Tennessee’s Billboard Regulation and Control Act of 1972 regulates roadside signs by imposing onerous restrictions as well as location and permit requirements. The statute also provides exemptions, particularly with regard to so-called “on-premises” signs. On-premises signs are those that either advertise activities that are conducted on the property or the sale of the property on which the sign is located. If a sign fails to qualify as “on-premises,” it’s subject to the full weight of the law and is often outright prohibited.
Based on the 2015 Supreme Court case of Reed v. Town of Gilberti, the federal district court ruled this on-premises/off-premises distinction to be a content-based regulation subject to strict scrutiny, ultimately finding it to violate the First Amendment. Cato certainly agrees with this outcome, and we have now filed a brief supporting it after Tennessee appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Our basic point is this: Regardless of whether the court applies “strict scrutiny” or some lesser form of review, the statute is unconstitutional because of an insufficient fit between the ends the state claims to pursue and the means it uses.
While strict scrutiny requires the government’s interest to be “compelling” and the means employed to be the least restrictive possible, lesser scrutiny employs a somewhat more forgiving standard; a narrowly tailored regulation must directly advance the government’s “substantial” or “significant” interests.