Despite bringing some important benefits, such as free movement of goods, services, capital and people, the EU faces serious challenges that stem from its redistributive and regulatory nature. Most of the EU budget consists of financial transfers among the member states. Such transfers may work relatively well in homogenous societies, but create serious problems in heterogeneous communities. The break up of European federations, such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, is relevant here. Both countries consisted of two or more distinct nationalities and both engaged in resource transfers.
In order to work, large financial transfers require the existence of a cohesive “demos” with a highly evolved sense of common identity and, concomitantly, altruism. The more people identify with a particular group, the more willing they are to make sacrifices; witness the family. But Europe has no such common identity. According to a poll conducted by the EU Commission in 1999, on average, only 4 percent of the people in the pre-enlargement EU felt “European.” As a consequence, resource redistribution often leads to accusations of free riding and selfishness.
Take the current debate about falling corporate tax rates in new member states. Fearing tax competition from the east, Messrs. Nicolas Sarkozy and Hans Eichel, the French and German finance ministers, proposed a minimum corporate tax rate for the whole of Europe, stating that the minimum tax “would in no way stand in the way of healthy competition between member states.” That proposal may well become a serious option when the Dutch, whose finance minister already signalled his support for the Franco-German proposal, assume the EU presidency next month.
Messrs. Sarkozy and Eichel are disingenuous. The entire point of a minimum corporate tax is to make the new members less competitive. Alas, that kind of economically suicidal policy is not likely to be accepted in Central and Eastern Europe, whose people were constantly asked to make sacrifices under communism. Altruism was lauded as the highest of civic virtues. But by the late 1980’s the new members had little to show for it. They are unlikely to sacrifice their economic prosperity to help France and Germany balance their budgets.
In addition to taxation, there are divisions over other policies. The EU’s social liberalism, for example, is treated with suspicion by more conservative nations, such as Italy and Portugal. Environmental regulations have a disproportionate impact on post-communist countries like Poland, which is required to come up with $40 billion for environmental improvement. In other words, imposition of pan-European laws and regulations, which benefit some members but hurt others, serves as a powerful centrifugal force.
The break up of the EU may not be immediate. But the event that may push it over the precipice has already become apparent. In the past, when a country experienced a recession not shared by other countries, a well-run central bank could expand the money supply and moderate the recession without causing run-away inflation. With the arrival of the Euro and monetary policies of the member states turned over to the European Central Bank, this kind of response is no longer possible. A common monetary policy will be useful for moderating only Europe-wide business cycle fluctuations. When the members of the EU experience cyclical expansions and contractions at different times, some countries may come to regret the sacrifice of their monetary autonomy.
An economic shock, such as a terrorism-precipitated oil crisis, could have an asymmetric or “uneven” impact on the EU economy. Some EU states export oil, while others import it. The EU countries also differ in the intensity of oil use. As such, they will likely need very different interest rates. A single interest rate could hypothetically be preserved if the “asymmetry” of the economic shock were to be offset by massive labor inflows to countries experiencing economic expansion and large financial transfers to countries experiencing economic contraction. The first seems unlikely, because European labor is, in part due to language barriers, famously immobile. The second is impossible because the member states lack both the political will and the necessary resources. As Milton Friedman recently put it, “there is a strong possibility that the euro zone could collapse in the next few years because differences are accumulating between countries.”
It is feasible that, as a result of troubles with the common currency and rising costs of belonging to the EU, some members may decide that staying in the “club” is not worth the candle. The potential break up of the EU could destabilize the world economy. But it could also provide an opportunity for breaching the transatlantic divide. It is unfortunate that at the start of the 21st century, Europe and North America form two separate trading blocs. The Bush administration could rectify that situation by declaring that, in principle, the North American Free Trade Agreement could be expanded to include interested Europeans thus transforming NAFTA into a North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement.
The new bloc could bring about many benefits, including improved market access for exports from Europe and North America, increased economic efficiency and greater global economic stability. It could thwart the plans of those in Europe who want to pursue a policy of economic centralization and unify the continent around the concept of anti-Americanism. In short, for the United States and much of Europe, it could be a winning strategy.
