“Congress should reaffirm the House’s promise in 1965 to refuse to seat, or to unseat, members who benefit from discriminatory voting laws,” Elias wrote. “If there ever was a need for it to do so, it is now.”
In other words, the House could refuse to seat either individual members or entire delegations from Georgia, Texas, Florida, Iowa, and numerous other states whose laws Elias railed against as discriminatory over this period because a majority of seated members refused to recognize them as having been duly and legitimately elected. Whatever else one can say about the outcome of the midterm elections, the Democrats’ loss of their majority did spare us any suspense about whether Elias’ scheme would have gained any footing with the party’s post-Pelosi leadership in the House.
As I and others have argued before, most of the measures assailed as voter suppression fall well within the mainstream of election law as recently practiced in the 50 states. That doesn’t guarantee that the bills are optimal as policy—it’s perfectly legitimate to argue that different rules would be better at advancing values of voter convenience and turnout. For what it’s worth, turnout rose in Georgia after the recent changes—not that surprising given that the state’s voting rules remained more permissive along multiple dimensions than those in such liberal Northeastern strongholds as New York, Connecticut, and Delaware. (On top of all that, Biden and others persistently misrepresented what the Georgia bill would do.)
It’s dangerous, in fact, to describe voting laws you may disagree with—requiring re-registration by those who haven’t voted in years, or providing only a few days of early voting rather than weeks—as though they somehow “disenfranchised” electors. For one thing, it’s a bit of an insult to people who actually have been stripped of the franchise.
The wider danger of rhetorically assailing these procedural variations as somehow literal disenfranchisement is that you might start getting high on your own supply. The Constitution and historical practice, after all, allow for some drastic remedies in cases of literal disenfranchisement. Why not treat a relatively stale controversy like that over voter ID laws as if it furnished the basis for a new Reconstruction?
It would be nice to report that Elias’ proposal reflected a mere personal foible. But in a California Law Review symposium, Harvard law professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos cited the Constitution’s Judging Elections Clause (Article I, Section 5) under which “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,” and explained how it might be put to use here: