U.S. arms transfers have become a salient issue during the Biden administration given the Saudi-led war in Yemen, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and continued sales to risky neighbors.

Over the past few weeks, the Biden administration has had to balance supporting Ukraine from a brutal attack while also trying to prevent concerns over weapons dispersion to dangerous groups outside of the country. The administration announced that it is sending $400 million more to Ukraine through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s ongoing war in Yemen continues to expand, which continues in part because of large U.S. weapons sales to the Saudis and their allies.

As we have written about numerous times, the administration’s policy is not reducing risk in arms transfers. Ironically, Biden had the right idea about arms sales in the 1980s. Specifically, during the authorization of the Foreign Assistance Act for 1986 and 1987, then-Senator Joe Biden proposed an amendment that would prohibit “military and paramilitary aid” to the Nicaraguan Contras—a rebel group that was receiving aid from the Reagan administration to fight the communist Nicaraguan Sandinista government. In his defense of the amendment, Biden raised four points that should be considered in his administration’s military aid policy.

First, the amendment proposed providing humanitarian aid instead of military aid. Specifically, Biden said that humanitarian aid will, “ipso facto help the Contras militarily because it will help them economically.” He argued that the United States would provide this aid, “because we wish at this time to confer on the Nicaraguan resistance some measure of legitimacy and practical assistance without affirming the political and moral commitment entailed by overt military support.”

As we have previously discussed, the past eight years of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners has directly tied the United States to the human rights abuses in Yemen. Despite numerous reports about the Saudis targeting civilians with U.S. weapons, Washington’s solution has been to send more weapons, creating a vicious cycle of killing. For Yemen to truly begin recovering, U.S. policymakers need to address the underlying problems and push for peace and offer humanitarian aid to Yemen. In doing so, the United States can disentangle itself from the “moral commitment” while offering “practical assistance.”

Second, Biden noted that “Congress shall consider further aid to the Nicaraguan opposition only if the opposition has acted effectively to remove from its ranks those persons who have engaged in serious abuses of human rights.”

Concern over human rights is a contemporary problem in Biden’s current foreign policy. Despite claiming that the government would more carefully consider a weapons recipient’s human rights record, Biden has sold arms to countries where weapons dispersion is known to lead to civilian casualties, where there is slave-like labor conditions for noncitizens, where they are fighting in violent warzones, and where there is a risk that the government uses military strength to suppress human rights. The damage from this is mitigatable if Biden simply considered human rights before transferring weapons.

Third, Biden’s 1985 proposed amendment would have required both sides to negotiate before the United States would send aid to the Contras or offer sanctions relief to the Nicaraguan government. As Biden stated, “the amendment seeks to promote negotiations by conditioning the availability of this aid on the demonstrated willingness of the administration and of the Contras to enter into talks with the Nicaraguan government.” Further, “the amendment offers to the Sandinista government certain inducements to negotiation by providing for a suspension of the U.S. economic embargo if the Government of Nicaragua enters into a ceasefire and negotiations with opposition forces.”

Admittedly, the situation in Nicaragua was vastly different from what is happening now in Ukraine, where neither side has much incentive to stop fighting. Russia is a great power with the ability to fight a protracted war, and Ukrainian forces have exceeded all expectations and stopped Moscow from winning. Domestically, too, the situations diverge. There are serious bureaucratic dilemmas that prevent Washington from offering this sanctions relief. In essence, Congress needs to remove any sanctions that are public law, which makes any sanction relief promises difficult to implement.

Nonetheless, absent a total nuclear strike, a regime change in either country, or other drastic exogenous shocks, the most likely way any war will end is through negotiations. To this end, it is important for the United States to start thinking about how it can condition both arms transfers to Ukraine and sanctions relief to Russia on attempts at ceasefires and negotiations, not dissimilar to what Biden attempted in 1985.

Finally, in this 1985 defense of his proposed amendment, Biden noted that collaboration between Congress and the president leads to a policy that works “by blending the administration’s emphasis on military aid with congressional emphasis on the practical reality that popular support in a civil war cannot be won by death squads.”

Once again, President Biden should listen to Senator Biden. He has had ample opportunity to pass legislation that would “flip the script” and empower Congress to stop dangerous weapons transfers. Yet, President Biden has continuously failed to seize the opportunity. The administration has not even released its conventional arms transfer policy, where among other things, he could advocate for this “flip the script” legislation.

Ultimately, Biden’s amendment failed to pass in 1985, winning only 22 other senators. Nonetheless, as president, he has power to implement these policies. Someone should remind Biden of what he once believed and encourage him to look to his 1985 self and attempt to change U.S. arms transfer policies for the better.

On October 10, Politico’s Andrew Desiderio reported that Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Bob Menendez (D‑NJ) said that “the United States must immediately freeze all aspects of our cooperation with Saudi Arabia, including any arms sales and security cooperation beyond what is absolutely necessary to defend U.S. personnel and interests.” Desiderio’s tweet and the corresponding article both claim that “Menendez has veto power over foreign weapons sales.”

While stopping the sales would constitute a bold step in reassessing U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia, Menendez cannot veto such sales under current conditions. Our research examines how Congress can restrain the president’s ability to use weapons sales as a foreign policy tool. Ultimately, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair—and Congress as a whole—can stop weapons sales to a specific country through three legislative mechanisms. Unfortunately, they all require presidential tolerance.

Method 1: Section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

Section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 allows the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or House Foreign Affairs Committee to request a report on a specified country. This addition was passed following two House Foreign Affairs subcommittee reports on human rights in 1973 and 1974. After 30 days, no security assistance is delivered until the report is received. Once received, Congress can then pass a joint resolution of disapproval to terminate or restrict security assistance. In the Senate, resolutions requesting a report and post-report are subject to expedited procedures, meaning that a simple majority should be able to move them forward.

The problem is that this is subject to the president’s willingness to let it happen. Current legal precedent does not make this easy. It was tried twice: first in Crockett v. Reagan (1982) and again in Clark v. United States (1985). Both cases were dismissed and never advanced to the Supreme Court. In addition, following Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983), former President George H. W. Bush noted that 502B(c) is likely inconsistent with U.S. law because it would allow a single congressional committee to stop security assistance without being “presented to the President” for review.

More recently, Senator Jeff Merkley, Senator Bob Menendez, and Representative Tom Malinowski have all attempted to employ 502B(c) to no avail. Former President Donald Trump successfully argued that the provision violated separation of powers to stop Menendez and the then chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Corker from using a similar provision of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. Likely, President Biden could do the same thing if Congress enacted 502B(c) to stop sales to Saudi Arabia.

So, while this provision could in theory allow Menendez to veto a sale to Saudi Arabia, it would likely trigger a lengthy court battle. Legally, it is unclear if it can be used, and any lawsuit would likely not have any resolution for well over a year if it did make it to the Supreme Court. Ultimately, that is why one of the most anti-sales-to-human-rights-abusers chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Frank Church, never invoked 502B(c) during his tenure as chair between 1979 and 1981.

Method 2: The Arms Export Control Act of 1976

The Arms Export Control Act gives Congress the ability to stop a sale 30 calendar days before a transfer of equipment valued at $14 million or more. After being notified of a sale, Congress can pass a joint resolution of disapproval. Yet because of two legislative barriers, Congress has never successfully stopped a sale.

First, in the House, there is no mechanism to force the House Foreign Affairs Committee to debate an arms sale, which allows a potential resolution to die in committee. If the House Foreign Affairs Committee does not act to stop a sale, there is nothing Menendez can do because he needs the House to disapprove of the sale to pass a joint resolution.

Second, because Congress needs to pass a resolution disapproving of the president’s sale, the president can veto the resolution. Therefore, even if Congress can unify and both chambers pass a resolution of disapproval to stop a sale, they need to have a veto-proof majority. Trump was able to veto such resolutions to stop sales to Saudi Arabia multiple times.

Absent legislation that “flips the script” to give Congress the power to approve, rather than disapprove, every sale, this presidential veto will override any “veto” that Senator Menendez attempts.

Method 3: The Informal “Hold” Process

In the current arms sales process, the State Department traditionally submits an informal notification to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee 20–40 days before the formal notification. If any members of Congress have serious problems with the sale, the offices can then place a “hold” on the sale until the issues are resolved.

The problem is that this hold is a courtesy and not written into law. According to Alexandra Stark at the New America Foundation, “the administration has the legal authority to ‘blow’ a hold, meaning they trigger the formal notification process anyway despite Congress’ objections.”

Menendez himself already failed to stop a sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia this way in June 2018. He blocked the sale for a few months by placing a hold but was eventually overruled when the Trump administration declared an “emergency exception.”

It is not only optimistic but also inaccurate to say that Senator Menendez has veto authority. Through both legal and informal processes, the executive branch has the final say on arms sales, unless Congress has a veto-proof majority behind a disapproval or passes new legislation that grants it more power over the process.

Nonetheless, Menendez may still succeed in blocking the next round of sales to Riyadh. Biden is growing irritated with Saudi Arabia and may be looking for a way to de-emphasize the American-Saudi security relationship. Allowing Congress to stop the sales helps him avoid political blowback.

North Korea celebrated its 74th birthday on September 9 with a new nuclear policy law. North Korea’s new law explains the general role of nuclear weapons in North Korea’s defense strategy, lays out the conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons, and establishes other broad policies, making it analogous to a U.S. nuclear posture review. North Korea’s nuclear policy law does not contain any unexpected revelations, but it highlights several worrying trends in the country’s nuclear strategy that could make future crises more dangerous.

The new nuclear policy law underscores the importance of first use, including preemptive attack, in North Korea’s nuclear strategy. The overarching objective of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, according to the new legislation, is to preserve the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. To achieve this goal, North Korea will have a flexible strategy for employing nuclear weapons, including retaliation and preemption. Nuclear preemption means using nuclear offensively to eliminate the danger of a looming attack by beating the other side to the punch.

A nuclear preemption strategy is intended to prevent enemy action by making it too dangerous for the other side to consider attacking in the first place. The target of the preemption strategy, in this case the United States and South Korea, needs to tread very carefully because it is not certain what actions will cross the other state’s threshold for nuclear use. The safest course of action, therefore, is for the target of the preemption strategy to always err on the side of caution and not make threats or maneuver its forces in ways that could trigger a nuclear attack.

Nuclear preemption is especially attractive for North Korea because of its overall weakness vis-à-vis the United States and South Korea. Once a war starts, be it conventional or nuclear, North Korea will likely not survive because its armed forces, while large, are at an immense qualitative disadvantage. Nuclear weapons give Kim Jong-un the ability to inflict immense pain on the United States and South Korea even if he would ultimately be defeated. While Seoul and Washington would ultimately prevail, the high costs stemming from North Korean nuclear use should be enough to stop them from attacking Pyongyang.

North Korea hopes that its preemption strategy will create such high risks of a conflict going nuclear that South Korea and the United States will always act cautiously. However, there is another way to respond to preemption: attack even faster. South Korea has leaned into this option with its “Kill Chain” system, which uses precise conventional weapons such as cruise and ballistic missiles to rapidly target North Korea’s leadership before it can give a launch order to nuclear forces. Kill Chain has been in development for several years, but the relatively new Yoon Suk-yeol administration has been particularly vocal about the system in recent months.

North Korea’s nuclear policy law does not mention Kill Chain by name, but it does contain provisions designed to undermine Kill Chain’s effectiveness. The law clearly states that Kim Jong-un has “all decisive powers concerning nuclear weapons” with assistance from other officials in carrying out attack orders. However, in the event of a Kill Chain-like attack against North Korea’s command and control, the new law states “a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately.” In other words, even if Kill Chain decapitates North Korea’s leadership, it will not be able to fully disable North Korea’s ability to use its nuclear weapons.

It is not clear how North Korea will turn this rhetoric into reality. One approach could involve delegating launch authority to military commanders in the field at some point during a crisis or early in a conflict so that they can fire their weapons if they are cut off from central command. Delegating launch authority would improve survivability against decapitation attacks, but it could also increase the likelihood of units going rogue and using their weapons to threaten North Korea’s leadership.

Taken together, North Korea’s nuclear policy law and South Korea’s Kill Chain system paint a worrying picture for nuclear stability on the Korean peninsula. In a crisis or conflict, both sides would face an incentive to escalate quickly and decisively to preempt the other’s preemption strategy. A nuclear crisis like the one in 2017 does not appear imminent. Hopefully things will stay calm on the Korean peninsula because the next crisis could be even more prone to escalation than the last one.

To avoid a large increase in oil prices to European customers that would result from reduced supply, finance ministers from the G‑7 nations recently agreed in principle with U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s plan to reduce Russian revenues from the sale of its oil. The plan would limit the price paid to Russia rather than ban the sale of Russian oil to the European Union, as is currently scheduled to take effect in early December. Price caps are aimed at keeping supply roughly constant while reducing Russian revenue.

How would these price controls function? How will markets likely respond? And will throwing another log on the economic warfare fire work?

The new plan relies on the current western quasi-monopoly on oil tanker insurance. Western insurers would be banned from offering tanker insurance for Russian crude shipments unless the price paid for the oil was below the price-controlled amount. For now, non-western insurance substitutes, while they exist, could not realistically fill the void. This would serve to decrease Russian revenue from oil sales.

Let’s assume that this policy is implemented and insurance companies can verify the price paid to Russia even though insurance companies say otherwise. How would energy markets react?

For insight we can examine the U.S. experience with oil price controls during the 1970s. Price-controlled crude oil was not the marginal source of crude for U.S. refiners and refined products were also imported and not price-controlled. Thus, gasoline prices were not affected by crude oil price controls. The major effect was that refiners that had access to price-controlled oil made more profit than refiners that used market-price oil because the price of gasoline produced by both was the same.

We could also look to the sale of Russian oil to Indian and Chinese refiners so far this year. According to the New York Times, with Western insurers already wary of underwriting Russian commerce, “oil companies in countries like India have demanded very steep discounts on the price to cover the extra cost and risks.”

What was the result? The Times notes “trade between Russia and China, much of it Russian energy exports, jumped nearly 30 percent in the first three months of this year compared with a year earlier.” The Yellen plan aims at replicating this price-discounting scheme for crude to refiners in Europe.

Oil is an appealing target for Western countries because Russia earns more than three times as much revenue from oil and refined products as it does from natural gas. Attempting to choke Russia by limiting its oil revenue can be seen as the mirror-reflection of Russia’s effort to coerce Europe by limiting the flow of natural gas.

Beyond the mechanics of how an effort to limit Russian revenue from oil would work lies the question of whether the effort will achieve its desired end. Could a reduction in oil revenue alter Russia’s foreign policy behavior in Ukraine?

Western officials have been reluctant to explicitly spell out the logic of sanctions. In general, they suggest the sanctions are a precise weapon primarily targeting Putin cronies, not the Russian population. This tactic is seen as increasing pressure on Putin to make concessions or reverse the invasion altogether.

Rhetoric aside, the economic weapons Western states have used to date have produced effects more akin to carpet bombing. Financial sanctions and sanctions against the Central Bank of Russia, for example, sent the ruble into chaos and led the Kremlin to institute currency controls. But a New York Times reporter in Moscow this month perceived little mass suffering: according to the Times, Putin “has mostly succeeded in making Russian life feel as normal as possible.”

Duke University sanctions expert Bruce Jentleson remarked last month that when it comes to sanctions, the war is entering “the attrition phase.”

“Who will get ground down first?,” Jentleson asked.

Both Russia and its (mainly European) economic warfare opponents are engaged in tit-for-tat escalation, with each side wagering that it can suffer more than the other. Whether entering a competitive suffering contest against Russia is a good bet seems to stand on dubious historical footing, but in this context, a cap on the price of Russian oil is an escalation, not a sea change.

Even before the new effort to reduce Russian oil revenue, the Kremlin shut off the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline, blaming Western sanctions for preventing it from acquiring a turbine needed to safely restart gas flows. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is already having to tour the country, fending off questions about what many Germans fear as they head into winter: the choice between heating and eating.

Western sanctions are hurting the Russian people and the Russian government, and the Kremlin would prefer the economic pressure stop. But historically, when major powers have perceived vital interests, they have been willing to suffer extraordinary political, military, and economic pain in pursuit of those interests. So while oil price caps could deprive Russia of some portion of the profits from its crude, there is little reason to believe that such a strategy — even if it worked perfectly — will help change the outcome in Ukraine.

In June, the State Department issued a report suggesting that poor oversight over U.S. weapons in the war in Yemen directly led to civilian casualties, starvation, and displacement. On September 7, Senators Bernie Sanders (I‑VT), Elizabeth Warren (D‑MA), and Mike Lee (R‑UT) sent letters in response arguing that the U.S. role in this conflict is “an unacceptable failure” and that the “United States may be complicit to in Yemen would represent a failure in the Biden administration’s stated prioritization of human rights and our core democratic values.”

An estimated 15,000 civilians have been killed in airstrikes carried out by the Saudi-led coalition. Beyond that, the coalition has executed more than 22,000 airstrikes, 33 percent of which struck nonmilitary sites, including schools, factories, and hospitals, according to the Yemen Data Project.

Despite not directly contributing troops to the fighting, the United States has played a pivotal role in the conflict. At least 80 percent of the Saudi pilots who executed these frequent strikes in Yemen received U.S. training. Furthermore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the United States’ top purchaser of weapons and has been so for the past 10 years. Unfortunately, it has also ranked as one of the riskiest customers of U.S. weapons in every edition of the Cato Institute’s annual Arms Sales Risk Index.

Three successive U.S. administrations contend that weapons sales to Saudi Arabia provide the United States leverage over Riyadh’s policies.

If this is true and leverage exists, there are only two reasons that explain why Saudi Arabia has continued its brutal dictatorship at home and assault on its neighbor despite receiving U.S. weapons.

The first answer is that weapons sales have afforded Washington leverage over Riyadh, but not in visible ways. In other words, the thinking goes, without U.S. support, Saudi Arabia would have behaved more recklessly. If this were true, then there should be no evidence that U.S. support has worsened the situation.

However, the evidence suggests that the United States is empowering Saudi Arabia’s inhumane policies in Yemen. The U.S. military trained Saudi pilots, delivered billions in weapons to Saudi Arabia, and maintained Saudi planes and munitions. It is inconceivable that Saudi Arabia could commit human rights violations to the same level in Yemen without U.S. military support.

From a domestic angle, things are not much better. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman rose to power in 2017, becoming its de facto leader. By constantly referring to him as a reformer, the United States has covered up for Saudi Arabia’s inhumane crackdown on women’s rights activists and Shi’ite protestors. If leverage is a dog that does not bark, there is sparse evidence of this being true in the case of Saudi Arabia.

The second argument is that leverage exists in theory but that Washington does not want to use it.

In 1974, during the wake of the Vietnam War and rise of a media covering human rights, then Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger responded to calls to use leverage against human rights-abusing countries that receive U.S. weapons by saying, “They want us to be anti-Philippine, anti-Korean, anti-Chilean—pro what?” In essence, his argument is that while he theoretically could do something about these countries abusing human rights, the security risk is too great to do so.

Cutting arms sales to Saudi Arabia until they come to a peace agreement with the Houthis would show that the United States wants to use leverage over its weapons recipients. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that policymakers will suggest taking such action, which suggests that this second argument about leverage—however misguided—may have credence.

If neither of these two policies are accurate, though, leverage does not exist. In this case, Washington is approving weapons sales to risky clients on shaky reasoning.

If weapons sales have truly failed to create leverage over Saudi Arabia, then it is a clear example of a failure in U.S. foreign policy, as the human rights situations both in the kingdom and in Yemen have simply gotten worse as they receive more U.S. weapons.

Members of Congress who are questioning Biden’s willingness to continue sending weapons to Saudi Arabia should continue doing so. By pushing for answers on a policy that has historically led to human rights abuses, Congress can push for evidence that weapons sales to risky clients create leverage. It is time to demand answers as to why the United States sells weapons to known human rights abusers under the false pretense that it increases American global power and influence.

Earlier this week the United States revealed that it possesses intelligence showing that Russia reached out to North Korea to purchase artillery shells and unguided rockets. While American officials have not provided more details, they have been quick to argue that the Russian request demonstrates the effectiveness of sanctions and export controls levied against Moscow in response to its invasion of Ukraine.

The effectiveness of sanctions argument may have some merit, but in a roundabout way. Russia has reportedly asked North Korea for unguided rockets and howitzer shells. These types of artillery are fairly easy to produce because they do not have guidance systems. Even under sanctions, Russia should have the industrial capacity and materials to produce these munitions.

Western sanctions are probably more effective at reducing Russia’s ability to replenish more complex, guided weapons like long-range cruise and ballistic missiles. Precise, long-range weapons have more advanced components, especially for navigation, and Russia has imported materials for these components from more technologically advanced countries. Conflict Armament Research, a group that tracks weapons systems in conflicts around the world, has identified “a total of 144 non-Russian manufacturers of more than 650 unique component models in Russian material used in the war on Ukraine.” This included technology used in the satellite navigation systems of Russian land-attack cruise missiles.

Over approximately six months, the Russian military has fired over 3,600 missiles and guided rockets into Ukraine, many of which likely contained electronic components made outside of Russia. Many such components were already subject to sanctions or export controls before the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine but slipped through cracks in enforcement. Greater attention and resources dedicated to sanctions enforcement since the invasion are likely constraining the flow of these systems and, in turn, making it harder for Russia to replenish its stocks of long-range, guided weaponry.

Strategically, Russia does not have much to show for its expenditure of advanced weapons. Early targeting of Ukraine’s command and control facilities and air bases caused damage but did not decisively knock Ukraine out of the fight. Missile attacks against Ukraine’s defense industry and weapons storage sites have complicated Ukraine’s military operations, but Russia’s offensives have been slow and costly, and Russia is currently on the operational defensive as Ukraine begins counterattacks near Kherson and Kharkiv.

Russia’s biggest battlefield success thus far in the war, the summer offensive in the Donbas, made extensive use of massed, imprecise artillery fire to steadily grind down Ukrainian defensive positions. Advanced, precise missiles and rockets played a role in this operation, but their use was not decisive. Now that Ukraine is mounting an offensive, Russia will likely continue to depend on massed but imprecise artillery to hold onto its gains, especially as sanctions and export controls make it harder for them to replenish more advanced weapons by restricting the supply of foreign-made components.

Ukraine’s military, meanwhile, has received a steady supply of precise conventional weapons from the United States and, to a lesser extent, other NATO countries. While massed artillery is still important for Ukraine, its conventional strike capability has grown more precise over time while Russia’s has become less precise because Ukraine has a reliable external supplier of these weapons while Russia does not. Ukraine’s precise conventional weapons have shorter range than Russia’s, but Ukraine’s steadier supply of munitions, the better reliability of those munitions, and the proximity of Russian supply lines and depots to the frontline means that Ukraine can get more effective use of its weapons.

In other words, Russia faces a perfect storm in the artillery duel. Its long-range, precise weapons have not produced significant strategic benefits. Tighter sanctions and export controls make it difficult for Russia to replenish these weapons because they contained foreign-made components. Massed, unguided artillery has proven to be a valuable tool, but this requires Russia to forward-deploy ammunition to keep the shorter-range guns and rocket launchers supplied. Ukraine has effectively used the U.S.-supplied HIMARS, a precise guided rocket system, to attack these forward-deployed ammunition and other supply dumps, thereby reducing the overall effectiveness of Russia’s massed artillery.

This combination of factors explains why Russia is reaching out to North Korea, which has a large stockpile of Soviet-era unguided artillery, for more ammunition. Russia has very few good options for external assistance whereas Ukraine is being steadily armed by the United States. 

With the execution by drone of al-Qaeda chief, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the terrorist group is back in the news. However, beyond issuing a set of attention-getting videos filled with dire and unfulfilled threats, al-Qaeda’s record of accomplishment since 9/11 has been meager.

It has served as something of an inspiration to some Islamic extremists around the world who have wanted to glory in the success of 9/11 and to wear the al-Qaeda label. But it has exerted little control over them, and they mostly have maintained a local perspective rather than the global one al-Qaeda prefers.

For the most part, al-Qaeda tends to resemble Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin of John F. Kennedy: a fundamentally trivial entity that got horribly lucky once.

Yet, to defend against an enemy, or monster, that scarcely existed, the United States has waged wars in the Middle East that have cost trillions of dollars and led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands while erecting a massive security apparatus at home.

For further commentary on this issue, see: How a cottage terrorism industry made a lion out of an al-Qaeda mouse (Responsible Statecraft)