Legislation enshrining “constitutional carry” — that is, the legal right to carry a firearm without a government permit — is spreading quickly across the country. Many states have adopted constitutional carry in the past decade, and more are expected to do so in the coming years.

Gun control groups unsurprisingly oppose constitutional carry. More surprisingly, so do some police chiefs associations and police unions. They argue that permitless carry increases the danger faced by law enforcement officers. Yet, officer fatalities have trended downward slightly over the past four decades (excepting COVID-19 deaths), despite a growing number of law enforcement officers, a growing U.S. population, more guns in circulation, and expansions in concealed and open carry.

Could another motivation be behind the police groups’ opposition to constitutional carry? The economic theory of regulation, outlined by Nobel economics laureate George Stigler, posits that government regulation often reflects private interests rather than the public interest. An extension of this idea, public choice theory, holds that policymakers and other government officials, themselves, can be the private beneficiaries. Accordingly, law enforcement organizations’ position on constitutional carry may reflect their economic benefit from gun control. Armed citizens are a substitute for police in dangerous areas, thus gun control increases demand for police services, leading to more funding and more law enforcement jobs.

This may explain why police chiefs and unions, if not the rank-and-file of law enforcement, tend to favor gun control measures. Individual officers, many of whom are gun owners and Second Amendment supporters, may see only a small direct economic benefit from gun control, but police unions enjoy a larger membership and more union dues, and police chiefs enjoy the greater prestige and power that comes from commanding larger and better-funded police forces. Likewise, municipal law enforcement representatives are more likely to support gun control than their rural counterparts because they see armed citizens as substitutes for law enforcement. In rural areas, where crime rates are lower, armed citizens are seen as complements.

Law enforcement and gun control / Vermont, which is the historical home of several major U.S. gun manufacturers, led the way in constitutional carry, having never restricted the right to carry a firearm. As a result, constitutional carry is sometimes referred to as “Vermont carry.” Alaska adopted it in 2003. In 2010, Arizona became the third state to do so, kicking off a wave of similar laws in other states for the remainder of the decade. More recently, Iowa, Montana, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah adopted constitutional carry in 2021, while Wyoming extended it to visitors from other states. Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, and Ohio adopted constitutional carry earlier this year.

Throughout this process, representatives from law enforcement organizations have generally opposed constitutional carry laws. For instance, when Idaho enacted it in 2016, police chiefs Bill Bones, Jeff Lavey, and Rick Allen wrote in an op-ed in the Idaho Statesman, “We believe dismantling the longstanding and effective permitting system without taking additional precautionary steps will weaken public safety.” The three head police forces in Ada County, the largest county in Idaho, with a little over a quarter of the state population as of 2020. In contrast, Joe Rodriguez, sheriff of Nez Perce County — a much smaller county — has been more favorably disposed to the legislation, saying in 2017 that “nothing has changed” in reference to crime rates. That same year, the Washington Post reported that Scott Haug, president of the Idaho Chiefs of Police Association, admitted that constitutional carry made him worry about a lack of gun safety training for those exercising the right, but “other than that, it’s gone pretty well.”

Constitutional carry went into effect in Texas on September 1, 2021. Many representatives of the law enforcement community voiced opposition to the law, including James McLaughlin, executive director of the Texas Police Chiefs Association, Austin interim police chief Joseph Chacon, Houston Police Officers’ Union director Ray Hunt, and Texas Municipal Police Association executive director Kevin Lawrence. Lawrence echoed his peers in arguing that constitutional carry “will make the jobs of our law enforcement officers more difficult and more dangerous.” Former Houston and Austin police chief and gun control advocate Art Acevedo called the law “ridiculous” and predicted “a lot more bloodshed,” claiming, “Law enforcement, police chiefs, sheriffs, police labor … do not support constitutional carry here in Texas or anywhere in this country.” He added, “You’re either with law enforcement or you stand with the fringe.” Similar statements have been made by law enforcement representatives in Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, and other states recently debating constitutional carry bills.

The general support for gun control measures among police chiefs and police union representatives stands in contrast to some sheriffs and the police rank-and-file. According to Doug Wyllie of Police magazine, a 2013 survey of over 15,000 verified law enforcement professionals found that 95% believe a ban on the manufacture and sale of ammunition magazines that hold over 10 rounds would have no effect on violent crime, and 71% believe that a ban on the manufacture and sale of semiautomatic weapons would have no effect while another 20% believe it would increase crime. Though similar polling doesn’t yet exist on constitutional carry, the impression is that police chiefs and unions generally oppose it while sheriffs tend to be supportive or neutral.

Cartel enforcement / In a 1983 article in Regulation, Clemson economist Bruce Yandle offered another extension of the economic theory of regulation. According to “Bootleggers and Baptists: The Evolution of a Regulatory Economist,” interest groups with very different motivations can independently work toward a mutually beneficial social regulation. One party would be driven by high-minded — and publicity friendly — interests while the other would follow narrow economic self-interest. Yandle argued that durable social regulation often emerges from the combined work of both types of interest groups.

Regulation of the firearms industry in the United States throughout the 20th century is an excellent real-world illustration of Yandle’s model. Previously in these pages, I observed that the major acts of U.S. federal gun control offered protectionism to the domestic firearms industry. (See “ ‘Bootleggers’ and Gun Control,” Fall 2015.) These included restrictions on imported weapons under the National Firearms Act of 1934 and the Gun Control Act of 1968, President George H.W. Bush’s executive action blocking imports of many popular firearms in 1989, and President Barack Obama’s blocking of the importation of surplus American M1 Garand rifles from South Korea during his term. Although these actions were rationalized in the name of public safety, they also protected domestic producers from foreign competition and ultimately attracted production facilities from other countries to the United States. Taken together, these acts seem to confirm Stigler’s general assertion that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”

Police organizations’ opposition to constitutional carry and other gun rights can be understood as a merger of both public choice and bootleggers-and-Baptists theories, with the police groups acting as both bootleggers and Baptists. Restrictions on the carrying of a firearm outside the home induce demand for public law enforcement. Police groups are hardly strangers to such self-motivation: as journalist Lee Fang has noted, one of the top five interest groups that lobby to keep marijuana illegal is police unions (along with private prison corporations and prison guard unions).

In contrast, public firefighters did not resist innovations that reduce fire incidence. The broader use of fire-resistant building materials, smoke alarms, fire extinguishers, and fire sprinklers have reduced the percentage of emergency calls for fire relative to medical aid. In 1980, 27.6% of calls to fire departments were for fire and 46.6% were for medical aid; today, just 4% are for fire and 65% for medical aid. As a result, firefighters have reoriented toward emergency medical services. If crime rates continue to trend downward, police officers may likewise have to expand their mission in the future; perhaps the war on drugs represents just such an adaptation to an evolving society.

Conclusion / The economic theory of regulation can lead to insights that may seem counterintuitive, yet it can explain seemingly irrational behavior by public officials. Many police chief groups and police unions say they oppose constitutional carry for officer and public safety reasons, yet data trends do not support that concern, making the chiefs and unions appear irrational. However, economic interests would explain why they support public safety regulations that restrict the individual right to carry a firearm, resulting in greater demand for police services.

Readings

  • “Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect,” by Bruce Yandle. Regulation 22(3): 5–7 (1999).
  • “Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist,” by Bruce Yandle. Regulation 7(3): 12–16 (1983).
  • “ ‘Bootleggers’ and Gun Control,” by Joseph Michael Newhard. Regulation 38(3): 10–16 (2015).
  • “Luddism as Cartel Enforcement,” by Gary M. Anderson and Robert D. Tollison. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 142(4): 727–738 (1986).
  • More Guns, Less Crime, 3rd ed., by John R. Lott Jr. University of Chicago Press, 2010.
  • “Police and Prison Guard Groups Fight Marijuana Legalization in California,” by Lee Fang. The Intercept, May 18, 2016.
  • “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” by George J. Stigler. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1): 3–21 (1971).