With so much riding on the pending bailout, I would ask Congress to hold a hearing this weekend, with two people testifying: Ben Bernanke and Roger Cole. Cole is head of the Federal Reserve’s Division of Bank Supervision and Regulation, fondly known as “soup and reg.”


Here is how mortgage securities markets could affect good borrowers:

  1. The securities lose market value.
  2. The banks mark the value of their securities to market. This eats into their capital.
  3. The banks have to cut back lending to good borrowers in order to comply with capital requirements.

To help good borrowers, you have to intercept one of these three steps. The Paulson plan and all its variants are an attempt to intercept step 1. Getting rid of mark-to-market accounting is an attempt to intercept step 2. Easing up on capital requirements is an attempt to intercept step 3.


The Paulson plan is awful. For one thing, I don’t see how the Paulson plan can really kick in for several months, because it will take that long to figure out implementation. With capital forbearance, you could have new rules up and running within a week.


Getting rid of mark-to-market is not what I would want if I were a bank regulator. That’s why I would want Cole at the hearing. Ask him: if you had to choose between relaxing capital requirements and getting rid of mark-to-market, which would you choose? If he disagrees with me, then go with what he says. Incidentally, there is an op-ed in today’s Wall Street Journal that says we should keep mark-to-market accounting.


The question for Bernanke is this: if the Paulson plan is defeated, can he do enough with capital requirements and other tools to keep money flowing to good borrowers, particularly small business? If the answer is “yes,” then I think there is a credible alternative to the Paulson plan. Wall Street may not like it, but the public will be protected from a Great Depression scenario. If Bernanke says he doesn’t have the tools to free up bank lending, and if he thinks that things are going to really freeze up for good borrowers, then I guess we have to default to the Paulson plan.


[Cross-posted from EconLog]