Do you ever wonder why the Federal Communications Commission persists in making political allocations of radio and TV broadcast licenses instead of auctioning off those rights? And why the FCC has the power to regulate broadcast content? If you think you have those explanations, then why during the Carter administration did the FCC move to award cellular licenses by auction? Or why did the 1996 Telecommunications Act usher in a requirement that V‑chips be implanted in all post-2000 TV sets so that parents could limit or control their children’s viewing of “violent” programs? And why did Ted Turner seem so delighted by this, yet the V‑chip solution never seemed to work? And what about satellite broadcaster SiriusXM; why is it required to broadcast nationwide and not allowed to offer regional or local services?

Are you curious about how and why Lady Bird Johnson gained the rights to radio and television broadcasts in Austin, TX and what was the quid pro quo? What about “wireless” data, the communications system that many early experts thought would at best become a valuable niche market, but instead has formed a new bedrock for millennial culture and global communication? Would you like to know how and why the FCC opened the regulatory barn gate for wireless, so to speak, and let the horses run? What happened to the regulators’ previous heavy hand? Is it gone or was this just a temporary lapse of regulatory judgment?

Here, I offer a sample of teasers for the material presented in this delightfully written and heavily documented history and analysis of U.S. telecommunications policy, written by Clemson economist Thomas Hazlett. (Full disclosure: I formerly was dean of Clemson’s School of Business and Behavior Sciences and I hold an emeritus title at the school.) The Political Spectrum, which reflects Hazlett’s career-long study of and participation in communications policymaking, is packed with fascinating stories buttressed with more than just casual references to industrial organization and public choice economics. He brightens his story with discussions of common law contracting, property rights, and potential market solutions that could be used to allocate communications access. Interestingly, the rent-seekers’ preference for command-and-control regulation that emerged for spectrum management parallels almost exactly what emerged with environmental regulation. Cartel-forming technical standards quickly replaced common law–accommodated market forces based on property rights.

The electronic spectrum has not, in and of itself, physically constrained the growth of telecommunications, though that is the justification for its regulation.

Property rights and public interest / The story Hazlett tells begins with late 19th century communications technology breakthroughs and ends with the 21st century wireless revolution. Throughout, there is one common theme: The electronic spectrum through which communications are transmitted has not, in and of itself, physically constrained growth and expansion of telecommunications, although that is a popular justification for federal regulation. As Hazlett explains, it is politics not physics that limits human communications capabilities.

Nonetheless, no less than the U.S. Supreme Court chose to assert the opposite. Hazlett writes:

The idea that radio services did not conform to legal or economic norms was formalized in law under Justice Felix Frankfurter’s key 1943 Supreme Court opinion in NBC v. United States. The case resolved a legal challenge to the FCC’s Chain Broadcasting Rules brought by the largest such network, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). Regulators had imposed various limits on the agreements made between radio stations and networks that sold them programs. NBC argued that this exceeded the authority of the Commission, which was to police airwave interference while leaving broadcasters free to create (or buy) their content…. NBC lost…. Observing “certain basic facts” about radio stations, the Court wrote that “the radio spectrum is simply not large enough to accommodate everybody who would like to transmit.”

As Hazlett explains, the Court confused excess demand that results when markets are not allowed to function (as when rights are not auctioned) with technical relationships. He argues that the problem contemplated by the Court would have been resolved if markets had been allowed to allocate broadcast rights.

Earlier in the book, after giving a brief synopsis of radio and television regulation, he describes the regulatory process this way:

Here lurks a template for the creation of communications policy. Government identifies a problem and takes measures to address it. The [asserted] market failure is misdiagnosed, and the regulatory “fix” reflects political bargains with powerful industry incumbents. Barriers to entry are created. The “public interest” is asserted. When the purported solutions is finally abandoned, more robust market forces assert themselves. Government proudly claims that its policy is a success. The cycle repeats.

As one who always enjoys a good “Bootleggers-and-Baptists” story of regulation (in part because I coined that term in the pages of Regulation in 1983), I appreciate the notion that regulators would find ways to feather special interest nests while at the same time claiming to serve the public interest. I note that Hazlett likes this sort of analysis, too: Chapter 9 is titled, “Baptists, Bootleggers, and the LPFM [Low-Power Frequency Modulated].”

The book is organized chronologically, moving from early to the most recent major regulatory episodes. Yet for those who cannot enjoy the luxury of embarking on a sustained read, the book offers an advantage: each chapter can stand on its own. To top it off, Hazlett is a talented storyteller, a trait each chapter demonstrates.

While there are several strong contenders for the book’s best chapter, I found myself rereading, “Spectrum Policy as If the Future Mattered.” It is here that the reader receives a summary of key thoughts, an explanation of how markets and property rights may continue to improve spectrum allocation, and how the economic way of thinking can offer valuable guidance along the way.

Who might gain from reading Hazlett’s book? Obviously, those engaged in the world of policy formation and analysis will value its contents, as will teachers and students of politics and government regulation. But then, there are countless individuals who enjoy reading a good account of how the world works. They should welcome this book, too. Highly accessible, delightfully written, and strongly organized, it should be read and discussed widely.