In other words, in the early 1990s, for every professor on the right, there were two professors on the left. By 2016, the imbalance was five to one. While this significant leftward shift certainly put the right on the defensive, it was not yet an existential threat for three reasons.
First, many left-leaning faculty members and administrators remained committed defenders of Enlightenment concepts like reason, objectivity, tolerance, freedom of speech, and free inquiry. Although they themselves identified with the left, they tolerated the right and — in theory, if not always in practice — evaluated ideas from the right based on the same standards of logic and evidence they applied to others. In such environments, parity between left and right was not required for the right’s ideas to receive a (relatively) fair hearing; enough left-leaning faculty members treated those ideas as legitimate topics of inquiry that it prevented academic departments from being reduced to left-wing echo chambers.
Second, the ideological balance in academic fields didn’t matter much because most fields afforded little opportunity for ideologically biased teaching. It didn’t matter if a biology professor was a die-hard leftist outside of school because within the four walls of the classroom, he taught biology.
Third, academic departments tended to be siloed from one another: The sociology department had little say in what went on in the economics department, and vice versa. If right-leaning faculty in one department were to have gone virtually extinct (as they have in sociology, where there are now 44 registered Democrats for every registered Republican), that scholarly field would suffer, but any damage from the ideological monoculture would remain relatively self-contained.
The Beachhead Strategy
Given an environment characterized by a general leftward drift mitigated by tolerance for a right-leaning presence, the right’s best strategy was to establish and maintain beachheads within academia. The biggest successes came with the establishment of explicitly right-leaning colleges (e.g., Hillsdale and Grove City) and independent right-leaning centers within otherwise left-leaning universities (e.g., the Hoover Institution at Stanford University). I played a small part in this effort while working for the Charles G. Koch Foundation to help set up and finance independent centers at colleges across the country. Not all of these centers leaned right — but some did.
The beachhead strategy’s successes were threefold. First, these institutions ensured that right-leaning ideas would not be entirely snuffed out in academia. No matter how unbalanced the rest of higher education became, the beachheads would ensure that any eventual revival of right-leaning thought would not have to start from scratch. Second, these beachheads allowed right-leaning scholars to continue to improve, update, and refine ideas, helping ensure they would not become stale or obsolete. And third, the beachheads helped educate and train the next generation of right-leaning and right-tolerant scholars to pass on the torch to future generations.
While this strategy kept right-leaning thought in academia alive, conservative scholarship was often on life support. The beachheads were never supposed to be the only places where right-leaning ideas were developed, discussed, and debated; they were (and are) too rare and too small to influence higher education as a whole. The faculty involved in the beachheads probably number in the thousands, with students in the tens of thousands. Given the size of American academia (1.5 million faculty members and 19 million students), these numbers are a drop in the bucket.
The beachhead strategy’s influence was most significant among unaffiliated faculty and students. Even though relatively few people worked at, say, the Hoover Institution, the ideas developed or refined there filtered out to the rest of the academy. But such diffusion relies on there being a sufficient pool of unaffiliated faculty members who are not reflexively hostile to right-leaning ideas. When there is ideological balance among faculty members — or even when the left-right balance among the faculty is two to one (as it was in the late 1980s and early 1990s) — right-leaning ideas can spread to other scholars and institutions. Once the ideological balance tilts to five to one, as it had by 2016, such dispersion is severely impaired. By the time the balance reaches sociology’s 40-plus to one (and likely long before then), virtually no spread will occur because there is no receptive audience for the right’s ideas. At that point, the imbalance among faculty members is so extreme as to leave the right-leaning scholars at beachheads shouting into a void.
The Revolution
Right-leaning leaders in higher education needed a new strategy. But before they could settle on a different approach, a revolution swept through academia.
Starting around 2011, the rise of the social-justice movement dramatically altered the trajectory and pace of academia’s leftward march. What was once a gradual drift became a sharp lurch, differing from earlier trends in both scope and scale.
One of the most significant of these changes concerned faculty hiring. At most American colleges, existing faculty members choose new faculty hires. When ideological balance exists among faculty members, neither side is likely to impose ideological litmus tests against its opponent because the other side could retaliate in kind. If there is an ideological imbalance, however, one side can discriminate with impunity.
Take a field like social psychology, which has a Democrat-to-Republican ratio of 14:1. If a Republican were to apply to become a member of the department’s faculty, his odds of facing a search committee composed entirely of Democrats would be around 70%. One might hope that existing faculty members would not abuse their power to discriminate against ideological foes; alas, that is not the world we live in. As researchers Yoel Inbar and Joris Lammers found, 82% of liberal social psychologists “admitted that they would be at least a little bit prejudiced against a conservative candidate” applying for a faculty job.
The last decade saw these discriminatory practices grow more common — and more likely to be practiced in the open. Bias against right-leaning individuals used to occur behind closed doors or within the subconscious of hiring-committee members; now some universities explicitly impose ideological litmus tests on potential hires.
One egregious example comes from the University of California, Berkeley, which granted veto power over faculty candidates to its diversity, equity, and inclusion administrators. After the school’s faculty-hiring committees identified a total of 893 qualified applicants for various open positions, those administrators vetoed 679 of them — over three-quarters of the applicant pool — for not agreeing enthusiastically enough with progressive shibboleths regarding diversity.
Not all colleges are using explicit litmus tests in hiring, but such tests are shockingly common. Even colleges in deep red areas like Texas Tech in Lubbock use them (though the university ceased doing so after being exposed). Many red states are now banning their use at public colleges.
The Berkeley example illustrates another recent change that virtually guarantees that right-leaning scholars won’t be found on many campuses. Under the old model, each department conducted its own faculty hiring, with little opportunity for other departments or the central administration to weigh in. Today, administrators on many campuses enjoy veto power over applicants in all departments, allowing them to control faculty hiring throughout the university.
Conservatives aren’t the only personae non gratae among hiring-committee members: When 76% of applicants are disqualified because of ideological thought-crime, plenty of centrists and left-leaning applicants suffer, too. Many centrists and liberals remained silent as conservatives were eliminated from the faculty over the past several decades; now they are suffering a similar fate without anyone left to defend them.
This revolution has extended into the classroom, in some cases replacing education with indoctrination. Mark Goldblatt, a recently retired professor who taught at New York’s Fashion Institute of Technology, relayed a disturbing firsthand account of this shift in Quillette.
Before he retired, Goldblatt sat on the institute’s curriculum committee. One of the proposed courses that he and the other committee members were asked to review was an LGBT-focused sociology course, submitted by a newly hired faculty member. Goldblatt liked the idea, but he “noticed an apparently minor, easily correctable issue” in the course description: The proposal sought, as a desired learning outcome, “greater acceptance of LGBTQ+ perspectives and rights” among students. He expressed his misgiving to his colleague, explaining that as instructors at a state university, “[o]ur mission is to pursue, ascertain, and disseminate objective truth, and to equip our students to do the same. Given that mission, I don’t think we can list a learning outcome that requires students’ assent on a matter of personal morality.” Recalling his colleague’s response, he wrote: