On Sunday, Colombians will vote in a referendum on a historic peace deal signed this week between the Colombian government and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) rebels who have been at war for more than 50 years. The next paragraph gives a taste of what’s in the 297 pages of the peace agreement. I recommend you skip over it since you will almost certainly not understand it, and it will not be pleasant to read.

 “During the term of the Agreement on CFHBD and DA, the Police Forces and the FARC-EP must comply with the rules governing the CFHBD and DA, as well as other chapters and protocols that make up the Agreement on CFHBD and DA. The MM&V has unrestricted access to the ZVTN included in Annex X of this Agreement and to the units of the Police Forces, committed to the devices specified in Annex Y of this Agreement.”

Surely only a small percentage of Colombians will read the entire text of the agreement. The Colombian government probably counts on that as it and its allies push the notion that those who criticize the peace plan support war. But many Colombians who read the document are finding serious reasons to oppose the plan and agree with independent observers, such as Human Rights Watch, who strongly criticize it. Indeed, José Miguel Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch’s Americas division, calls the agreement a “façade of justice in the name of peace” and points out that it guarantees impunity.

The Colombian peace deal represents a setback in international practice. Since the aftermath of Apartheid in South Africa in the 1990s, war crimes or crimes against humanity have been prosecuted in international or ad hoc courts where justice is administered as part of peace settlements. Not so in the case of Colombia which “punishes” such criminals with requirements to engage in community service and with no deprivation of liberty.

Moreover, confessed criminals would be entitled, contrary to the Colombian constitution, to participate in politics even while serving their alleged sentences. The agreement guarantees the FARC 10 congressional seats and 16 more in special areas to be created, and in which existing political parties in Congress “may not register candidates.”

In the not too distant future, Colombia may very well see the legitimized political influence of a Senator Timochenko, leader of the FARC guerrillas. It is as if in the 1990s in Peru, which had been ravaged by the unpopular Maoist Shining Path guerillas, the country had chosen to negotiate with the rebels on the verge of their collapse, rather than what it actually did –defeat the group, and capture, try and jail its members who had been found to have committed serious crimes. (The FARC was also decimated on the eve of the Colombian government’s announcement that it would pursue peace negotiations.) Had Peru followed the alternative Colombia is pursuing, it would most assuredly have Abimael Guzmán, the Shining Path’s bloodthirsty leader, and his party in Congress today.

All this comes with the generous support of the state. The agreement ensures that the government will finance the political party of the FARC and the dissemination of its ideas. In addition, the state will pay for a “center for thought and political education” of the FARC, a TV channel and 31 radio stations. According to Rafael Nieto Loaiza, former vice minister of Justice, the FARC’s new party “will receive an annual contribution proportionately higher than that of the other parties.”

The agreement creates all kinds of bureaucracy for the administration of peace and the transition, and relies on new welfare and spending programs. The government will oversee a rural reform reminiscent of the unsuccessful state-centered models of the 1960s. It will create a land fund, and will distribute three million hectares for free. The government will also provide subsidized credits and insurance, and direct subsidies. The largesse will be focused on rural areas, where the amount of land each family can own is limited by law, as is the transfer or sale of land without government authorization. Public spending on housing, irrigation and other infrastructure will increase and be directed to the places affected by the conflict, but not necessarily take into account the economic viability of such spending. In this way, the government seeks to invigorate the rural economy and give peasants independence, but like so many examples of government planning, it is a model that is bound to fail.

It is reasonable to seek peace and to make concessions along the way if the exchange is worth it. To many of those who read this agreement, however, it will be difficult to conclude that that has been achieved.