How will America’s distinctive body of defamation law shape what we hear about the forthcoming election? Will we all be subjected to another firehose of stolen-election lies because the New York Times v. Sullivan doctrine, as one Supreme Court Justice has claimed, generates “an ironclad subsidy for the publication of falsehoods by means and on a scale previously unimaginable”? (I try to straighten out some election untruths in a new Cato podcast.) Or, conversely, does Sullivan leave even big media organizations so legally exposed that even flimsy lawsuits and threats can inhibit their investigations and reporting? (Plenty of dubious suits keep getting filed.)
Or maybe both? One of the paradoxes of US defamation law—which combines Sullivan’s relatively press-friendly “actual malice” standard with a lack of the loser-pays principle found in many other countries—is that it simultaneously puts coercive leverage in the hands of those who want to bully writers and speakers even as it leaves many defamed parties with no practical legal recourse.