Typically ranked among America’s greatest presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt is regarded by most historians as having had a good record on civil rights issues, marred only by the (understandable) internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Other than that, FDR is lauded for his many “progressive” accomplishments.

But in the mind of University of Alabama history professor David T. Beito, this reputation is undeserved. In his book The New Deal’s War on the Bill of Rights, he shows that Roosevelt was happy to trample on people’s rights whenever they impeded his political goals. Often, FDR was driven by partisanship and a lust for vengeance against anyone who dared to oppose him. If the Constitution got in the way, he ignored it.

Foretaste / Beito begins his survey long before FDR was elected president in 1932. Roosevelt’s philosophical guiding lights were his distant cousin, Theodore, who was a proponent of the “New Nationalism” that glorified centralized power, and Woodrow Wilson, who pushed his “New Freedom” agenda that severely restricted actual freedom in favor of state planning.

Beito reminds us that FDR served as assistant secretary of the Navy under Wilson and enthusiastically supported Wilson’s assault on freedom of speech for anyone who opposed America’s entry into the Great War. During his time in the administration, Roosevelt revealed his authoritarian colors on various occasions, such as his “Newport Sex Squad” that aimed to root out homosexual activity at the Newport (Rhode Island) Naval Station. The sting employed 41 operatives using entrapment and intimidation. After the war, a Senate committee rebuked FDR for the operation, declaring that it “violated the moral code of the American citizen.” That was a foretaste of things to come during his 13 years in the White House.

Silencing the critics / Once in the White House, he often attacked freedom of speech. Beito finds it ironic that in his famous “Four Freedoms” speech, Roosevelt put freedom of speech first since, Beito writes, “he never hesitated to exploit opportunities to restrict the individual rights of dissenters.” A good example is FDR’s behind-the-scenes push for the US Senate to “investigate” lobbying against the New Deal.

In 1935, with some Americans souring on his economic policies, Roosevelt encouraged his Senate allies to take action against organizations that opposed him. Sen. Hugo Black of Alabama eagerly took the lead. His committee went after groups and individuals, demanding the release of millions of private telegrams. Black (soon to be elevated to the Supreme Court) declared that he was merely trying to find out if any laws were being violated. The true purpose, of course, was to frighten away political donors who might contribute to FDR’s Republican opponent in 1936, making them leery of being hauled before the committee and/​or subjected to tax audits. Many journalists decried these tactics, including the famed liberal columnist Walter Lippmann, who called the Black committee “an engine of tyranny.”

After FDR was easily re-elected in 1936, he continued to pressure his friends in Congress to go after his political opponents. His main attack dog was Sen. Sherman Minton of Indiana. In 1937, FDR suffered several defeats, especially in some Supreme Court decisions that put him, Beito writes, “in the mood for reprisals.” The principal target was the National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government, which was having success with a message tailored to voters across political, occupational, and class lines. In an effort at silencing them, the zealous Minton called many people before his committee, demanding that they produce huge numbers of documents and browbeating them with hostile questions. Again, Lippmann cried foul, calling Minton’s committee “arbitrary government and capricious tyranny.”

In 1938, Minton went further, introducing a bill that would criminalize the publication of “false news.” The bill drew widespread opposition throughout the country, but it showed the mindset of FDR and his allies: the law should be used to silence the administration’s critics, no matter what the Constitution might say.

The nation’s newspapers mostly stood firm against the administration’s efforts to bend them to its will, but radio was different. Beito explains how the emerging technology had come under the control of the federal government during the administrations of Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover, in particular the power of the Federal Communications Commission to license only broadcasters that would operate “in the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” Those vague guidelines meant that licenses wouldn’t be granted to applicants who, the officials felt, would not be operating in the public interest, or could be revoked if holders angered their FCC masters. Fearful broadcasters did not want to upset federal bureaucrats who held such power.

Shortly after FDR’s election, the National Association of Broadcasters announced that its members were “at the service of the administration.” Many of them would carry government pronouncements without charge about all the good that New Deal programs were doing and try to tone down or entirely drop broadcasts that were critical. Because of the government’s power, radio was largely kept from attacking FDR’s policies.

World War II / As the clouds of war began to gather in the late 1930s, many Americans expressed the view that the United States should stay out of foreign entanglements. FDR had no more tolerance for those views than Wilson had and sought to silence them through legal action. He had his Justice Department bring cases against non-interventionists starting in 1940. The first case was based on an 1861 statute against seditious conspiracy, but it failed in court. FDR then got Congress to pass a new law that classified as “sedition” not just action against the US government but also advocacy of overthrowing the government or of insubordination in the armed forces. Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee likened it to a sword with which those in power “will be able to slash at almost any unpopular person who is speaking or writing anything that they consider objectionable criticism of their policies.” With the new law, administration officials began to attack critics, going after publications making arguments they disliked. It also used the Post Office in its campaign by denying Second Class mailing rates to “seditious” papers and magazines.

FDR’s darkest, most glaring attack on the rights of American citizens was his 1942 Executive Order 9066 for the internment of Japanese Americans living on the West Coast. While many historians have tried to paint the president as a victim of circumstances, forced to go along with expert advice and public opinion, Beito disagrees. He argues that FDR was entirely responsible for the order and showed no reluctance; in fact, he had made anti-Japanese statements as far back as the 1920s.

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the government’s attention was focused on the question of whether the Japanese American population was a threat to US defenses. Military authorities in Hawaii and California stated that the threat was minimal. Things were calm on that front until January 1942, when California Gov. Culbert Olsen declared that the people of his state wanted the Japanese moved out because they were so “inscrutable.” California attorney general Earl Warren (later the chief justice of the US Supreme Court) chimed in, claiming the country was sure to get “Fifth Column activities timed just like the invasions of France and Norway.” There was no evidence of any such activity, but that just showed how inscrutable the Japanese were, according to internment advocates. Once the drumbeat for action against the presumed threat began, FDR readily went along, ignoring the reports from his own intelligence people that the Japanese population was overwhelmingly loyal.

FDR’s order was duly carried out. Without due process of law, more than 100,000 Japanese Americans were deprived of liberty and most had to sell their property at very low prices. Beito offers this judgment:

Had Roosevelt deployed his famous charm and eloquence, perhaps citing the four freedoms, he might have prevented much suffering. He did not behave like a president who was trapped by conditions or distracted by other issues … but rather like a man who really did not care.

The internment was politically popular, but a few voices were raised against it. Socialist presidential candidate Norman Thomas tried to rally civil libertarians against what he called “totalitarian liberals” but found scant support. Eventually, the American Civil Liberties Union supported two cases that challenged the legality of the internment order.

Those cases posed a problem for the administration because of the possibility that the plaintiffs would present evidence showing that the government had acted contrary to the recommendations of its officials who had declared the Japanese posed little or no threat. That led to a high-level cover-up, complete with document destruction and the preparation of new versions to replace them.

The effort worked. When the Supreme Court heard and decided the cases, it went along with the government’s “military necessity” rationale. In the Korematsu case, even the three justices who dissented declined to blame FDR; as Beito notes, they pinned the blame for the order on his subordinates. He also notes that the internment camps were kept going long after the Japanese forces had been pushed back across the Pacific and couldn’t possibly menace the West Coast. The reason, according to Beito, was that FDR feared releasing the Japanese Americans might hurt Democrats at the polls.

Beito’s book is a needed counterweight to the hagiography usually given FDR by historians. Perhaps even more important, it’s a reminder that far too many politicians will do whatever it takes to get their way.