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January 14, 2025
Policy Analysis

No. 987
A Comprehensive Evaluation of Policy Rate Feedback Rules
Given the existing framework of centrally managed fiat money, Congress can greatly improve monetary policy by requiring the central bank to follow a policy rule.
By Jai Kedia and Norbert Michel
October 8, 2024
White Paper

Cato Handbook on Executive Orders and Presidential Directives
Executive orders and other presidential directives that conflict with the principles of individual liberty, free markets, limited government, peace, and the American Constitution should be revoked or amended by the next president.
By Alex Nowrasteh
September 13, 2024
Working Paper

No. 81
Central Banker’s Hours: The Fed’s Tortuous, Slow Road to Faster Payments
The best way to appreciate the importance of timely wholesale settlements is by taking a close look at how ordinary U.S. dollar payments are completed.
By George Selgin
April 18, 2024
Policy Analysis

No. 973
A Case for Federal Deficit Reduction
Some basic fiscal truths show that we are headed toward a fiscal crisis, sooner or later, unless significant action is taken to reduce the scale of future deficits and debt.
By Ryan Bourne
September 27, 2023
Research Briefs in Economic Policy

No. 351
Connected Lending of Last Resort
Today’s central banks have strict rules to prevent conflicts of interest, as do other public administrations. Yet, given their role in the economy, central bankers cannot be fully isolated from private‐sector influence.
By Kris James Mitchener and Eric Monnet
June 1, 2023
Working Paper

No. 77
Following the Taylor Rule: Has the Fed Learned from Its Own “Success”?
Since 2009, monetary policy has been exceptionally loose, with the Fed failing to increase the policy rate in response to macro indicators.
By Jai Kedia
May 31, 2023
Survey Reports

Poll: Only 16% of Americans Support the Government Issuing a Central Bank Digital Currency
It is clear the idea does not have the majority support that government officials should seek before adopting a CBDC.
By Emily Ekins and Jordan Gygi
May 10, 2023
Briefing Paper

No. 155
Regulatory Clarity for Crypto Marketplaces Part II: Centralized Exchanges
Part II describes centralized exchanges and proposes tailored registration and disclosure pathways for centralized and decentralizing crypto marketplaces.
By Jack Solowey and Jennifer J. Schulp
May 10, 2023
Briefing Paper

No. 154
Regulatory Clarity for Crypto Marketplaces Part I: Decentralized Exchanges
This briefing paper focuses on decentralized exchanges and, in conjunction with Part II on centralized exchanges, proposes crypto marketplace regulatory policy sensitive to these distinctions.
By Jack Solowey and Jennifer J. Schulp
May 8, 2023
Working Paper

No. 76
Has Fed Policy Mattered for Inflation? Evidence from Monetary VARs
This paper investigates the effects of unanticipated changes to monetary policy on inflation
By Jai Kedia
April 4, 2023
Policy Analysis

No. 941
Central Bank Digital Currency
There is no reason for the federal government to issue a CBDC when the costs are so high and the benefits are so low. Congress should ensure that the federal government does not issue a CBDC.
By Nicholas Anthony and Norbert Michel
February 22, 2023
Visual Feature

The Risks of CBDCs
Congress should prohibit the Fed and Treasury from issuing a digital national currency. CBDCs have no place in the American economy.
By Norbert Michel and Nicholas Anthony
January 10, 2023
Briefing Paper

No. 145
Central Bank Digital Currency
The threat to freedom that a CBDC might pose is closely related to its threat to privacy.
By Nicholas Anthony and Norbert Michel
December 15, 2022
Working Paper

No. 71
Regulatory Clarity for Crypto Marketplaces
This briefing paper proposes crypto marketplace regulatory policy that is sensitive to these distinctions.
By Jack Solowey and Jennifer J. Schulp
November 18, 2022
Working Paper

No. 70
Central Bank Digital Currency: Assessing the Risks and Dispelling the Myths
In the case of a CBDC, however, the digital dollars would be a liability of the central bank itself.
By Nicholas Anthony and Norbert Michel