The deferred asset is the magic asset. Though like a tax loss carry forward, the “amount of net earnings a Reserve Bank will need to realize before remittances to Treasury resume” is entirely up to the Fed. (The Fed does not follow generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), it follows the Financial Accounting Manual for Federal Reserve Banks, a set of accounting principles the Fed created.)
The implication, of course, is that there will be earnings in the future and the Fed will remit those earnings to the Treasury. So, the Fed could just decide that it will hold back from Treasury an additional amount in the future and increase the deferred asset.
The Fed could, for instance, decide that it will hold back an additional $1 trillion in the future and increase the deferred asset now by $1 trillion. As the deferred asset goes up, capital goes up by a corresponding amount.
Just as it did in 2015, Congress could then raid the Fed’s capital account. Back then, they raided the Fed to pay for new highway spending. But there is no reason that Congress couldn’t now take the Fed’s capital surplus to pay for whatever Congress wants. (For what it’s worth, I mentioned back then Congress was setting a dangerous precedent.)
Still don’t think this gimmick sounds crazy?
In a 2016 Brookings blog post, Ben Bernanke himself explained that the Fed could use this method to create helicopter money to stimulate the economy. As he pointed out, the move would give Treasury money to finance a tax cut without raising the federal debt. The Fed would essentially turn over to Treasury an amount of money that represents the present value of future seigniorage.
Bernanke was concerned with the Fed’s ability to provide stimulus when interest rates were at zero, but Treasury and Congress could use the very same method to avoid a default.
Of course, this scheme would set a precedent far worse than the 2015 highway raid, and Congress would be tempted to do it again all the time. Nonetheless, it’s easy to envision members of Congress arguing the alternative to this special helicopter drop would be for the United States to default on its debt, possibly causing a global recession that destroys the dollar’s hegemony.
Does the gimmick sound less crazy yet?
Here’s another fun fact: Under the Fed’s current operating framework (a floor system), after the Treasury spends all this gimmick money, it would end up as reserve balances kept in check by interest payments on those reserves. That is, unlike under the Fed’s old (scarce reserve) operating framework, those reserve balances would not automatically be inflationary.
Formally, the Fed’s new operating framework divorces its balance sheet from its monetary policy stance. The Fed can buy assets (or create reserves by way of the magic asset approach) and maintain a tight policy stance by preventing those reserves from expanding the broader monetary aggregates. To accomplish this feat, the Fed would simply pay banks to hold those reserves.
As I – and George Selgin – have pointed out before, the framework removes an important tool the Fed used to have to maintain its operational independence. Now, however, the Fed can no longer legitimately tell Congress “No, we can’t buy those assets because it will cause too much inflation.”
Put differently, the Fed has opened the door to becoming a piggy bank for excessive federal spending.
The Fed has also opened itself up to a new political problem because as those reserves pile up and interest rates rise, the Fed pays billions of dollars in interest payments to large banks, reducing the money the Fed remits to the Treasury. Because of the existing reserve/interest rate situation, the Fed has been losing about $2 billion a week since mid-September.
It hasn’t had an annual loss yet, but it may have one in 2023, triggering its use of the magic asset. (Table 6 on the Fed’s H.4.1 release shows the Fed currently books these losses by making more negative the liability “Earnings remittances due to the U.S. Treasury.” For more on Fed losses, which could result in Treasury remittances being suspended until 2028, see this Mercatus Center Policy Brief, this NBER working paper, or this Hoover Institution working paper.)
The Fed has the power to insulate itself from this kind of shenanigans by returning to a scarce reserve operating framework — the type of system it operated prior to the 2008 financial crisis. If it doesn’t, it’s only a matter of time before it will no longer be able to resist political pressure to buy more federal debt and fund more federal spending.
The 118th Congress should make fixing this problem a top priority.