1 Concerns about climate change and national security are not limited to the United States. A 2013 report “Heavy Weather: Climate and the Australian Defence Force” by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute concluded that “the ADF [Australian Defence Force] will always need to have hard-edged war-fighting capabilities, but it will also have to recognise the increasing requirement for capacity building,” and it’s “about the ADF being well placed to deal with the potential disruptive forces of climate change.” British Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti is quoted by the Guardian (July 1, 2013) as saying, “Climate change posed as grave a threat to the UK’s security and economic resilience as terrorism and cyber attacks” and was “one of the greatest risks we face in the 21st century” because “by virtue of our interdependencies around the world, it will affect all of us.”
2 Bryan Bender, “Chief of US Pacific Forces Calls Climate Biggest Worry,” Boston Globe, March 9, 2013.
3 Stephen Cheney, “Climate Change Threatens America’s National Security,” Take Part, June 6, 2013, http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/06/10/climate-change-national-secu….
4 Joshua W. Busby, “Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action,” CSR no. 32, Council on Foreign Relations, November 2007, p. v.
5 Kylie Schultz, “Experts Say Climate Change Is a Threat to National Security,” The International, April 3, 2013.
6 “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,” CNA Corporation, 2007, p. 1.
7 “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” Department of Defense, February 2010, pp. xv, 84–87.
8 Fiscal year 2013 federal government outlays of $3,685 billion.
9 Christopher Mann, “The Arctic Circle: Development and Risk,” paper presented at the “Unfrozen Treasures: National Security, Climate Change, and the Arctic Frontier” conference held at the National War College, Washington, May 13–14, 2008.
10 Thomas F. Stocker et al., eds., Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers (Geneva: IPCC, 2013), p. 2.
11 See, for example, Indur M. Goklany, “Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and Others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming,” Policy Study no. 399, Reason Foundation, December 2011; Bjorn Lomborg, Cool It: The Skeptical Environmentalist’s Guide to Global Warming (New York: Knopf, 2007); and Patrick J. Michaels, ed., Addendum: Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States, Cato Institute, October 31, 2012.
12 M. L. Parry et al., eds. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 36–47. These predicted impacts are similar to those described in the Fifth Assessment Report published in draft form on March 30, 2014.
13 Future climate is projected by defining carbon emission scenarios in relation to changes in population, economy, technology, energy, land use, and agriculture—a total of four scenario families, that is, A1, A2, B1, and B2 are defined and used in the IPCC’s Third and Fourth Assessment Reports in 2001 and 2007, respectively. The A1 scenarios indicate very rapid economic growth, a global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies, as well as substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income. Subcategories of A1 scenarios include A1FI and A1B, which represent the energy in fossil intensity and a balance across all sources, respectively. The A2 scenarios are based on a very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is that of strengthening regional cultural identities, high population growth, and less concern for rapid economic development. The B1 scenarios are more integrated and more ecologically friendly than the A1 scenarios, with rapid changes toward service and information economies, and reductions in material intensity and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) to be released in 2014 will use Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). The four RCPs—RCP 2.6, RCP 4.5, RCP 6, and RCP 8.5— are named after a possible range of radiative forcing values in the year 2100 (2.6, 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5 watts per square meter, respectively), where RCP 8.5, RCP 6, and RCP 4.5 are roughly equivalent to A1FI, A1B, and A1B to B1 emission scenarios, respectively. The selected RCPs were considered to be representative of the literature and included a mitigation scenario leading to a low forcing level (RCP 2.6), two medium stabilization scenarios (RCP 4.5 and RCP 6), and one high baseline emission scenarios (RCP 8.5).
14 Ryan P. Crompton and K. John McAneney, “Normalised Australian Insured Losses from Meteorological Hazards: 1967–2006,” Environmental Science & Policy 11, no. 5 (2008): 371–78.
15 Sigridur Bjarnadottir, Yue Li, and Mark G. Stewart, “A Probabilistic-Based Framework for Impact and Adaptation Assessment of Climate Change on Hurricane Damage Risks and Costs,” Structural Safety 33, no. 3 (2011): 173–85.
16 Bjorn Lomborg, “Stern Review: The Dodgy Numbers behind the Latest Warming Scare,” Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2006. See also Yale Symposium on the Stern Review (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2007); as well as Robert O. Mendelsohn, “A Critique of the Stern Report,” Regulation 29, no. 4 (2006): 42–46.
17 Nicholas Stern, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. vi.
18 Ibid., p. 156.
19 Indur M. Goklany, “What to Do about Climate Change,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 609, February 5, 2008, p. 5. See also Indur M. Goklany, “Global Public Health: Global Warming in Perspective,” Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons 14, no. 3 (2009): 69–75.
20 A future world of very rapid economic growth, low population growth, and rapid introduction of new and more efficient technology. In that world, people pursue personal wealth rather than environmental quality.
21 Based on a very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is that of strengthening regional cultural identities, having high population growth, and showing less concern for rapid economic development.
22 Goklany, “What to Do about Climate Change,” p. 14.
23 Very rapid economic growth, an emphasis on fossil fuels, a global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies, as well as a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income.
24 Goklany, “What to Do about Climate Change,” p. 23.
25 Parry et al., Climate Change 2007, p. 47.
26 National Research Council, National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces (Washington: National Academies Press, 2011), pp. 94–113.
27 Parry et al., Climate Change 2007, pp. 656–57.
28 “First Commercial Ship Sails through NorthWest Passage,” CBC News, November 28, 2008.
29 Robin McKie, “China’s Voyage of Discovery to Cross the Less Frozen North,” Observer (UK), August 18, 2013.
30 Christine Parthemore, “Climate Change and the Maritime Services,” in Broadening Horizons: Climate Change and the U.S. Armed Forces by Herbert E. Carmen, Christine Parthemore, and Will Rogers (Washington: Center for a New American Security, 2010), p. 27.
31 Arne Instanes et al., “Infrastructure: Buildings, Support Systems, and Industrial Facilities,” in Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, ed. Carolyn Symon, Lelani Arris, and Bill Heal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 907–44.
32 Pete Evens, “Arctic Thaw Heats Up Northwest Passage Dreams,” CBC News, September 13, 2012; Busby, “Climate Change and National Security,” p. 7.
33 Joseph F. Francois, Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, and Ana-Maria Vasilache-Freudenthaler, “Melting Ice Caps and the Economic Impact of the Northern Sea Shipping Lanes,” paper presented at the 16th Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Shanghai, China, May 2013.
34 Donald L. Gautier et al., “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science 324, no. 5931 (2009): 1175–79.
35 Mann, “The Arctic Circle,” p. 3.
36 James Kraska, “International Security and International Law in the Northwest Passage,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42, no. 4 (2009): 1109–32.
37 National Research Council, National Security Implications, p. 3; “National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” White House, May 10, 2013, p. 3. Others argue that ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea will harm U.S. national interests. See, for example, Doug Bandow, “Don’t Resurrect the Law of the Sea Treaty,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 552, October 13, 2005.
38 Robert Huebert, “United States Arctic Policy: The Reluctant Arctic Power,” University of Calgary School of Public Policy Briefing Papers, May 2009, pp. 1–2.
39 Ronald O’Rourke, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, July 24, 2013. The National Science Foundation has a smaller icebreaker, Nathaniel B. Palmer. It is a purpose-built ship for research, and its capability is more suited to the more benign ice conditions in the Antarctic Peninsula.
40 Ibid., p. 1.
41 Cost of $4.7 billion in 2011 dollars, inflation adjusted to $5 billion in 2013. U.S. Coast Guard, “United States Coast Guard High Latitude Region Mission Analysis Capstone Summary,” July 2010.
42 “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan,” Congressional Budget Office, July 2012, pp. 18, 27.
43 O’Rourke, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization,” p. 25.
44 National Research Council, National Security Implications, p. 95.
45 Ibid., pp. 97–99.
46 Patrick L. Smith, Leslie A. Wickman, and Inki A. Min, “Broadband Satellite Communications for Future U.S. Military and Coast Guard Operations in an Ice-Free Arctic,” Crosslink 12 (Summer 2011): 12–17.
47 “Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage,” Department of Defense, May 2011, pp. 17–19.
48 Ibid., p. 25.
49 That figure is the average of the past five years’ military construction expenditures in Alaska. “Construction Programs (C‑1),” Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Years 2009–2014, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2013.
50 National Research Council, National Security Implications, p. 50.
51 Ibid., p. 51.
52 “Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage,” p. 10.
53 “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,” pp. 6–7, 17
54 Ibid., p. 17.
55 Liana Sun Wyler, “Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, August 28, 2008, p. 6. See also Edward Newman, “Weak States, Failed States, and Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 4 (2007): 463–88; as well as Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, “Washington’s Newest Bogeyman: Debunking the Fear of Failed States,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 4, no. 2 (2010): 17–38.
56 Henry A. Kissinger and James A. Baker III, “Grounds for U.S. Military Intervention,” Washington Post, April 8, 2011.
57 Wyler, “Weak and Failing States,” pp. 12–15.
58 Maxine Burkett, “In Search of Refuge: Pacific Islands, Climate-Induced Migration, and the Legal Frontier,” Asia Pacific Issues no. 98, East–West Center, January 2011, p. 3.
59 Jon Barnett and Michael Webber, “Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate Change,” Policy Research Working Paper no. 5270, World Bank, April 2010, p. 5.
60 Richard P. C. Brown, Gareth Leeves, and Prabha Prayaga, “An Analysis of Recent Survey Data on the Remittances of Pacific Island Migrants in Australia,” Discussion Papers Series no. 457, School of Economics, University of Queensland, March 2012.
61 Based on OECD 2011 data of 1,062,000, 210,000, and 40,000 immigrants for the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, respectively. If they were all to be resettled only in Australia and New Zealand, then Australia and New Zealand would need to lift their existing immigration levels by only 25 to 40 percent.
62 World Migration Report 2010: Executive Summary (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2010). One billion people reside in a country not of their birth.
63 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010 (Washington: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011); Immigration Federation to Century’s End 1901–2000 (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Statistics Section, 2001); Facts and Figures 1998: Immigration Overview (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1998).
64 International Migration Database, OECD.StatExtracts, 2011. The database ignores illegal (unauthorized) immigrants.
65 “Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change: Synthesis Report,” International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2010, p. 19. The estimate sums the positive effects and negative impacts of climate change. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change predicts annual adaptation costs for the developing world at $27 billion to $67 billion by 2030. See Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2007). For a discussion of the costs of climate adaptation, see Samuel Fankhauser, “The Costs of Adaptation,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 1, no. 1 (2010): 23–30.
66 OECD, Development Co-Operation Report 2012: Lessons in Linking Sustainability and Development (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), p. 268.
67 Goklany, “What to Do about Climate Change,” p. 20.
68 Gary W. Yohe et al., “Climate Change,” in Global Crises, Global Solutions, ed. Bjorn Lomborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 254–57.
69 The United States produced 5.4 billion tons of CO2 in 2012. As a comparison, the price on carbon in the European Union and Australia is approximately $6 and $23 per ton of emitted CO2, respectively.
70 “Department of Defense Base Structure Report: FY 2013 Baseline,” Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations and Environment, Department of Defense.
71 “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,” p. 37.
72 Expenditure of $625 million in FY2013 for “Base Realignment and Closure,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Construction Programs (C‑1), Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2015, March 2014.
73 Mark G. Stewart, Xiaoming Wang, and Garry R. Willgoose, “Direct and Indirect Cost and Benefit Assessment of Climate Adaptation Strategies for Housing for Extreme Wind Events in Queensland,” Natural Hazards Review (forthcoming).
74 “The Costs of Adapting to Climate Change for Infrastructure,” Discussion Paper no. 2, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, August 2010, p. 38.
75 Mark G. Stewart, David V. Rosowsky, and Zhigang Huang, “Hurricane Risks and Economic Viability of Strengthened Construction,” Natural Hazards Review 4, no. 1 (2003): 12–19.
76 “Construction Programs (C‑1).” Includes family housing costs of nearly $2 billion and assumes no additional consolidation of existing bases.
77 Lev Grossman, “Drone Home,” Time, February 11, 2013. More than a third of the aircraft in the U.S. Air Force’s inventory of aircraft are now unmanned.
78 “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” p. 87.
79 Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, “Energy Alarmism: The Myths That Make Americans Worry about Oil,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 589, April 5, 2007, p. 2.
80 National Research Council, National Security Implications, pp. 41–43.
81 Ibid., pp. 39–40.
82 Busby, “Climate Change and National Security,” p. 1.
83 Lisa Daniel, “U.S. Military Remains Ready to Help Japan,” American Forces Press Service, April 11, 2011.
84 “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,” p. 38.
85 National Research Council, National Security Implications, p. 39; USNS Comfort website, http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/usnscomfort/Pages/default.aspx.
86 National Research Council, National Security Implications, p. 5.
87 Ships cost $815 million each in 2002 dollars, inflation adjusted to $1.1 billion in 2013. The cost of converting 30-year-old amphibious ships to hospital ships is considerably lower (less than $300 million per ship). Neil Carey et al., “Future Deployable Medical Capabilities and Platforms for Navy Medicine,” CNA Corporation, February 2002, pp. 44–46.
88 Brett D. Schaefer, “Congress Should Renew the Report Requirement on U.S. Contributions to the U.N. and Reverse Record Setting Contributions to the U.N.,” WebMemo no. 3324, Heritage Foundation, July 22, 2011.
89 Médecins Sans Frontières, “Financial Report 2012: Key Figures,” 2012.
90 FY13 federal government outlays of $3,685 billion.