One prominent narrative that emerged as Russia initiated its reprehensible invasion of Ukraine centered on Ukraine’s decision to give up the nuclear weapons left on its territory after the Soviet Union collapsed. If only Ukraine had kept these nuclear weapons, the argument goes, it could have deterred Russia from invading. This perspective emphasizes nuclear weapons as the ultimate insurance policy against invasion but underplays important details and the historical context around Ukraine’s decision.
Ukraine became the world’s third‐largest nuclear power almost overnight in 1991 as it declared independence and the Soviet Union collapsed. The Soviet military stationed approximately 1,800 strategic and some 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory.
The question of what to do with this massive arsenal quickly became a top priority of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States. Newly independent Ukraine was eager to join the international community, Russia was trying to limit the damage of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the United States was worried about the security of nuclear weapons as Russia and former Soviet republics faced intense political and economic challenges.
Although Ukraine had thousands of nuclear weapons stationed on its territory, these weapons did not really belong to Ukraine. Command and control is a core feature of an effective nuclear deterrent, but Kyiv did not have it. According to the official history written by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, “The preplanned launch codes remained in the rocket army’s underground command and control centers…No one denied that authority to launch the nuclear forces, the third largest in the world, remained in Moscow.”
In other words, Russia retained effective command and control over the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine could not launch the missiles or use the warheads, and therefore the arsenal could not be used as a deterrent. Moreover, even if Ukraine did obtain command and control, it did not have the infrastructure to safely maintain the weapons.
Given these operational and technical limitations, the nuclear weapons in Ukrainian territory could simply not serve as an effective deterrent. They were, however, a valuable bargaining chip. Ukraine could not use the weapons, but it could trade them for other benefits.
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