Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a diplomatic blitz. From hosting yesterday’s talks between Washington and Kyiv over the war in Ukraine to positioning the kingdom as central to the “day after” plans for postwar Gaza and offering to help deconflict tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Riyadh appears to be everywhere. This “peace push” is tethered to the political agenda of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS—namely, his effort to rehabilitate his own image while positioning the kingdom at the forefront of Middle East geopolitics and casting Saudi Arabia as a constructive player on the international stage.

At its core, this international push by Saudi Arabia is intimately linked to internal politics inside the kingdom, particularly MBS’ efforts to preserve and expand his own power. MBS is spearheading a new hypernationalist project designed to restructure the country’s domestic “ruling bargain” and transform Riyadh’s global image. Almost every Saudi policy at home and abroad is a byproduct of this new project as well as MBS’ ultimate imperatives of regime preservation and power projection. Critical to this effort is the restructuring of the Saudi economy toward a sustainable footing in anticipation of a future of declining oil revenues. MBS’ ambitious economic plan, Vision 2030, is the economic foundation of his new nationalist project, aimed at establishing Saudi Arabia as the major economic hub of the Middle East and a lucrative market for international capital.

For MBS, the success of this nationalist project is existential. It is the new autocratic foundation on which the crown prince—the kingdom’s de facto ruler who has already amassed more power than any individual in the history of the Saudi state—hopes to base his authority. But the success of this domestic vision depends on more than just absolute control at home. It is intertwined with regional and international objectives, making it also the driver of Saudi foreign policy.

At the regional level, MBS needs calm to focus on his domestic agenda. This is why he has shifted from an aggressive foreign policy, epitomized by the Saudi intervention in Yemen in 2015, toward an emphasis on de-escalation beginning roughly in 2020. In particular, Saudi Arabia has focused heavily on deconfliction with Iran, its chief regional adversary with which it had severed relations in 2016. In 2023, after a period of diplomatic engagement, Riyadh and Tehran reestablished formal relations. The two sides have continued to pursue their delicate détente since then. This should not be interpreted as a cessation of long-standing strategic competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but rather as opportunistic maneuvering by both parties, given the changing regional and international contexts as well as both sides’ increased concern with pressing domestic issues.

Recently, concern in Riyadh over the prospects of a region-wide conflict have grown considerably in the wake of the war in Gaza and rising tensions between Israel, Iran and the United States. Compounding these heightened tensions are concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, with Tehran now closer to being able to manufacture a nuclear weapon than any point since its uranium enrichment program was discovered in the early 2000s. Fearful that a war between Israel, Iran and the U.S. would consume and destabilize the entire region, Riyadh is offering to mediate between Tehran and Washington, hoping that it can prevent such an outcome.

MBS is also keen on asserting Saudi Arabia’s central role in shaping the Middle East’s geostrategic landscape. This has been particularly apparent over the past year and a half, after the war in Gaza brought the Israel-Palestine conflict back to the forefront of regional geopolitics. Before Hamas’ attack against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Gaza, Saudi Arabia was reportedly close to joining the series of normalization deals between Israel and several Arab states known collectively as the Abraham Accords, in return for unprecedented U.S. concessions. The war in Gaza derailed this sprint toward normalization, with Riyadh now demanding a concrete pathway toward a Palestinian state as a prerequisite to any potential deal, while denouncing Israel’s military campaign in Gaza as genocide. As of now, there is no indication that Riyadh has moderated its position or that Israel is about to renege on its firm opposition to a Palestinian state, leaving the prospects for normalization in limbo.

Riyadh’s focus has now shifted since U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would “take over” Gaza and forcibly remove its Palestinian inhabitants. Trump later appeared to walk back his remarks, and the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is now teetering on collapse, threatening renewed fighting. But Saudi Arabia wasted no time in spearheading an Arab counterproposal to Trump’s declaration. And regardless of how conversations over Gaza’s postwar governance and reconstruction proceed or whether the war resumes, Riyadh has positioned itself as central to negotiations over the territory’s future.

Globally, Saudi Arabia is also seeking to position itself as a constructive actor on the world stage. In trying to revamp its international reputation and increase its global influence, Riyadh hopes to project an image of modernity, progress and stability—particularly to Washington, which remains the kingdom’s security guarantor. But Riyadh’s international strategy has also included increased outreach to non-Western powers such as Russia and China, amid a broader global shift toward multipolarity. This reflects the fact that, unlike the U.S., Saudi Arabia does not view the return of multipolarity in zero-sum terms. To the contrary, Riyadh hopes to leverage this changing world order to its own benefit, engaging global powers solely from the perspective of how best to advance the kingdom’s own interests. Playing the role of mediator between Russia and the U.S.—as well as between Ukraine and the U.S.—is one way for Riyadh to curry favor with global powers while enhancing its own diplomatic clout.

Critical to MBS’ international agenda is strengthening his personal ties with Trump. The two had a strong relationship during Trump’s first term, though it was not totally quarrel-free. Saudi Arabia was Trump’s first international visit after taking office in 2017, and during his time in office he showered the kingdom with advanced weaponry and other concessions, such as shielding MBS for his role in the 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was killed in Turkey by Saudi security operatives. This time around, Trump’s first phone call with a foreign leader after his inauguration in January was with MBS, and the president suggested that Saudi Arabia could once again be his choice for his first trip abroad during his second term—perhaps even to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin there.

Riyadh’s efforts to curry favor with Trump will likely continue. Shortly after Trump’s second term began, MBS announced that Riyadh will invest $600 billion in the U.S. over the next four years. Trump also maintains strong personal business ties with the kingdom, as do members of his family. Riyadh will certainly look to capitalize on these ties in pushing for greater U.S. concessions to the kingdom and positioning Saudi Arabia as central to U.S. regional policy in the Middle East.

Riyadh’s diplomatic frenzy is a low-cost strategy designed to depict the kingdom as a constructive actor in the Middle East and globally. But that does not mean it is entirely risk-free. Riyadh’s ability to successfully navigate the challenges, uncertainties and competing interests underpinning these various conflicts will have a profound impact on MBS’ agenda domestically, regionally and internationally in the years to come.