It’s called the Tullock Paradox: if you run the numbers, the expected returns to lobbying commonly appear much larger than they ought to be. Bad behavior pays really well, and yet corporations and interest groups routinely pass on what would seem, from a coldly amoral stance, to be easy money. Rational economic actors ought to bid up the price of government favor—and thus bid down the rate of return—but real-world actors don’t do so.

Why don’t we see even more money in politics? That’s the question we ask in the April, 2013 issue of Cato Unbound.

To answer that question, we have invited Fred L. Smith, founder and chairman of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a man who has spent much of his career pondering just this question, and who benefits from an insider’s view of political advocacy. His lead essay suggests that there is a widespread distaste for political activity among people who would otherwise turn to lobbying, and often that’s with good reason.

To discuss with him the potential pitfalls of public choice modeling, we have invited a panel of distinguished academics: Professors Stephen Ansolabehere of Harvard University, Francesco Parisi of the University of Minnesota School of Law, and Raymond J. La Raja of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

As always, Cato Unbound readers are encouraged to take up our themes and enter into the conversation on their own websites and blogs, or on other venues. We also welcome your letters. Send them to jkuznicki at cato dot org. Selections may be published at the editors’ option.