United States Representatives Pramila Jayapal (D‑WA) and Barbara Lee (D‑CA) recently introduced a resolution that calls for a massive change to U.S. foreign policy. Rather than focus on military tools such as troops, interoperability drills, and weapons sales, the representatives want one centered around diplomacy and cooperation.
The legislation lacks specifics, but it raises interesting issues about weapons sales. It argues for a transformation in U.S. military aid and weapons transfers policy and says that these tools should only be for governments that are not corrupt and do not abuse human rights.
In the Cato Institute’s 2021 Arms Sales Risk Index, we identify these problems as two of our four vectors that create risk in weapons sales. These vectors are corruption, stability, human rights abuses, and conflict involvement.
A blanket resolution stopping sales to countries that flag as risky on one of these measures, (like the one introduced by Representatives Jayapal and Lee) is noble. Yet, it is important to note that vague statements that try to limit risk in weapons sales often fail.
Since 2000, three pieces of legislation have reduced the risk of weapons transfers. The most comprehensive piece of weapons sales legislation is the Golden Sentry Program introduced in 2001. This monitors government-to-government arms transfers through the Department of Defense after delivery. Then, in 1997 Congress reduced the standard of proof needed to stop security transfers via updates to the Leahy Laws, which was amended to its final version in 2010. Finally, the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act included legislation on arms transfers. This includes limiting security aid to the Northern Triangle and reporting requirements for arms recipients.
These restrictions do not have a large scope and work to prevent only the worst and obvious human rights abuses from U.S. weaponry. The most comprehensive piece of legislation restricting arms sales is the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, which outlines the process for a sale’s approval by Congress. Still, even those faces problems caused by presidential authority over weapons transfers. This is because, even if Congress does issue a joint resolution of disapproval, the president can simply veto the sale unless there is a veto-proof majority. This veto-proof majority has never happened.
Unfortunately, a policy calling for large overhauls to U.S. arms export policy is sure to be dead on arrival because of the revolving door between government and defense contractors, the president’s ability to supersede Congress, and congresspersons’ desires to keep unity amongst their party.
Reducing the risk of arms sales goes beyond human rights violations and government corruption. This needs to start with the president choosing to acknowledge problems and working with Congress to “flip the script” on weapons sales.
Currently, the president can veto any congressional joint resolution of disapproval of a sale, unless Congress has a veto-proof majority. In essence, this means that Congress must block sales rather than approving them. Flipping the script would revise the process by requiring congressional approval for every sale and removing the presidential veto. Moreover, it also will force Congress to justify approval of these sales to their own supporters. These two changes combined will likely lead to a drastic decrease in sales.
Other potential avenues include improving end-use monitoring, rejoining the Arms Trade Treaty, and placing the sale of small arms and light weapons in the State Department’s purview rather than the Commerce Department’s. These solutions involve empowering departments that are supposed to evaluate the risk of sales. By increasing their funding and authority, these departments will be better equipped to evaluate and stop transfers to risky nations.
While the policy by Representatives Jayapal and Lee is noble, it is likely to have no effect on U.S. arms transfer policy. Effective legislation requires showing the signs of human rights violations and corruption as well as supplying relevant aid to the government departments that regulate these sales.