A recent joint intelligence bulletin from the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Counterterrorism Center reveals what the agencies consider to be the first attempt to use a drone to target domestic infrastructure. The incident, which occurred last year, involved a small drone flown toward a Pennsylvania power substation. It highlights the regulatory headaches surrounding counter-drone measures.
According to reporting from Wired magazine, the attempted attack featured a DJI Mavic 2 carrying two pieces of nylon rope attached to a copper wire. The drone had been stripped of any identifying markings as well as its memory card and onboard camera. The lack of camera may have been a significant contributing factor to the attack’s failure, as it seems that the pilot of the drone was flying it absent the aid of camera footage.
News of the bulletin comes amid reports that prospective assassins used three drones to try to kill Iraq’s prime minister, an attack reminiscent of a similar attempted attack against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.
Concerns over drone threats to public safety and infrastructure are not new. In 2016, Brookings Institution scholars outlined a number of methods to disable drones that pose threats to airports, power stations, and other sensitive locations. While undoubtedly capable of stopping drones, a number of these methods face regulatory and legal issues. Guns, for example, can disable drones. But those who use a gun to shoot down a drone could, as the Brookings article notes, “face reckless endangerment charges or be prosecuted under laws relating to the discharge of firearms. Additionally, the offender could be liable for civil damages paid to the destroyed drone’s owner.”
Drones can also be grounded by devices such as the DroneDefender, which is designed to interrupt the communication between drones and their pilots. But these devices ran afoul of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations.
Those interested in preventing drones from damaging their property are not in an environment without clear regulatory or legal approval. The counter drone technology company Droneshield summarized the regulatory and legal landscape in its recent factbook as follows:
Laws surrounding purchase and use of counterdrone equipment are continuing to evolve, attempting to keep up with the developments of the drone technology. In the US, the most relevant restrictions are around FCC and FAA.
The FCC regulations stipulate how much energy can be emitted from various equipment at various frequency bands, and generally radars and jammers (as well as cyber/protocol manipulation) falls within their coverage. This means either a licence is needed (the common approach with radars), or the FCC regulations need not to apply to a particular user in a given situation – such as military, DOJ or FBI in certain situations. As a basic rule, jammers (or protocol manipulation/cyber) are off-limits to individuals, corporations, state and local Government agencies (however drone detection equipment can still be used by them). Outside of the US, similar rules are in place by Ofcom in UK and ACMA in Australia.
The FAA regulations essentially treat a drone like any full size aircraft, and prohibit “downing” of the drones by private citizens, in the same way as downing of the full size aircraft is not allowed- limiting the defeat to military and federal Government agencies.
Readers interested in drone regulations and the safety issues associated with drone flight may want to read the recent Cato Institute book Eyes to the Sky: Privacy and Commerce in the Age of the Drone, which includes chapters that discuss the history of drone regulation in the U.S.
