Writing about our nation’s entitlement problem can be a bore. Anyone who is paying attention and not wearing political blinders is already aware of the problem, and there is no shortage of economists, former politicians, and other public policy mavens who have endeavored to tell the masses how much trouble we face if we do not fix this problem at once. Former comptroller general David Walker has made it his mission in life to inform the world that the sky is falling, although in such an unctuous way that most people immediately turn him off. To be fair, the intricacies of the topic lead to an eye-watering gaze.

There are two different think tanks in Washington, D.C., devoted solely to producing op-eds, position papers, and conferences on the topic, and there is not a day that goes by without a sober analysis of the problem coming from someone. So do we really need another book on the subject?

This one we do. Eugene Steuerle has something new to say on the matter. His message—laid out in a precise and engaging manner—is that liberals, who normally are loathe to tinker with our cherished entitlement programs, have the most to lose from allowing the problem to continue metastasizing.

Social insurance with an army / Entitlements—that is, the spending on Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, the various retirement benefits for federal government workers and veterans, and interest on the national debt—constitute fully two-thirds of federal spending in fiscal year 2014. That proportion is only going to grow in the ensuing decades: with the baby boom generation reaching retirement age and longevity rapidly increasing for those who make it to age 65, entitlement costs are on pace to constitute three-fourths of all spending by 2030, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

Before General Motors’ bankruptcy, the joke among pension cognoscenti was that the company was really a retirement fund that happened to make cars. So what does that make a government that uses 75 percent of its tax revenue to finance its senior citizens or debt-holders? A social insurance entity with an army, perhaps—and probably not a very big army, if recent history holds true. The previous five years of trillion-dollar deficits has driven a robust bipartisan coalition to acquiesce in continuing defense cuts. While the wind-down of U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan afforded some of the cuts, the reductions have left us with a military that has significantly fewer resources to call upon should another conflict arise. This pattern has already played out in Western Europe, where the cabinet position of power long ago ceased being defense minister and is now the health minister, where the budgets are much bigger.

But Steuerle is not writing to warn the neocons. Rather, he is sounding a clarion call to liberals that they will need to choose between leaving entitlement spending untouched and their other cherished programs. Spending on education, infrastructure, health research, and general science are all at risk if we continue on the current path, he avers.

GOP ideas? / Republicans largely (but not wholly) understand the depth of the crisis, although they usually embrace facile solutions that do not come anywhere near solving the problem. For instance, in the 2005 fight over Social Security reform, a substantial Republican contingent balked over including any reduction in the growth of the initial benefits of wealthy new retirees, a step that could have reduced as much as two-thirds of the multi-trillion-dollar shortfall. Instead, they argued that eliminating the employee’s portion of the payroll tax would generate so much additional economic growth that it would not only replace the forgone revenue but also generate so much more revenue that it would erase the long-term deficit.

Cato scholar Jagadeesh Gokhale, whose book Social Security: A User’s Guide stands apart as the most piquant analysis of the program and its shortcomings, patiently explained in a number of different places that the fact that we currently index initial benefits to wages makes it arithmetically impossible for economic growth to save Social Security. More growth ultimately begets higher wages that, in turn, beget higher benefits down the road, capturing most or all of the revenue gains from growth.

Gokhale’s analysis was set aside and the push for lower payroll taxes and undiminished benefits continued until the George W. Bush administration and everyone else gave up on reform. These days there are few Republicans who lend credence to this version of Social Security reform fantasy. Reform must entail reducing the growth of benefits or increasing revenue (or both), but no politician will deliver that message to voters unless reform is an actual possibility.

Republicans have historically shown more concern about long-term structural deficits, fearing that higher government spending inevitably crowds out potentially more productive private spending. It goes without saying that politicians, when offered the chance, nevertheless embrace dubious spending proposals that benefit their district as well as their chances of reelection. For an example of some, simply look for Amtrak projects that are outside the Northeast Corridor.

Steuerle does not let Republicans off the hook for the current morass. His complaint is that while they may have been no more than accomplices during the various entitlement expansions (although, when it came to Medicare Part D, they were willing to do the job themselves), their tax cuts have left current Congresses unable to contemplate anything resembling a new agenda. Every dollar raised (and then some) must be dedicated to current spending plans, which cannot (owing to political constraints) be reduced enough to return us to a balanced budget in the foreseeable future.

Fiscal federalism / While Steuerle bewails such an outcome, I have a much more sanguine view of the matter. If we have truly managed to tie the hands of Congress regarding new programs, it ought to be grounds for celebration. Perhaps then we can return some of the powers and duties of the federal government to the states, where they belong.

For instance, Congress recently kicked the can down the road after considering legislation that would fund future road construction projects over the long term. The hurdle is that while everyone involved wants to do more construction than can be financed via the gas tax, there is little support for increasing that tax, and Congress’s appetite for funding roads via general tax revenues (or, to be more precise, borrowing) has ebbed.

This could be a very good thing. Thanks to the diminution of gas tax revenue and the insistence by the poorer, less politically connected states that transportation monies be allocated more evenly, Congress is less able to treat the federal transportation trust fund as a giant goody bag to reward favored constituencies. If the federal government were to cut the gas tax by 95 percent and federal highway projects by the same amount, the states could choose their own projects and their own road financing mechanisms. Congress may be content with some modest redistribution and coordination, thus shrinking the federal Department of Transportation. If this were to happen, a few states would quickly come to embrace a market-based system of road financing that would result in less congestion, less need for building new roads, and less pollution as well. Once it succeeds in one state, it would spread to others.

Tying Congress’s hands / The last thing I want to see is for our national budget problem to be solved before Congress hands over a few of its spending priorities to the states. But I think Steuerle underestimates the ability of Congress to rationalize away our budget predicament when it is politically expedient to do so. Congress will keep doing this until financial markets begin downgrading their expectation that the federal government will repay its debt, resulting in higher interest rates. That might not happen for a decade or two.

In the education of a political staffer on the Hill, the first lesson (besides the fact that identity politics trump all) is that it is impossible to tie the hands of future Congresses to keep them from undoing any brilliant legislation they may be considering. But the staggering future debt is tying Congress’s hands. Capitol Hill gridlock at present is due more to the lack of money available to grease potential legislative deals than to the intransigence of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid or the Tea Party insurgency.

It would be a shame if we were to let this crisis go to waste.