I am pleased to see the Regulation article by Roderick Hills Jr. and David Schleicher (“Can ‘Planning’ Deregulate Land Use? Fall 2015), including a critique of the proposals made in the 1970s by William Fischel and myself that the large American zoning inefficiencies be resolved by allowing the sale of zoning changes.

Hills and Schleicher are concerned with evolving land use patterns in central city areas, partly reflecting the growing demand for residential development and revitalization in many such areas. As they point out, the rigidities of land use transition, combined with rising economic pressure for change, have led to rapidly escalating housing prices in many leading American cities—in some cases to the exclusion of all but the best-off members of American society. I agree that remedial steps are greatly needed.

Rights holders? / In my early 30s, I brashly proposed in Zoning and Property Rights (MIT Press, 1977) the creation of a “New System of Metropolitan Land Tenure.” As has been common throughout the very long history of land tenure, I argued that zoning was a major new tenure development again grounded in legitimating myths and fictions. Zoning in actuality was not a form of public land regulation, but a disguised new form of collective property right otherwise analogous to more conventional private property rights. The key missing element, however, was the ability to sell the collective right in the manner of a traditional property right. As a result, changes in the use of zoning rights had to be achieved by some other means that would typically be less organized and less efficient than the usual exchanges of use rights—individual or collective—in the marketplace.

If zoning rights were to be legally saleable, this raised a key question: who would hold the rights and potentially receive the revenues from their sale? This issue is now raised by the Hills and Schleicher article. I proposed in 1977 two very different answers according to whether the land at present was developed or undeveloped.

If the land already contained housing or other development, I radically proposed assigning the zoning rights to the collectivity of the owners of property in each neighborhood. An existing neighborhood under this proposal would thus take on much of the character of a private homeowners association. At present, homeowners associations have the right to terminate the association in exchange for a developer payment, thus selling their collective rights. This has seldom happened, partly because the actual process of homeowners association termination at present faces large practical difficulties. I have since proposed new ways of significantly reducing those transactional difficulties.

In the much different circumstance of undeveloped land, my first choice in 1977 was to abolish the zoning altogether, possibly by a series of court rulings that this form of zoning was an unconstitutional taking of longstanding private rights to benefit from the new development of individually owned land. Recognizing the inertial, political, and other large hurdles to such a radical change in zoning, however, I also proposed a second-best solution: the zoning rights to undeveloped land within a given local governing jurisdiction could be sold by the existing residents for the wider benefit of the full jurisdiction. I questioned then the overall equity of such sales, but the legalized sale of zoning rights by a municipality or other local government could do much to resolve the growing land efficiency and equity problems in American undeveloped suburban land.

To some extent, the evolving patterns of management and control of undeveloped land in the United States have actually moved in these directions. In the outer suburbs, new housing development today is largely occurring in private homeowners associations (and condominiums). Developers also typically pay for the zoning rights in various indirect ways—although explicit legal cash sale remains unacceptable to the courts.

In existing neighborhoods, however, the trends have been less promising. In big cities, as Hills and Schleicher describe, it is the citywide government, not the immediate neighborhood property owners, that holds and sells the local zoning rights. This is problematic because the “not in my backyard” opposition to new development is typically localized and thus the most negatively affected parties usually are not adequately compensated by the citywide revenues from the zoning sale.

To address this problem, I proposed in 1977 that new laws be enacted to allow—on the vote of a high-enough neighborhood supermajority—the transfer of the zoning rights (including the ability to sell the rights) to a new collectivity of the immediate neighborhood property owners. Rather than attempting to plan future land uses, as Hills and Schleicher propose, the principal task of citywide planners would be to design an appropriate set of neighborhood boundaries within which such a decentralized approach could be implemented. Little movement has occurred thus far in this direction, but I would repeat the same recommendation today.

Transactions and costs / As Ronald Coase pointed out many years ago, the party negatively affected by a nuisance has two choices: force the nuisance to cease its objectionable activities or demand adequate compensating payments. The generator of the nuisance has the obverse choice: meet the monetary demands or stop the offending activity. A metropolitan system of land tenure, including the definition of initial rights, should be chosen to minimize the information and other transaction costs of the associated land use bargaining and contracting (as well as to reflect considerations of social equity).

Hills and Schleicher make a case that their proposal for a revival of comprehensive planning (with zoning precisely following according to the plans) will in fact reduce such overall transaction costs. I am skeptical, however. The proposal depends critically on a newfound ability of expert city planners to anticipate with considerable accuracy future land use demand and supply trends—something they have never been able to do on the scale of a major city in the past. Hills and Schleicher also propose to overcome the high transaction costs of political deal making and other negotiating over any such comprehensive plan by means of an urban version of fast-track legislation in the international trade area. I find it hard to believe that any city legislature would surrender so much authority to the executive branch in a matter as critical as laying out a plan for the city’s future. There is an element of utopianism here that is reminiscent of earlier expectations for urban comprehensive planning that eventually had to be abandoned, resulting in the substitution of more market-like mechanisms. It certainly seems a misnomer to describe it as a “libertarian” proposal, as they do.

Coasian ways of thinking generated a vast body of literature that has been central to the development since the 1970s of a whole new field of institutional economics. Although Fischel has been an important exception, and my Private Neighborhoods and the Transformation of Local Government (Urban Institute Press, 2005) is a sequel to Zoning and Property Rights, this field has given less attention to zoning and local land use management and control than many other areas of American public and private activity. Given that the negative economic consequences for the nation of perverse land use controls dwarf those of any other form of American regulation, it is to be hoped that the Hills and Schleicher article will work to advance the institutional discussions—both legal and economic—and the assessment of possible new collective control arrangements.