However, nearly all discussions on the topic are about the appropriate U.S. reaction to an attack on Taiwan itself, not to an incident involving a PRC offensive against some outlying islands. I emphasized the latter danger in articles published in June 2020 and February 2021, but few other analysts focused on that possibility. Although I mentioned Kinmen and Matsu as possible targets, a decision to attack those islands would revive U.S. Cold War memories from the 1950s when the United States and China nearly came to blows twice. I noted that a more probable target would be the tiny Pratas/Dongsha cluster, nearly 300 miles south and west of Taiwan. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of the growing number of incursions by PRC warplanes into Taiwan’s self-proclaimed Air Defense Identification Zone have taken place in the extreme southwestern portion of that zone—close to Pratas/Dongsha.
Recently, even some portions of America’s sleepy foreign policy blob are beginning to notice the possibility of a limited strike. The hawkish Center for a New American Security published a report on October 26 based on a scenario in which PRC forces invade the Pratas/Dongsha islands, capturing the 500 Taiwanese troops based there and establishing a military outpost. During the CNAS war game, both the U.S. and Taiwanese teams found it difficult to come up with an effective military response, lest that move trigger a full-scale war. Predictably, the lesson CNAS participants took away from the exercise was that Washington must gain a firm commitment from Japan and other allies regarding Taiwan’s defense, as well as strengthen America’s own forces in the region to deter Beijing from even contemplating aggression against the smaller territories.
That is little more than wishful thinking, and it certainly is not a viable strategy in the next year or two. Japan’s political elite clearly is torn about whether to incur the costs and risks of committing to Taiwan’s defense. The response of other regional allies, especially South Korea, is even more uncertain.
PRC leaders have given multiple indications over the past few years that their patience is wearing thin about Taipei’s increasingly blunt rejection of unification with the mainland—and that impatience seems to accurately reflect the attitude of mainland elites generally. Beijing’s displays of military power in the immediate region also have become larger and more frequent. The signs are mounting that Beijing believes that it must do something or watch Taiwan continue to slowly drift away from any prospect of reunification. Seizing Pratas (or perhaps even more remote Taiwanese-claimed islands in the South China Sea) would be a shot across the bow of both Taiwan and the United States to emphasize that the PRC is deadly serious. Yet it would not be a direct attack on Taiwan—a move that would almost certainly trigger a robust U.S. military response.
Xi Jinping and his colleagues would have legitimate reasons to doubt whether the United States would be willing to risk a horribly destructive war with China over small islands that are merely claimed by Taipei. Indeed, the Biden administration would encounter considerable difficulty securing the support of the American people for a war over such meager stakes. Chinese officials very likely understand that point as well. Seizing Pratas/Dongsha would be a bold move, and certainly is not one without risks, but it also would put the onus of any subsequent, dangerous escalation totally on the United States while sending an emphatic message of China’s determination and fraying patience. Washington needs to pay more attention to this scenario before being blindsided by a major crisis.
