In June, the Supreme Court overturned Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, a 1984 decision that instructed courts to defer to agencies’ interpretations of statutes when Congress’s statutory instructions to agencies were adjudged to be ambiguous. The 2024 Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo decision, written by Chief Justice John Roberts, argues that “statutes, no matter how impenetrable, do—in fact, must—have a single, best meaning.” Thus, it “makes no sense to speak of a ‘permissible’ interpretation that is not the one the court, after applying all relevant interpretive tools, concludes is best.” In effect, statutes are not ambiguous; they always say something, and courts rather than agencies decide what statutes say.

Justice Elena Kagan, in her dissent, argued that the future of federal regulation is imperiled by the decision. According to her, Chevron

has become part of the warp and woof of modern government, supporting regulatory efforts of all kinds—to name a few, keeping air and water clean, food and drugs safe, and financial markets honest…. The majority’s decision today will cause a massive shock to the legal system, “casting doubt on many settled constructions” of statutes and threatening the interests of many parties who have relied on them for years.

For the Loper Bright majority, the concern was procedural: Courts, rather than agencies, are the arbiters of statutory language and its instructions to the agencies. The dissent’s concerns were substantive: Modern regulation depends on agency discretion that the Court majority has now eliminated.

Are Kagan and other Loper Bright critics right, and the federal government now faces serious obstacles to implementing regulations desired by lawmakers and the public? Or are Chevron critics correct that the original decision resulted in regulators implementing regulations that lawmakers did not intend and the public does not want? The authors of the following essays offer their perspectives on what Chevron’s overturn means.