There is considerable debate in both academic and policy circles about the utility of nuclear weapons. Of what use are they? Some say just about all nuclear weapons are good for is self defense. States that possess them can more easily deter attack or invasion. Others argue that possessing nuclear weapons also gives states added leverage to get their way in international politics. In this conception, nuclear weapons add to the ability to coerce other states. Not only can they deter actions we don’t like, but they can help compel others to take actions that we do like.
A new and important book, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy by Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, evaluates the empirical record to test whether or not nuclear weapons aid in coercive diplomacy. Their findings are clear: no, nuclear weapons do not have much coercive utility. States with nukes don’t have more leverage in settling territorial disputes, they’re not more likely to initiate military challenges, they are not more likely to escalate ongoing disputes, and they are not more successful in blackmailing rivals.
This has significant implications for U.S. foreign policy. What do these findings suggest we should expect from our nuclear‐armed rivals, like Russia and China? Does it make sense to undertake preventive military action against nascent nuclear weapons programs in countries like North Korea? If Iran were to get nuclear weapons once the time‐limited restrictions in the JCPOA expire (as critics of the deal suggest), how would that influence its behavior in the region?
The authors are coming to the Cato Institute on March 7 to discuss their book and explain their theoretical and empirical findings. Matthew Kroenig will be a discussant and offer comments on the book. You can register to attend the event here.
