Yet policymakers who expect talks to fail nevertheless commonly advocate maintaining and increasing pressure on North Korea. Some analysts, such as the Rand Corporation’s Soo Kim and the Brookings Institution’s Evans Revere, explicitly reject any switch to arms control, which would accept North Korea as a nuclear power and negotiate to limit its weapons and activities.
Rather, they insist on reiterating the demand that Pyongyang denuclearize. Washington also lectures Chinese President Xi Jinping that it is in his nation’s interest to destabilize North Korea, China’s one formal military ally. No one should expect anything good to come from such an approach.
A diplomatic shift is necessary, but it will not be easy. North Korean‑U.S. dialogue has been sporadic over the years. It peaked and then crashed during the administration of former U.S. President Donald Trump, when the failed Hanoi summit effectively ended Kim’s outreach to Washington. North Korea has ignored Biden administration’s efforts to engage in the most basic diplomacy while pouring obloquy over both the United States and South Korea. At last December’s party plenum, Kim stated:
“[T]he U.S. and its vassal forces have still perpetrated vicious anti‐DPRK confrontational moves, and the desperate efforts of the enemies have reached the extremes unprecedented in history in their reckless, provocative, and dangerous nature. The U.S., which has caused instability and continued to aggravate the situation in the Korean Peninsula, is exposing various forms of military threat to our state even at this moment when the year is falling. The U.S. has more persistently instigated the South Korean puppets and Japanese, who are playing the role as the most faithful stooge and ‘running dog’ in carrying out its hostile policy toward our republic.”
As if that wasn’t enough to discourage even the most seasoned diplomat, Kim has directed particular abuse at South Korea and its president, Yoon Suk‐yeol. Indeed, Kim recently proposed changing his country’s constitution to define South Korea as the North’s “primary foe and invariable principal enemy.” Although disclaiming any desire to start an inter‐Korean war, Kim promised to finish one on his terms by occupying the South.
To Washington’s frustration, Beijing refuses to act against its allies in the North, relaxing sanctions enforcement and refusing to back any new restrictions. To be fair, Chinese opposition still might have discouraged North Korea from undertaking a long‐predicted nuclear test, and Kim has moved much closer to Russia. The latter has ostentatiously busted sanctions that it previously approved and is now importing artillery shells and missiles from Pyongyang.
Western analysts fear that in return, the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin might be aiding the North’s development of ICBMs and even nuclear weapons. Indeed, given the United States’ support for Ukraine—which has resulted in thousands and perhaps even more Russian battle casualties—Moscow might view such cooperation as appropriate payback.
By any measure, then, U.S. policy toward the North has failed. In 1992, the Heritage Foundation warned that North Korea possessed “enough plutonium to build one to three weapons.” As a result, the organization predicted that “[i]f diplomacy fails, the options open to the United States and South Korea are grim. … Prolonged diplomacy may give North Korea the time it needs to build nuclear weapons. … But if Pyongyang refuses to comply [with demands for denuclearization], both Washington and Seoul must prepare a program of political and economic sanctions, as well as military measures, to deter possible North Korean aggression.”
Three decades later, North Korea is estimated to have several scores of nuclear weapons. Its ultimate objective is uncertain, but pessimists posit that it could amass an arsenal of as many as 242 weapons in just a few years. The logical—indeed, seemingly inexorable—end point is North Korea’s possession of tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use, with many more nukes atop MIRV‐tipped ICBMs targeting U.S. cities.
A change is vital. However, Washington’s mindset remains locked in the past. The National Security Council’s Mira Rapp‐Hooper created a brief flurry by suggesting a willingness on the U.S. side “to consider interim steps on that pathway to denuclearization.” However, the State Department had repudiated prior talk of “arms control” discussions with the North, and there was no follow‐up. Little more is expected from Washington in the near future, with the U.S. presidential election only a few months off.
This resistance to change reflects several unpersuasive arguments. One is that it is simply unacceptable for North Korea to have nuclear weapons, as successive U.S. administrations, including the current one, have declared. But it does have them, whether the United States accepts it or not. Another is that North Korea cannot be trusted to fulfill any agreement that it signs. If so, then it will also be impossible to negotiate denuclearization.
Other policymakers fear accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state would undermine nonproliferation policy. Seoul has emphasized this point. However, the basic problem is that the North has already developed nukes, not that Washington might accept that reality. Anyway, the international system has survived U.S. recognition of India and Pakistan—and at least the private acceptance of Israel—as nuclear weapons states. Acknowledging Pyongyang would be no worse.
Analysts also worry about the reaction of allies, most notably Japan and South Korea. However, continuing demands for denuclearization won’t ease concerns about North Korea’s growing arsenal. Better to limit the threat than ostentatiously huff and puff. Finally, U.S. policymakers fret that South Korea and Japan might develop their own nuclear weapons. That would not be good, but continuing to hold U.S. cities and people hostage to North Korea’s capabilities would be much worse.
Unfortunately, the reflexive panacea is to strengthen extended deterrence, as the United States has done through the Washington Declaration published in April 2023. This is but a thin reed upon which to lean. First, Americans lose if North Korea becomes a significant nuclear power with a substantial war‐making capacity. Second, South Koreans can count. The larger the number of Pyongyang’s weapons, the lower U.S. credibility falls. South Korea realizes that it is foolish to expect Americans to engage in self‐immolation in the event of a nuclear war with Pyongyang. Nor should they. The strongest proponents of extended deterrence fail to explain how doing so would be in Americans’ interest.
Rather than whine about what Washington cannot change—Pyongyang’s nuclear capability—the United States should abandon denuclearization as an essential demand. It might be possible to square the circle. John Carl Baker of the U.S. Institute of Peace has suggested pursuing a course that acknowledges rather than accepts the North’s status “in order to secure pragmatic constraints that, in the long run, will put the peninsula and the world back on the path to disarmament.” Something like this might be what Rapp‐Hooper intended to convey. Limiting North Korea’s program is the first and most essential requirement.
In demanding full denuclearization, successive administrations have encouraged North Korea to become a serious nuclear power. Only by conceding past failure and pursuing a new course is there much chance of actually thwarting the North’s ambitions.
