Do Immigrants Affect Economic Institutions?
Evidence from the American States

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DO IMMIGRANTS AFFECT ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS? EVIDENCE FROM THE AMERICAN STATES

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The US economy is productive because of its high-quality economic institutions. The higher productivity of the US economy attracts immigrants who generally come from poorer countries that historically have had lower quality economic institutions. Immigration from less productive countries to more productive ones raises immigrant incomes, the incomes of natives, and gross world product. However, immigrants could reduce those economic benefits if they undermine the economic institutions that are the source of higher productivity. Alternatively, immigrants may not affect economic institutions, in which case government restrictions on immigration are imposing many trillions of dollars in annual deadweight loss. This paper uses an epidemiological model to investigate how heterogeneously distributed immigrants affect the economic institutions of American states over the 1980-2010 period under the assumption that institutions are highly responsive to changes in the immigrant population. We find evidence that state economic institutions do not change much in response to immigrants. Our estimates suggest that the mean quality of state economic institutions would be 1 standard deviation higher in 2010 if state economic institutions were more responsive to changes in the immigrant population.

INTRODUCTION

The global economic gains from free immigration dwarf any other single economic policy reform. Free immigration, which would allow any person to move to any other country to live and work, would increase gross world product (GWP) by 50 to 150 percent according to a range of estimates.[1] The gains are large because there are vast differences in place-specific worker productivity, called the place premium.[2] For instance, prime-age low-skilled male workers from Yemen, Cambodia,

and Mexico can expect real 16.4-fold, 9.2-fold, and 2.6-fold increases in wages, respectively, from moving to the United States. These gains translate into approximately $23,475, $21,352, and $10,523 gains to annual wages (PPP-adjusted), respectively. These increases represent enormous gains in economic output from immigration. Thus, workers from low-productivity countries can move to high productivity countries to vastly increase their economic output and, hence, wages. If immigration were liberalized or if economic barriers were entirely eliminated, economic theory predicts that GWP would dramatically increase.

However, those massive gains in GWP will only materialize so long as the economic institutions that incentivize high productivity are not degraded as a result of the immigrants transmitting the relatively poor economic institutions of their home countries to their destinations.[3] If immigrants do not much affect the institutions in their new countries, then the institutions in destination countries are robust and the so-called "founder effects" are strong, meaning that economic institutions are sticky, new populations don't much change them, and founders have a large and disproportionate effect on those institutions regardless of subsequent changes in demographics.[4] If immigrants do have a large effect on economic institutions then the founder effects are weak, meaning that economic institutions are fluid, new populations affect them greatly, and founders have a small effect on how they change across time. Fear of the immigrant-implied degradation of economic institutions should diminish if founder effects are strong and increase if founder effects are weak.

This paper seeks to build on a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature to test whether immigrants have an impact on the economic institutions of American states over the 1980-2010

period. It does so by examining whether the founder effects are strong or weak. We look at American states because immigrant population levels and countries of origin differ widely between states. Additionally, states have different economic policies and a wide degree of control over their own economic institutions. Thus, states provide a wonderful laboratory to test how immigrants affect economic institutions. States provide a less good laboratory for evaluating how immigrants affect cultural and political institutions or certain values such as support for gender equality, free speech, and religious freedom that are all also very important. Data limitations on the state level and federal laws that protect non-economic values and institutions preclude analysis of the type we conduct with economic institutions.

We begin by presenting a theory of how immigrants could affect state-level economic institutions that is based on an epidemiological model developed by Clemens and Pritchett.[5] We then use the Economic Freedom of North America (EFNA) and the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) indices to estimate the quality of institutions and to attempt to measure whether immigrants transmit their home country institutions to the US states where they settle.[6] Second, we explain our data sources. Third, we compare the projected economic institutions on the state level under the assumption of weak founder effects with the actual quality of economic institutions. We then run additional regressions to attempt to understand the causal relationship, if any, between the change in institutions and changes in immigrant populations. Lastly, we discuss the implications of our findings.

1.   THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

We adapt the epidemiological framework of Clemens and Pritchett to model the transmission of economic institutions from the home countries of immigrants to the US states in which they settle.[7]

Epidemiological models provide a useful representation of the how immigrants bring, or transmit, institutional preferences from their home country into the country in which they ultimately settle. Three key parameters in their epidemiological framework determine the extent to which immigrants spread economic institutions from their origin country into a host country: transmission, assimilation, and congestion. Clemens and Pritchett use a country's total factor productivity (TFP) as a stand-in for the quality of economic institutions.[8] In their model, immigrants from lower productivity countries transmit institutions from their origin countries to their destination countries via changes in destination country TFP. We use the EFW to measure the quality of economic institutions in different countries.[9]

Following Clemens and Pritchett, we suppose that immigrants choose to immigrate into a single state.[10] The economic institutions in the destination country are $EFW^{Destination}$. P_t is the immigrant stock. Economic institutions in the origin country are EFW^{Origin}. Each year, M_t immigrants move from the country of origin into the destination state and contribute to the state's stock of unassimilated immigrants. Similarly, each year a fraction of immigrants $a \in (0,1)$ assimilates and acquires the same economic institutions as the state's native-born population.

The current unassimilated immigrant stock in the state is determined by

$$\bar{P}_t = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (1-a)^k M_{t-k}.$$

(1)

For simplicity, Clemens and Pritchett assume a constant migration rate $m := M_t / P_t$.[11] The share of a state's population comprised of unassimilated immigrants is

$$\phi := \frac{\bar{P}_t}{P_t} = \int_0^\infty m(1-a)^t dt \approx \frac{m}{a}, \qquad \phi \in (0,1).$$

(2)

Immigration impacts a state's economic institutions according to

$$\widehat{EFW} = EFW^{Destination} - \left(EFW^{Destination} - EFW^{Origin}\right)\left(\frac{\tau\phi}{1-c\phi}\right), \qquad \tau \in (0,1),$$

(3)

where c captures how the concentration of unassimilated immigrants reduces the rate of transmission (congestion). This formulation carries a few important insights into the transmission mechanism. First, immigrants transmit institutions proportional to the share of unassimilated immigrants within the destination state's total population ($\tau\phi$). Second, the transmission effect is dampened by the "agglomeration" of unassimilated immigrants, scaled by their share of a state's population. Finally, the magnitude of deterioration is proportional to how different economic institutions are across origin countries' institutions compared to the destination ($EFW^{Destination} - EFW^{Origin}$). In other words, the quality of economic institutions in immigrants' home countries determines how they affect economic institutions in their states of destination.

2. MEASURING THE INSTITUTIONAL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM

Our objective is to estimate whether and to what extent immigrants transmit economic institutions from their countries of origin to their destination states. To measure the quality of state economic institutions we use the Economic Freedom of North America index (EFNA).[12] The EFNA index is constructed such that a higher score indicates a higher level of economic freedom.[1] Economic freedom scores are a proxy for the quality of economic institutions. These data are available from

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[1] Economic freedom is broadly defined as legal protections for private property and fewer barriers to voluntary exchange. This index is widely used in the literature as a measure of subnational institutional quality (Padilla and Cachanosky, 2018).

1981-present and assign a score for each state-year from 0 to 10. The state-level index is a simple average of three subcomponents: 1) government spending, 2) taxes, and 3) labor market regulation.

Borjas and Clemens and Pritchett posit that immigrants from countries with poorer economic institutions will import them into a destination country, thereby deteriorating the destination country's institutions.[13] In the Clemens and Pritchett epidemiological model, the rate at which immigration from origin countries with poorer institutions reduce institutional quality in destination countries is proportional to how much of these poorer institutions are transmitted, how many immigrants assimilate into the destination country's institutions, and how the agglomeration of immigrants within the destination country slows down assimilation.[14]

From Equation (3) we know that immigrants induce a change in a host country's economic institutions proportional to the difference between the destination and origin countries' institutions, weighted by how much of the institutions are transmitted through immigrants since they arrived. $\bar{y}$ is the number of years since the immigrant's arrival in year y. Thus, $\bar{y}$ models the decay of the immigrant's ability to spread support for poorer quality economic institutions during their residence. A reasonable counterfactual estimate for a state's economic institutions is the state's economic freedom score, adjusted for the institutions imported by unassimilated immigrants. This amounts to estimating the state's institutional quality for each year of origin y

$$\widehat{EF_{oy}} = EFW_y^{US} - \left(EFW_y^{US} - EFW_{oy}^{Origin}\right)\left(\frac{\tau\phi}{1-c\phi}\right)^{\bar{y}}.$$

(4)

For multiple countries of origin o we can calculate the implied quality of economic institutions for a state i as the inner product of immigrants' origin countries' institutions weighted by the share of immigrants of each origin for each time period

$$EF_{iy}^{Implied} = \sum_o w_o \widehat{EF_{oy}}, \qquad \sum_o w_o = 1.$$

(5)

The above measure reflects a composite index of institutional quality implied by institutions imported by states' immigrant populations. Further, the measure is adjusted based on immigrants' assimilation and whether immigrant agglomeration into a state accelerates or stifles institutional change. Immigrants' institutional quality scores are also adjusted according to the origin country's institutions when an immigrant entered the destination country.[2] Finally, we adjust the EFW scores to reflect the three areas used in the EFNA calculation by recomputing the EFW scores as the simple average of the Size of Government, Legal System and Property Rights, and Regulation scores.[3]

To estimate the immigrant EFNA index, we take the values for parameters $\{\tau, \phi, c\}$ from Clemens and Pritchett, who provide a series of "calibrated values" representing general historical immigration trends.[15] Calibrated values refer to the empirical parameter values Clemens and Pritchett synthesized using historical macro and microdata from the United States. Where the

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[2] For immigrants who arrived earlier than 1980 we bottom code institutions using 1980 institutions due to data limitations. Since the first year in our dataset is 1980 and the minimum residency before a permanent resident can apply for citizenship is 5 years, immigrants will likely have assimilated over 10 years or applied for citizenship. In each case, their institutional preference will likely be more aligned with those of natives by 1980, making our bottom coded approach relatively conservative.

[3] The additional EFW areas that measure Sound Money (Area 3) and Freedom to Trade Internationally (Area 4) do not vary on the subnational level.

calibrated values are presented in ranges, we take the simple average of the range. These calibrated values are in Table 1.

Table 1
Clemens and Pritchett (2019) model calibrations

Parameter	Calibrated Value
c	0.5
m	0.003
a	0.077
τ	0.327
ϕ	0.039

3. DATA

We combine data on the quality of economic institutions on the state level from EFNA, the quality of economic institutions in other countries from the EFW, and demographic and immigrant data from the Census Bureau. The EFNA and EFW reports provide quantitative data on the quality of economic institutions and are used extensively in the immigration literature as a proxy for institutional quality.[16] To calculate the immigrant-implied EFNA score for each state in each year, we first calculate the simple average of the Size of Government, Legal System and Property Rights, and Regulation scores for the United States and all other immigrant countries of origin because those are the EFW subcomponents that are also used in constructing the state-level EFNA index. We then curate a consistent sample of countries that have had EFW data availability since 1980 for census years and calculate the state's immigrant-implied EFNA score for each year using the epidemiological model described above (See Table 2 for an example). Note that we assume the parameters taken from Clemens and Pritchett do not change over the timeframe of the model.[17]

Table 2
1980 countries of origin by population and immigrant EFNA

Country	Population	Immigrant-Implied EFNA

Mexico	2,192,560	5.26
Canada	843,720	7.54
Germany	830,320	6.71
Italy	828,000	5.61
United Kingdom	667,240	6.68
Philippines	510,900	4.8
Poland	418,920	3.46
Russia (USSR)	297,800	2.40
South Korea	290,820	5.23
China	286,180	4.02
Japan	224,500	6.69
Greece	208,020	5.59
India	207,620	4.99
Portugal	207,260	5.17
Jamaica	198,100	5.02
Ireland	197,640	6.62
Dominican Republic	166,200	5.56
Colombia	146,800	5.81
Hungary	144,660	4.53

Data for our control variables come from various sources: Population and income data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis with dollar amounts in 2012 dollars, adjusted using the Personal Consumption Expenditures Index. Government ideology scores come from NOMINATE. States' urban population shares come from decennial census data. The share of a state's population that is non-Hispanic Black and the share of 25+ year-olds with at least a high school education or equivalent both come from the decennial census and the American Community Survey. Summary statistics for these control variables are in Table 3.

Table 3
Summary statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
EFNA	0.0	1.0	-2.9	0.0	2.3
EFNA-Immig.	0.0	1.0	-1.6	-0.0	2.7
log(Population)	15.0	1.0	12.9	15.1	17.4
% NH Black	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.4
% HS+	44.5	15.1	12.9	51.1	62.9
% Urban	0.7	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.9

|	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
NOMINATE	50.7	12.9	17.6	51.1	73.6

4. RESULTS

This section plots the results of adapting the Clemens and Pritchett model to economic freedom scores on the state level.[18] First, we compare how the economic institutions of American states would adapt under the assumption of weak founder effects compared to how they actually changed. Second, we use regression analysis to estimate the causal effect of immigration on state-level economic institutions.

### 4.1. COMPARING US AND IMMIGRATION-IMPLIED INSTITUTIONS

Figure 1 plots the time series of our new measure of immigration-implied EFNA and the Real EFNA scores across US states. Each line represents the unweighted average Real EFNA and immigrant-implied EFNA scores for all states in each census year. Three stylized patterns quickly emerge from the data. First, we find that, after adjusting for transmission following Clemens and Pritchett, immigrant-implied EFNA are generally lower than the Real EFNA from 1980 until 2000.[19] However, immigrant-implied EFNA scores trend upward across our entire sample horizon and surpass Real EFNA by 1.2 standard deviations in 2010. This implies that, if immigrants have a big effect on state-level economic institutions, then they would have lowered their quality during the 1980-2000 period and then *improved* them in the 2010 period.

Figure 1
Trends in real and immigrant-implied economic freedom scores.

Notes: EFNA-Immig. denotes the average immigrant-implied EFW score adjusted using the Clemens and Pritchett (2019) method.

Next, we compare the distribution of our new institutional quality scores by decade. Figure 2 shows kernel density plots of the real and immigrant-implied EFNA scores for each census decade. Like Figure 1, we find that the average institutional quality of immigrant origin countries has increased substantially over time while average domestic economic institutions (in blue) are relatively constant. Moreover, the variation in quality is also moving toward the higher end. The shifting distribution of immigrant economic freedom scores potentially highlights self-selection effects – immigrants who embody institutions that are more aligned with those in the United States are more likely to migrate to the United States.[20] Also, they indicate how much economic institutions have improved around the world. The reservoir of poor economic institutions is shrinking and less likely to spill over into the United States.

Figure 2
Distribution of real and immigrant-implied economic freedom scores by decade.

Notes: EFNA-Immig. denotes the average immigrant-implied EFW score adjusted using the Clemens and Pritchett (2019) method.

Finally, we look at the pairwise relationship between our immigrant economic freedom scores and states' real EFNA scores by decade. In Figure 3 we highlight the bivariate relationships between each index by decade. Two patterns quickly emerge. First, we observe a negative relationship between each index in 1990 and 2000 (1). Second, we notice a level shift in the average quality of immigrant institutions from 1980 to 2010. If founder effects were weak and immigrants had a large effect on the quality of economic institutions in American states, then immigrant transmission of institutions would have lowered the quality of economic institutions in 1980, 1990, and 2000 but would have *improved* the quality of economic institutions in American states in 2010.

Figure 3
Correlation between immigrant-implied EFNA scores and real EFNA scores by decade.

Notes: EFNA-Immig. denotes the average immigrant-implied EFW score adjusted using the Clemens and Pritchett (2019) method.

4.2. THE CAUSAL IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

This section will attempt to estimate the pairwise correlations between the new measure of our transmission-adjusted immigrant-implied EFNA and the Real EFNA for American states. We therefore construct a panel of US states and economic institutions for each census year in which we measure both immigrant stocks by country of origin and economic institutions. Our final state panel dataset spans 1980-2010 in 10-year intervals.

We first use a simple fixed effects multiple regression framework. Fixed effects allow us to isolate the variation in a state's economic institutions while holding constant economic policy preferences and common shocks affecting all states in a given year. In each specification we regress the Real EFNA score for the state on the immigration-implied EFNA. To ensure each measure is comparable, we standardize both EFNAs to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. This ensures that each index is comparable in variance terms in that a standard deviation change

in the immigration-implied EFNA correlates with a standard deviation change in a state's Real EFNA.

Our preferred specification is shown below and incorporates state and year fixed effects to identify the within-state variation in economic institutions:

$$EFNA_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \gamma EFNA_{it}^{Immig} + X_{it}'\beta + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where the variables for each state i in census year t are the Real EFNA and the immigrant-implied EFNA scores. Each score is normalized to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one. The coefficient of interest γ therefore shows how a standard deviation increase in a state's immigrant-implied EFNA score correlates with a corresponding standard deviation change in the state's Real EFNA score. X_{it} represents an optional vector of control variables selected from the literature. These include log population, government ideology scores, urban population share, share of those age 25 and above with at least a high school education or equivalent, and the share of the population that is non-Hispanic black. We include state and year fixed effects to control for level differences and common shocks affecting institutions across all states, denoted α_i and λ_t, respectively. Since the Real EFNA scores tend to trend upward over time, we also employ a specification that includes a unit linear trend. Standard errors are clustered by state.

The main metric of interest is the immigrant-implied EFNA score. A higher score on the index implies that the immigrants within a state come from places with better average economic institutions in the year when they arrived. We can therefore empirically test whether immigrants from countries with worse economic institutions have a deleterious effect on the economic

institutions of the states in which they settle by comparing the immigrant-implied EFNA with the Real EFNA.

Table 4 shows the regression results from our baseline empirical specifications. Columns 1 through 3 test the correlation between the Real EFNA and immigrant-implied EFNA under a series of specifications. Column 1 represents the most parsimonious model, controlling only for state and year fixed effects. Here, we find that a one standard deviation increase in a state's immigration implied EFNA is associated with a 0.38 standard deviation lower Real EFNA. This result is significant at the 5 percent level.

Noticing the apparent trends in economic freedom scores from Figure 1, we also control for state trends in two ways. First, we estimate our baseline specification using state-linear trends in Column 2. Second, we estimate our model in first differences with a state fixed effect in Column 3. In each model we find a similar result – a standard deviation increase in the immigrant-implied EFNA correlates with a lower Real EFNA. Considering the general trends in our immigrant economic freedom index, this result is unsurprising. For most of the time series back to 1980, the immigrant-implied EFNA generally falls below the states' Real EFNA. Given the simple nature of these models, it is impossible to ascertain whether this negative correlation is causal. We therefore run another series of tests using control variables used in the economic freedom literature to examine other substate areas.[21]

Table 4
Baseline regression results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Levels	Linear Trend	First Difference	Levels	Linear Trend	First Difference
EFNA-Immig.	-0.381*	-0.615***	-0.476***	-0.411*	-0.222	-0.246
	(0.167)	(0.137)	(0.063)	(0.178)	(0.283)	(0.261)
Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Num.Obs.	200	200	150	200	200	150
R2 Within	0.045	0.170	0.338	0.115	0.441	0.469

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In Columns 4 through 6, we repeat the same regression specifications adding controls for states' economic conditions and demographic characteristics. In the baseline specification in Column 4 we again find a negative and significant correlation between a state's real and immigrant-implied economic freedom score. Further, the estimate is similar in magnitude to the baseline model, showing that a one standard deviation increase in the immigrant-implied freedom score is associated with an average 0.41 standard deviation lower state economic freedom score – a difference of 0.03 from the model with only state fixed effects. However, after controlling for state trends in Columns 5 and 6, we find that the inclusion of covariates renders the point estimates statistically indistinguishable from zero. Further, the point estimates decrease in magnitude by nearly a half compared to the prior specifications and show a negative correlation in the range of 0.22 to 0.25 standard deviations. Additionally, the models explain a greater amount of within-state variation compared to each of the corresponding baseline specifications.

Since our empirical results are substantially changed by the inclusion of control variables, we run a further sensitivity analysis by running each model with only one control variable. Table 5 shows the results from these regressions. In nearly every specification we find the same negative and significant correlation between a state's immigrant-implied EFNA and its Real EFNA. These point

estimates show that a standard deviation increase in the immigrant -implied EFNA is associated with a 0.36 to 0.43 standard deviation lower Real EFNA.

Notably, we find that the most significant correlates of a state's economic freedom score are its population, per capita income, and share of the population with at least a high school education. While each of these control variables mitigates the negative association between the immigrant-implied EFNA and a state's Real EFNA, the magnitudes are still close to our baseline estimates.

Table 5
Sensitivity to covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Levels	Levels	Levels	Levels	Levels	Levels
EFNA-Immig.	-0.428*	-0.388*	-0.363*	-0.384*	-0.384*	-0.380*
	(0.182)	(0.190)	(0.165)	(0.163)	(0.166)	(0.167)
log(Population)	-0.783**					
	(0.254)					
log(Income per cap.)		3.184***				
		(0.492)				
% NH Black			9.713			
			(5.479)			
% HS+				0.033*		
				(0.015)		
% Urban					0.677	
					(1.491)	
NOMINATE						-0.002

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Levels	Levels	Levels	Levels	Levels	Levels
						(0.004)
Num.Obs.	200	200	200	200	200	200
R2 Within	0.084	0.266	0.071	0.069	0.047	0.047

Our regression results show how the immigrant-implied EFNA based on the assumption of weak founder effects is negatively correlated the states' actual economic freedom scores. After testing this correlation against a series of fixed effects, trends, and related covariates, we still find that our index of immigrant institutional quality is negatively correlated with states' observed economic institutions. While this result holds over the 1980-2000 timeframe, it is not clear whether this inverse correlation is lasting. Examining the time series of our new index of immigrants' institutional experience, we find a striking change in 2010 – a difference of over 1 standard deviation when compared to states' observed institutions. This likely reflects three features of the data: a growing stock of assimilated immigrants, immigrants' self-selection into the United States based on their own ideological and institutional preferences, and the improving state of economic institutions in countries that send immigrants to the United States.

5. DISCUSSION

Figure 1 shows that the immigrant-implied EFNA on the state level are significantly different from the Real EFNA, which is evidence that economic institutions are likely sticky, founder effects are strong, and immigrants don't have much effect on state level economic institutions in the United States.

The stickiness of economic institutions on the state level in the 80s, 90s, and 00s is good news because, according to our epidemiological model of institutional change as adapted from Clemens and Pritchett, immigrants would have lowered the quality of economic institutions in these years.[22] Unexpectedly, our regression results show that weaker founder effects would have resulted in higher quality economic institutions on the state-level in 2010. This is mostly because American state-level economic institutions are stable over time and the quality of economic institutions in foreign countries has improved significantly since 1980 (Figure 2).

Our results are consistent with Clemens and Pritchett in that they suggest either rapid immigrant assimilation to American institutions, the improvement of institutions in foreign countries reducing the seriousness of the "contagion" of less productive foreign economic institutions, or individual self-selection whereby immigrants who come to the United States from these countries have opinions on the right tail of their home countries' distributions.[23] Regardless of the reason or any hypothesized mechanism, there is no evidence that immigrants reduce the quality of economic institutions in American states.

NOTES

[1] Clemens, "Economics and Emigration", 83-106; Nowrasteh and Powell, *Wretched Refuse?* 14.
[2] Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett. "Place Premium", 201-13.
[3] Borjas, *Immigration Economics*, 149; Borjas, "Immigration and Globalization", 961-74; Voigt, *Institutional Economics*.
[4] Zelinsky, *Cultural Geography of the United States.*
[5] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.
[6] Stansel, Torra, and McMahon, *Economic Freedom of North America 2020.*
[7] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.
[8] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.
[9] Gwartney et al., *Economic Freedom of the World: 2020 Annual Report.*

[10] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.

[11] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.

[12] Stansel, Torra, and McMahon, *Economic Freedom of North America 2020*.

[13] Borjas, *Immigration Economics*, 149; Borjas, "Immigration and Globalization", 961-74; Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.

[14] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.

[15] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.

[16] Nowrasteh, Forrester, and Blondin, "How Mass Immigration Affects Countries with Weak Economic Institutions", 533-49; Padilla and Cachanosky, "Immigration and Economic Freedom of the US States"; Clark et al., "Does Immigration Impact Institutions?" 321-35; Powell, Clark, and Nowrasteh, "Does Mass Immigration Destroy Institutions?" 83-95.

[17] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.

[18] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.

[19] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.

[20] Grogger and Hanson "Income Maximization and the Selection and Sorting of International Migrants", 42-57; Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.

[21] Padilla and Cachanosky, "Grecian Horse", 351–405; Padilla and Cachanosky, "Immigration and Economic Freedom of the US States".

[22] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.

[23] Clemens and Pritchett, "New Economic Case for Migration Restrictions", 153-64.

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