But there are good reasons to doubt that an Obama administration would meaningfully de-imperialize the presidency.
From Truman and Johnson’s undeclared wars to the warrantless wiretapping carried out by FDR, JFK, LBJ and Nixon, the Imperial Presidency has long been a bipartisan phenomenon. In fact, our most recent Democratic president, Bill Clinton went even further than his predecessors in his exercise of extraconstitutional war powers. Prior presidents had unilaterally launched wars in the face of congressional silence. But Clinton’s war over Kosovo in 1999 made him the first president to launch a war in the face of several congressional votes denying him the authority to wage it.
Recently, Barack Obama has found his own convenient rationales for endorsing broad presidential powers in the area of surveillance. When he signed on to the surveillance bill Congress passed this summer, Sen. Obama broke an explicit campaign promise to filibuster any legislation that would grant immunity to FISA-flouting telecom companies. By voting for the bill, Obama helped legalize large swaths of a dragnet surveillance program he’d long claimed to oppose. Perhaps some were comforted by Obama’s “firm pledge that as president, I will carefully monitor the program.” But our constitutional structure envisions stronger checks than the supposed benevolence of our leaders.
What motivated Obama’s flip-flop? Was it a desire to look “tough” on national security-or was it that, as he seems ever closer to winning the office, broad presidential powers seem increasingly appealing? Either way, it’s clear that the post‑9/11 political environment will provide enormous incentives for the next president to embrace Bush-like theories of executive power. Can we really expect a Democratic president, publicly suspected of being “soft on terror,” to spend much political capital making himself less powerful?
Not likely, say analysts on both sides of the political spectrum. Law professors Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson, both left-leaning civil libertarians, predict that “the next Democratic president will likely retain significant aspects of what the Bush administration has done”; in fact, “future presidents may find that they enjoy the discretion and lack of accountability created by Bush’s unilateral gambits.” Jack Goldsmith, head of the Bush administration’s OLC from 2003-04, argues that “if anything, the next Democratic president — having digested a few threat matrices … will be even more anxious than the current president to thwart the threat.”