many issues unsettled. It calls for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and a demilitarized buffer zone in Eastern Ukraine. It also mandates constitutional reform to allow the eastern regions increased autonomy, as well as amnesty for those involved in the fighting. But the issue of boundary lines is left effectively unsolved, requiring Kiev to adhere to the current front lines when withdrawing weaponry, and the rebels to adhere instead to the boundaries agreed upon in September. There is also no real mechanism to ensure compliance, although the situation will be monitored by the OSCE.

Still, Minsk II provides more concrete details on each issue, which may help this deal to succeed. Timing is more clearly defined for the start of the ceasefire, the removal of troops and heavy weapons, the creation of the buffer zone, while all constitutional reforms and elections are scheduled to be completed by the end of 2015. The sequencing of events is also more clearly defined: the agreement calls for control of the border to be returned to Ukraine only after new elections in the region, which themselves must follow constitutional reform in Kiev. Since Minsk I’s failure can be attributed in part to disagreement between both sides over who would implement such steps first, this is a welcome change. The restoration of social transfers from Kiev to residents in rebel-controlled areas is also welcome, and may serve to reduce some of the misery in the region.

Although an imperfect deal, it is important that U.S. and European leaders support it. In the next few days, we can expect to see hostilities increase as both sides attempt to make last-minute gains before the ceasefire begins on February 15^th. But thereafter, particularly during the first two week period, leaders must push strongly for both Kiev and Moscow to implement the deal. A substantive ceasefire will provide Kiev with breathing room, allowing them to begin the process of economic reform. Ukraine’s economy, never strong, has been a major casualty of the conflict, with the Hryvnia falling 65% in just the last year. A newly-inked IMF deal will provide Ukraine with $17.5 billion in reform-oriented aid, allowing the government to begin the process of reducing government waste, rooting out corruption, and salvaging the badly damaged economy. It will also provide time to bolster the Ukrainian armed forces, which have performed poorly in the conflict due to rampant corruption and inefficiency. Such reforms would be extremely difficult in the absence of a ceasefire.

This week’s Minsk deal doesn’t necessarily offer a viable long-term solution to the crisis, as it fails to address several key issues. But if it can be made to produce a successful ceasefire, even in the short- or medium-term, it will provide Ukraine’s government with time to strengthen itself by addressing its numerous economic problems and widespread corruption. Such reform is far more valuable to Ukraine’s future prosperity than the current military campaign. 

The Obama Administration is sticking to its talking points claiming climate change affects us more than terrorism. It might be valuable to compare and contrast the real life affects Americans endure from both of these threats.

First, let’s take a look at climate change’s effects in the United States: Hurricane power, when measured by satellites, is near its lowest ever ebb. There’s no change in the frequency of severe tornados. The relationship between heavy snow and temperature is negative along the East Coast. Carbon dioxide and longer growing seasons are significantly increasing the world’s food supply, and there’s no relationship between global temperature and U.S. drought.

Compare this with the effects of terrorism: On September 11, 2001, terrorists took down the World Trade Center and nearly an entire side of the Pentagon, extinguishing 2,996 lives. As a result, every American’s privacy is assaulted by the government on a daily basis—and let’s not talk about what they’ve done to air travel, or worse, Iraq. We’ve managed to remain in a perpetual state of war, unleashing a wave of federal spending our great grandchildren will be repaying.

Perhaps next time President Obama skips the TSA lines to fly around the world on Air Force One (on the taxpayer dime, emitting the carbon of which he’s so scared) he should look down at Arlington National Cemetery at the tombstones left from the reaction to terrorism–it’s an excellent reminder of the real cost of government action.

(Read more about actual threat of terrorism in “Terrorizing Ourselves,” by Benjamin Friedman, Jim Harper and Christopher Prebel, and “Responsible Counterterrorism Policy,” by John Mueller and Mark Stewart.)

Today, six months after President Obama unilaterally launched our latest war in Iraq, five months after he expanded the war to Syria, four months after his administration thought up a name for the war, and three months after he promised to go to Congress for authorization, the president sent congressional leaders a draft “Authorization for the Use of Military Force against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”—along with a message insisting that “existing statutes provide me with the authority I need” to wage war anyway.

Better late than never? Maybe not: as I explain in my “Reclaiming the War Power” chapter in Cato’s new monograph “Policy Priorities for the 114th Congress,” retroactive authorization might be worth it as part of a package deal that sunsets the 2001 AUMF and imposes new barriers to “mission creep” in the war against ISIS. The Obama AUMF does neither.

As drafted, the president’s ISIS AUMF:

1. Does not impose geographic restrictions on the use of military forces (…thus a war that began with the placeholder Pentagon designation “Operations in Iraq and Syria” could easily expand beyond its current two-country theater);

2. Does not include firm limitations on ground combat operations (…unless you think barring “enduring offensive ground combat operations” is a workable and enduring limitation);

3. Does not preclude the war’s expansion to “associates of associates” of ISIS (… in fact, the Obama AUMF’s “associated forces” provision contains a broader delegation than did the 2001 AUMF, which doesn’t contain any such provision…);

4. Does not sunset the 2001 AUMF; and

5. Does not clarify application of the 2001 AUMF to the ISIS fight (…which risks leaving any limits it imposes susceptible to evasion by a president invoking the earlier resolution).

What little congressional debate we’ve seen so far on the president’s new war hardly smacks of “Profiles in Courage.” Still, the draft AUMF approved by the lame-duck Senate Foreign Relations Committee last December, flawed as it was, made for a far better starting point. It imposed a three-year sunset on the 2001 AUMF, applied new transparency requirements, and at least tried to provide limits on ground combat beyond a few flexible adjectives. If Congress is going to retroactively authorize the president’s latest war, they ought to reclaim some of the control they’ve ceded, not blithely delegate still more power. As I argue in greater detail here, “the 114th Congress should pick up where the SFRC left off, and impose additional limits on presidential authority.” Adopting the Obama AUMF as-is would amount to signing another blank check.

In 2015, U.S. defense spending will be about $600 billion, or about 3.24 percent of GDP. The former figure would strike many Americans as sufficient, and a few would find it excessive. Robert Gates once said, “If the Department of Defense can’t figure out a way to defend the United States on a budget of more than half a trillion dollars a year, then our problems are much bigger than anything that can be cured by buying a few more ships and planes.”

But hawks want you to focus on the latter figure, 3.24: they believe that an arbitrary fixed percentage of national output should be dedicated to defense spending every year. For example, Mitt Romney and Bobby Jindal would peg defense spending at 4 percent of GDP. Wall Street Journal columnist Bret Stephens would see that, and raise them. In his new book, America in Retreat, Stephens calls for sharply increasing “military spending to upwards of 5 percent of GDP.”

It’s unclear whether these gentlemen fully appreciate what their proposals would equate to in real dollar terms. (Take a look at the chart below, prepared by my colleague Travis Evans). The bipartisan Budget Control Act (BCA) capped discretionary Pentagon spending at $3.9 trillion between 2015 and 2021, an average of 2.6 percent of GDP per year. That means Americans would need to spend $2.1 trillion above the current caps to meet the 4 percent threshold, and $3.6 trillion more to reach 5 percent. For added perspective, then-House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan’s FY15 alternative projected $4.2 trillion for defense, or 2.8 percent of GDP. In other words, Romney proposed to spend $1.8 trillion more than his running mate, and Stephens’ plan is even more disconnected from fiscal reality — $3.3 trillion more than the de facto GOP budget.

To justify their spending levels, hawks rely on imperfect historical analogies and threat inflation. Of course, it is true that the United States has spent more than 5 percent of GDP on defense in prior years and, at times, far more. President Dwight Eisenhower, who famously warned of a military industrial complex, presided over defense budgets that averaged about 10 percent; President Reagan averaged about 6 percent.

But, as I explain in a review of Stephens’ book in the latest issue of Barron’s:

While it’s true that military spending’s share of gross domestic product used to be higher than 5 percent, that was during the Cold War, when the U.S. was locked in a global struggle with the Soviet Union, and well before soaring entitlement spending threatened to overwhelm the federal budget.

If Stephens is serious about dedicating 5 percent of the nation’s economy to the Pentagon, nearly double what is called for under current law, cutting other federal spending won’t be enough to make up the difference. He never says whether he would hike taxes or add to a federal debt that is already out of control to pay for this global police force. But either way, taxpayer support is not likely.

That support is unlikely because U.S. foreign policy–and the military force structure needed to implement it–isn’t focused solely, or even primarily, on protecting the United States from foreign threats. Rather, our military aims to reassure nervous allies, and thus discourage them from defending themselves. As Stephens puts it, “America is better served by a world of supposed freeloaders than by a world of foreign policy freelancers.”

This is a pretty flimsy justification for massive spending increases. From my Barron’s review:

Set aside the hubristic assumption that the U.S. government can be relied on to respond to distant threats more wisely and prudently than governments much closer to the problem. More broadly, Stephens is asking U.S. men and women to risk their lives in foreign conflicts, many of which have nothing to do with safeguarding American security.

He is also expecting Americans to pay for something they do not support. A recent poll reprinted in the Wall Street Journal in December 2014, pointed out that among the foreign-policy goals that Americans counted as “very important,” “defending our allies’ security” ranked second from the bottom, just one percentage point above “strengthening the United Nations.”

Instead of using an arbitrary percentage of national output to determine defense spending and expecting Americans to pay the bill without question, policymakers should develop a national security strategy that places a priority on U.S. national security, including the nation’s fiscal health, and demands appropriate burden-sharing by our allies. America can maintain its military preeminence for decades if we reduce our military spending (or at least maintain the current caps), enact other reforms to get our fiscal house in order (including fixing entitlements), and allow our allies to better provide for their own security.

The release of a report this week by eight former U.S. government officials calling for the United States to send arms to Ukraine has reopened debate on the issue. The dispute is also lent urgency by the recent sickening escalation of violence in the Donbas, especially against civilians, as well as signs that some within the Obama administration may be reconsidering their stance on this issue. As appalling as the ferocity of recent fighting has been, however, the arguments against arming Ukraine remain as solid as they were three months ago. It would raise the stakes with Russia, while offering little prospect of ending the conflict.

The arguments made in the report, cosponsored by Brookings, the Atlantic Council and The Chicago Council on Global Affairs — seem compelling on the surface. The authors argue that the provision of lethal, but solely defensive, weapons would better allow Ukrainian troops to defend themselves against continuing attacks from pro-Russian rebels. As the evidence indicates that the rebels themselves are being supplied with advanced weapons from Moscow, American weapons would place Ukrainian forces on a more even footing. The report further asserts that such weaponry could raise the continued costs of backing the rebels for Moscow, bringing Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table.

Unfortunately, arming Ukraine will cause more problems than it solves. Certainly, such a move would be a propaganda coup for Russia, which has already been using state media to perpetuate the idea that NATO is involved in the crisis. Russian media is extremely good at blurring key facts to make a coherent, anti-Western narrative, even if the narrative itself is fundamentally false. It won’t matter than the weapons are ‘defensive’ in nature; the Russian media can spin this to bolster their arguments that Ukraine’s government is illegitimate and that the conflict is being driven by NATO. It could even increase popular support for the war among the Russian population.

Arming Ukraine will also shift U.S. policy further away from that of European allies. Although the report’s authors note that many European states could also be encouraged to provide weapons, several key states have already weighed in against such a move. Just yesterday, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told reporters: “Germany will not support Ukraine with weapons… I am convinced that this conflict cannot be solved militarily.” Differentiating the U.S. response from that of European leaders will only provide more ammunition for Russian dissension, further minimizing the likelihood of a diplomatic settlement.

Logistical problems abound. Compatibility may be a major problem given Ukraine’s primarily Soviet and post-Soviet armaments. Timing is another concern: although the report suggests that the U.S. could use current stocks of weapons, it may be logistically impossible to get large quantities of arms to Ukraine, or complete any necessary training, in time for the likely spring offensive by pro-Russian rebels. Even if these problems were overcome, the assumption that weapons will help Ukrainian forces is itself problematic. The Ukrainian army is poorly trained, and would likely require expert support and training from U.S. personnel. The integration of volunteer units into fighting forces is patchy, and corruption remains a problem. Even with U.S. weapons, there is effectively no prospect of a Ukrainian military triumph. 

This brings us to the fundamental problem with the report: an assumption that if Western states can simply raise the costs of conflict high enough, Vladimir Putin will fold under domestic pressure. Raising the costs of conflict for Russia will necessarily increase in the violence in the Donbas. The conflict is already bloody, with thousands of military and civilian casualties. While the Russian government has shown some sensitivity to the costs of the conflict – i.e., casualty numbers are being effectively hidden from the Russian people – it is still extremely unlikely that Putin, who has in large part staked his domestic credibility on this confrontation, will back down. If he does not, the West has little comeback.

Arming Ukraine won’t help to secure military victory, and will not encourage Vladimir Putin to back down. At best, it may help Ukraine to better withstand rebel attacks. But doing so comes at a very high cost, giving Russia additional propaganda material and driving a wedge between Europe and the United States. Worse, it raises the stakes in Ukraine, and will likely serve to increase, not decrease the bloodshed. Let’s hope the White House continues to take a pragmatic approach to the crisis, and resists the temptation to arm Ukraine.

The Greek elections, in which the radical left-wing Syriza won a near majority, shattered the Brussels consensus. A breakdown of the European bail-out program might make a Greek exit from the Euro (“Grexit”) the only feasible option. And the popular revolt against outsiders dictating economic policy may block new attempts to expand Brussels’ power over EU members.

Europe remains the world’s most important economic unit. However, the EU failed to live up to the grand hopes of the Eurocrats, the academic, bureaucratic, business, media, and political elites who dominate continental politics and policy. Voters rejected the proposed constitution to expand Brussels’ authority and reduce national independence a decade ago. 

The Eurocrats then repackaged the convoluted constitution as an incomprehensible treaty, for approval by national parliaments. More power shifted to Brussels. 

However, multiplying bureaucracy stifled action. Loyalty to the EU failed to extend beyond the organization’s sprawling headquarters buildings in Brussels. 

Then the Euro crisis exploded. The Eurozone created a common currency. Only 19 of 28 EU members today belong, but in theory all are supposed to eventually join. Even the Euro’s architects recognized the inherent instability of creating a monetary union without a common budget.

Once in, Athens borrowed at essentially German interest rates and spent wildly. Soon the loan bills came due and Athens couldn’t pay, which triggered a cascade of crises and bail-outs.

Although nominally concerned about Greece and other aid recipients, many Eurocrats had a larger purpose in mind. Said German Chancellor Angela Merkel: “We must overcome the architectural flaws that worked their way into the economic and monetary union during its formation.” Thus, Euroelites used the crisis to bludgeon the European public to accept further continental consolidation. 

European leaders insisted that no country, no matter how badly indebted, should leave the Eurozone. The EU would lend more in return for economic austerity. Although the Greek economy has started growing again, it shrank a quarter since 2008 and unemployment still tops 26 percent. 

That explains why Greeks voted for Syriza, which offered dreamy promises of more spending along with angry demands for debt relief. The Eurocrats imagined that Tsipras would moderate like so many previous radicals had done. But so far he and his party have given no indication of retreating. 

Doing so would disillusion Syriza’s supporters, who voted for non-violent revolution against a corrupt, failed establishment. Tsipras also would risk his government—Syriza is a coalition of leftist parties. 

Crisis could come quickly. The existing bailout program ends in a month. Tax revenues are down, borrowing will become difficult, spending is set to spike. Grexit might look attractive to Athens.

This horrifies the Eurocrats. Worried Chancellor Angela Merkel: “If the Euro fails it’s not just the currency that fails, but Europe and the idea of European unification.” 

Yet if European leaders blink in their game of financial chicken with the Tsipras government, their credibility will be destroyed. If the Troika proves willing to deal, other states will demand similar concessions. Caving in to debtors also would anger the wealthier countries footing the bill. 

Although the European Union is separate from the Eurozone, a break in the latter would impact the former. And the EU already faces increasing challenges. In part because of the lack of popular accountability, electoral opposition to Brussels is exploding.

Euroskeptic parties polled well in last year’s European Parliament elections. These groups are playing an ever greater role in national contests as well. As I point out in National Interest online: “If Tsipras delivers on his promise that “Democracy will return to Greece,” popular opposition to the EU as well as Euro could swell elsewhere.”

Alexis Tsipras and Syriza have delivered an electoral earthquake. Even if Syriza’s economic nostrums fail, its electoral victory may end up reinvigorating popular sovereignty and accountability throughout Europe. That could make radical party’s victory worthwhile.