First, managers who do things at the expense of taking positive investment opportunities earn a reputation worthy of never being hired to run another company. Furthermore, a share repurchase is an exchange of cash for shares–it uses part of the company’s value (cash) to buy back another part of the company’s value (equity). The result might be a boost in earnings per share, but not a boost in value.
For all these reasons, Hsu’s comments are just a distraction from the debate over whether large U.S. banks need more stringent capital rules. It is far from clear that they do. Yet, the new requirements will impose higher costs on these banks and possibly put them at a disadvantage to foreign-based banks. Any real gain in safety and soundness is also murky.
In fact, multiple federal banking regulators–Fed chair Jerome Powell, Fed governor Michelle Bowman, FDIC vice chair Travis Hill, and FDIC board member Jonathan McKernan, just to name a few–have voiced concerns with the proposed rules. Aside from their concerns, the 316-page proposal devotes less than five pages to explaining the “impact and economic analysis” of the new requirements, and that discussion is so general it’s virtually pointless.
Whether the rule is truly arbitrary is almost sure to be litigated, but this whole exercise exposes a bigger problem: The regulatory capital framework itself is highly flawed.
Under this regime, virtually no weight is given to people’s ability to manage their own safety. Instead, a handful of government officials dictate how carefully banks must treat all kinds of financial assets and activities.
Supposedly, this regime is an improvement over a simpler flat capital requirement. But the first version of Basel failed because regulators got the risk weights wrong on (among other items) mortgage-backed securities. And while the second version was being finalized, the 2008 financial crisis hit, so regulators started working on Basel III and never fully implemented Basel II. Some folks portray the new rules as the final touches on Basel III, but the new proposal is sort of Basel IV-ish.
Regardless of the version, this approach will always fail because nobody has the knowledge to correctly assign risk weights to thousands of assets and activities. Nonetheless, federal regulators have an enormous amount of discretion to set banks’ capital rules as if they do have the knowledge.
The best way to get closer to the “right” bank capital levels is to put them to the test of the market. Even then, there is no reason to think that bank managers will always get the amounts correct, but that’s not really the point. The point is that banks want to stay in business, so they would have to convince people they’re not too risky. (Yes, government backing, even if implicit, makes this virtually impossible, but that’s a problem for another column.)
Nobody–not even many of the folks in the banking industry–wants to hear this, but the whole issue comes down to what is best: operating in a free enterprise system or in one where government officials decide, at a very detailed level, how people get to use their money.
Tragically, the United States has moved further in the direction of the latter approach for decades. But it doesn’t work, just like micromanaging the broader economy doesn’t work.
Bankers have little incentive to say it, but Congress should ditch the current approach and reduce regulators’ discretion. For a very high cost, the current regulatory regime provides a false sense of security and little else.