El-Sisi’s Rise
El-Sisi’s rise to power has its roots in Egypt’s Jan. 25 revolution in 2011. Part of the Arab uprisings, Egypt’s revolution witnessed the fall of Hosni Mubarak after forcefully ruling over the country for 30 years. Egyptian politics, which for decades had been dominated by an expansive and entrenched “deep state” dominated by the Supreme Council of the Armed forces (SCAF), appeared to be on the cusp of a new era. In 2012, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi of the Freedom and Justice Party—affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood—assumed office.
From the beginning of Mubarak’s overthrow, the SCAF, as Gamal Selim explains, was “keen to block a transition toward a genuine democracy” and worked to “steer the revolution towards a path that would ultimately maintain the fundamental structure of power in Egypt.” These efforts to undermine Egypt’s transition were compounded by Morsi’s own attempted power grabs while in office, most notably when he issued a decree granting himself broad powers above the jurisdiction of Egypt’s courts, a move that was decried within the country and internationally.
Frustrated over Morsi’s anti-democratic moves and an economy that continued to deteriorate, protesters took to the streets in Egypt once again, this time calling for Morsi’s departure. As widespread protests continued, the SCAF issued an ultimatum to Morsi: satisfy the public’s demands in 48 hours, or the military will implement its own “road map” to be “enforced under the military’s supervision” to solve the crisis.
On July 3, 2013, el-Sisi led the Egyptian military in overthrowing Morsi and suspended the 2012 constitution. Morsi and other Brotherhood leaders were arrested, and Adly Mahmud Mansour, the head of Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court, became the country’s interim leader. El-Sisi, originally appointed as minister of defense under Morsi, went on to be “elected” in 2014, winning over 90 percent of the vote. The elections were widely condemned by international observers for lack of transparency and fairness.
Repression inside Egypt escalated dramatically under el-Sisi, with the military throttling the country’s political, economic, and social landscape. On Aug. 14, 2013, at the direction of el-Sisi, Egyptian police and armed forces forcibly dispersed protesters—the majority of whom were Muslim Brotherhood supporters—at two large sit-ins in Cairo, one at al-Nahda Square and a larger one at Rabaa al-Adawiya Square, killing over 1,150 people in what Human Rights Watch described as “one of the world’s largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history.” Commonly referred to as the “Rabaa massacre,” this event was a foreshadowing of the dark days ahead for Egypt. In his 10 years since rising to power, el-Sisi has pushed repression to new heights while also driving the country to the brink of economic disaster.
A change of political regime in Egypt, the Arab world’s largest country, is no small matter. Not only would the emergence of a popular democratic paradigm in Egypt have posed a direct challenge to the authoritarian status quo in the Middle East, but a change in Cairo’s foreign policy could have considerably influenced the regional balance of power. For these reasons, el-Sisi’s coup was embraced at the time by key regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Israel, all of which maintained a vested interest in the preservation of the status quo inside Egypt and across the broader region. It would later be revealed through leaked audio recordings of senior Egyptian officials that the UAE, through the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, helped fund protests against Mohamed Morsi. Upon securing his rule domestically with the help of his allies, el-Sisi joined with these actors to help lead the regional counterrevolution.
Washington’s Response
The United States, as the region’s preeminent power in 2013, viewed the uprisings as a threat to American interests—specifically, the maintenance of its client states—in the Middle East. Therefore, Washington sought to preserve the prevailing status quo—both directly and indirectly through regional partners—and supported the uprisings only in countries that resided outside of the U.S.-led regional order, namely, Libya and Syria.
For this reason, the Jan. 25 revolution was met with great caution in Washington. The United States maintained its support for Hosni Mubarak until the last minute. When Washington realized Mubarak could not be saved, the U.S. voiced support for the protests that toppled him but never turned against the Egyptian military. Upon el-Sisi’s victory in the 2014 election, the Obama administration issued a statement congratulating the new ruler, saying the U.S. “looks forward to working with Abdelfattah al-Sisi, the winner of Egypt’s presidential election, to advance our strategic partnership and the many interests shared by the United States and Egypt.”
The U.S. refused to officially label the overthrow a military coup in order to circumvent Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits military and other financial aid to any country “whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.” After a short hold on some military aid to Egypt, the Obama administration quickly reversed course and resumed the transfer of military equipment to Egypt, claiming at the time that it is “in the interests of U.S. national security.” In total, the Obama administration approved over $3.2 billion in arms sales to Egypt after the coup.
Upon entering the White House in 2017, President Trump embraced el-Sisi and authoritarians across the Middle East in general. Trump famously referred to el-Sisi as his “favorite dictator” and showered the regime with weaponry, approving over $5.3 billion in arms sales to Cairo while in office. Trump regularly praised el-Sisi and the U.S.-Egypt relationship. Speaking alongside el-Sisi during his visit to the White House, Trump said, “We’ve never had a better relationship, Egypt and the United States, than we do right now,” and hailed Egypt’s leader for doing “a great job.”
After Trump, Biden entered the White House having pledged “no more blank checks for Trump’s ‘favorite dictator.’” However, his policies quickly told a different story. The Biden administration reaffirmed its “steadfast commitment” to Egypt’s security while also praising Cairo for its role in advancing regional “stability.” Though the administration did withhold a symbolic amount of $130 million from Egypt’s $1.3 billion annual aid package, this was dwarfed in comparison to the weapons sales approved by Biden to Cairo. Thus far, the Biden administration has approved over $6.1 billion in arms sales to Egypt, surpassing the Trump administration.
It’s safe to say the blank check for el-Sisi is alive and well.
Reevaluating the U.S.-Egypt Relationship
Broadly speaking, three strategic rationales are typically cited for maintaining the status quo in the U.S.-Egypt relationship: preserving regional stability, protecting Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, and keeping Cairo from turning toward Russia or China.
Egypt tries to present itself to the United States as a beacon of Middle East stability. Motaz Zahran, Egypt’s ambassador to the U.S., argued recently that “Egypt has always been a pillar of regional security,” citing the peace deal between Egypt and Israel over 40 years ago, Egypt’s cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism, and Cairo’s diplomatic efforts throughout the region. Many observers within the United States have echoed such arguments, highlighting the role of U.S. aid and assistance in contributing to the stability of Egypt and the broader region. For example, David Ignatius argues that “a powerful Egyptian military, armed and trained by the United States, is a plus for regional security.”
This account gets things backward: The current U.S.-Egypt relationship does not promote regional stability. Unwavering U.S. support for Egypt’s el-Sisi is a symptom of a broader, flawed foundation underpinning Washington’s Middle East policy rooted in the “myth of authoritarian stability.” For decades, U.S. policymakers have put faith in the belief that authoritarian governments are the only viable upholders of stability and order in the Middle East. However, this assumption is unsound: These regimes’ own policies produce and reinforce many of the region’s most important problems, tensions, and grievances.
El-Sisi epitomizes this myth, presenting himself to Washington as an “oasis of security and stability” in the Middle East while actively undermining both. Under el-Sisi, the military has considerably increased its control over Egypt’s political, economic, and societal landscapes. Repression inside Egypt continues to accelerate at an alarming rate and is increasingly going transnational as el-Sisi seeks to crush dissenting voices, even inside the United States. Under el-Sisi, Egypt has engaged in various destabilizing activities abroad, such as the 2017 blockades against Qatar and the prolonging of the Libyan civil war through continued support for Khalifa Haftar. Though Egypt is often cited as a critical counterterrorism partner, the military’s brutal approach in the Sinai and elsewhere risks perpetuating the underlying grievances that can lead to radicalization.
U.S. military aid to Egypt subsidizes el-Sisi’s myriad abuses, which in turn fuel the grievances that lead to mass unrest and, at times, provide fertile ground for radicalization. As conditions inside Egypt continue to deteriorate due to escalating repression and a collapsing economy resulting primarily from corruption and chronic mismanagement, so too do pressures from below risk erupting to the surface. The state would likely meet any unrest with considerable violence due to the military having so much to lose if driven from office after assuming direct control of the country.
Nor is $1.3 billion in aid or swaths of weapons sales necessary to maintain the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt established in 1978. A common argument is that, if the U.S. ended this aid to Cairo, it would jeopardize the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, with negative ramifications for regional stability. However, this assertion neglects Israeli and Egyptian interests in sustaining this peace and how the U.S. is effectively subsidizing Cairo for advancing policies it has a vested interest in pursuing. As Richard Sokolsky and Andrew Miller argue, “For too long, the United States has allowed the Egyptian government to treat security assistance as an entitlement owed for making peace with Israel.” The strategic interests of Egypt and Israel have increasingly converged, especially following the Arab uprisings and growing shared fears over preserving regional status quo. El-Sisi described the Israel-Egypt relationship as stronger than ever before, and cooperation between the two has increased dramatically. Myriad weapons sales and $1.3 billion in U.S. taxpayer money is not necessary to convince Egypt and Israel to work together: The shared interests of political elites within these two countries have already done so.
A new rationale of preventing Egypt from turning toward Russia or China is also emerging rapidly as a new justification for the continuation of U.S. aid to Egypt. However, such arguments grossly overestimate the abilities and ambitions of Moscow and Beijing in the Middle East, failing to recognize the serious limitations facing both in the region. Nor does such reasoning recognize how regional actors are actively trying to manipulate the return of great power politics to the Middle East and pressure the United States into remaining as their security guarantor even if it is not in the strategic interest of the U.S. to do so. The “preferential” access Egypt grants the U.S. in the Suez Canal and over Egyptian airspace is often cited as critical to American power projection in the region and great power competition with Russia and China. But as the past almost three decades have demonstrated, the pursuit of primacy in the Middle East has been detrimental for U.S. interests and the region. Moreover, by continuing to view the return of multipolarity to the Middle East as a zero-sum game, the United States risks sacrificing its strategic interests in the region as a result of false assumptions and self-interested autocrats. What happens in Egypt, as the Arab world’s largest country, will always have considerable ramifications for the entire Middle East. For decades, flawed assumptions have misguided Washington’s relationship with Cairo—and the United States’ Middle East policy more broadly—effectively subsidizing dictators as they pursue policies in direct conflict with U.S. values and interests.
Ten years after Egypt’s coup, it’s time to cut el-Sisi off.
