The recent French election illustrated what may look to many like an intriguing fact: the rejection of free trade by both extreme-left and extreme-right populism. The extreme-right candidate, Marine Le Pen, presented herself as an opponent of globalization, promising a “smart protectionism” and vowing to “reject free-trade agreements,” to establish a “reindustrialization plan,” and to hire 6,000 new customs agents. “We need protectionism,” claimed a press release by the vice-president of the National Front, Le Pen’s party. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the extreme-left candidate, criticized “deindustrialization” and promised “solidary protectionism,” “industrial sovereignty,” and French exit from the World Trade Organization.

Both programs would undermine free trade and freedom to work within the European Union. In practice, there is little difference between Le Pen’s “smart protectionism” and Mélenchon’s “solidary protectionism.”

Today’s populists oppose free trade even when they don’t stand at the extremes of the political spectrum. In the United States, both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders campaigned for protectionism. Many other examples could be given, including most if not all populist third parties in Europe.

Authority and “the people” / The Encyclopedia Britannica defines “populism” as a “political program or movement that champions the common person,” noting that it “usually combines elements of the left and the right.” Authoritarian populism is “typically critical of political representation and anything that mediates the relation between the people and their leader or government.”

A number of reasons account for the marriage between populism and protectionism.

First, the common person does not understand how free trade benefits the vast majority of people. This ignorance is not surprising if only because the typical voter remains “rationally ignorant” of such matters. At least on this topic, ignorance is more prevalent among the less educated. There is evidence, including in a recent WSJ/NBC opinion poll, that individuals without a college degree are more likely to think free trade is detrimental (Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2017). But even among the educated, only a small minority understand the economic theory of trade.

A second reason why populists naturally favor protectionism is that the common person is more likely to fear foreigners, if only because he travels less and meets fewer strangers. As the word says, strangers are strange.

The third reason is that populism needs much state power, which free trade undermines. A populist leader may say he is working on behalf of “the people,” but at best he can only impose the preferences of the majority (or a large plurality) on the rest of the citizenry. “The people” do not have identical preferences and unanimous opinions. However much the populist leader wants to be loved, he will only be able to satisfy the preferences of some people. He will only satisfy his supporters—and then only some of their preferences. Power is required to steamroll minority preferences. Given the real or fictitious crises that typically spark and fuel populism, additional power will be needed. You don’t satisfy a mob by throwing roses to minorities.

When Trump said in a campaign advertisement, “We will be unified, we will be one, we will be happy again,” he was dreaming or uttering balderdash. No more unity would have been generated under Sanders; it would have been just another majority (or plurality) denying the preferences of another minority.

Free trade is an obstacle to any sort of government authoritarianism, including populist authoritarianism. Under free trade, domestic policies that would increase the cost of goods and services (say, by maintaining inefficient manufacturing) will be circumvented by imports. The free movement of capital, which is part of free trade, is also a powerful restraint on authoritarian governments. If your savings are threatened, you can transfer them to another country. If worse comes to worse, you can leave and bring your money with you—or, today, telecommute from a foreign abode and receive payments from your customers over the border. Needing more power, populist leaders will favor protectionism.

Dual (or multiple) citizenship is an interesting case study. Populist or authoritarian governments don’t like dual citizenship because it allows their citizens to escape more easily. The more authoritarian the state is, the more captive a citizenry it wants. It is significant that Le Pen has voiced her opposition to dual citizenship.

These reasons are reinforced by a fourth one: the establishment—the populists’ bête noire—has come to side with institutions that appear to favor free trade—that is, with “globalization.” Established international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development have acquired a bias against protectionism. The fact that many economists work for these organizations has reinforced their free trade orientation.

This is the result of seven decades of trade liberalization. Members of the political and economic establishment are typically more cosmopolitan than others: they travel more, are more likely to have dual citizenships, and so forth.

Yet, we are still very far from having truly free trade. Not only has the liberalization movement been stalled for two decades, but much of what passes for free trade is partially managed trade and is viewed as a concession from national states. The establishment’s free-trade bias is only a matter of degree. But it is apparently sufficient to provoke the populist ire.

These observations are not meant to depreciate common people, but to emphasize why they easily fall for populist rulers from whom, to borrow from H.L. Mencken, they will “get it good and hard.”