President Donald Trump wants European governments to spend five percent of GDP on their militaries. However, of those increasing their defense outlays, only Poland comes anywhere close to that much in Europe. Worse, important laggards, such as Italy and Spain, remain. And as the political center collapses across the continent, the issue has become increasingly divisive in important states like France and Germany.

Faced with increasingly urgent cries from Europe’s born-again hawks, the public remains largely unmoved. Explained The Economist: “With politicians bickering about pensions and social spending, and loth to raise taxes, the reality is of a continent unwilling to inconvenience itself for something so trifling as fending off a potential invader. Europeans want more military spending, sure; some churn out ludicrous soundbites about building a ‘war economy.’ But God forbid that anyone make voters endure the cost of it.”

Until Trump’s election in 2016, the Europeans were getting along just fine, including with Washington. The United States did the tough jobs, most importantly, defending the free world from communism and related threats. The Europeans focused on fun, creating bountiful welfare states at home and providing generous foreign aid to assorted Third World governments. Everyone was happy, more or less.

To be sure, American officials whined and complained about NATO allies preferring butter to guns. Robert Gates gave a particularly surly valedictory speech suggesting that the system was unsustainable: “The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American body politic writ large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.” However, the US public doesn’t make foreign policy, and the dirty secret was that Washington’s elite enjoyed bossing the Europeans around, which was only possible by keeping them weak and dependent.

Even though Dwight Eisenhower had declared that NATO would be a failure if US troops remained in Europe a decade after its creation, no president or Congress seriously considered forcing European governments to act like international adults, by ending America’s security guarantee and withdrawing America’s forces. To the contrary, US officials constantly “reassured” the Europeans that Washington would always be there for them, no matter how little they did for themselves. Among the worst of the offenders was, naturally, Joe Biden, who never met a US defense subsidy to a foreign client state that he did not support, at least until Afghanistan.

So the Europeans didn’t think they had reason to worry. At least until Trump entered the White House. He blustered and threatened, which gained widespread press attention, but during his first term his bark appeared to be worse than his bite. While he seemed serious about ending Europe’s cheap ride, his appointees actually spent more money and added more troops to the continent. When he was defeated by Biden, who had spent his entire career encouraging European dependence, America’s allies figured they could relax. The stars had returned to their alignment. Uncle Sucker was back on duty and Europe’s defense welfare was secure.

Then Russia’s Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. With the US having transformed the Monroe Doctrine into a policy of enforcing American dominance up to the border of every other nation, including Russia, the Europeans still thought they were safe. When the threat of war over Ukraine flared, they refused to negotiate and assumed that their verbal warnings would be sufficient to hold Moscow at bay. Although blame for taking the decision for war falls on Putin and his government, the allies had recklessly flouted Russian security concerns, violated their many promises not to expand NATO to Russia’s border, and ignored warnings of likely Russian retaliation from their intelligence and diplomatic officials. The Biden administration continued to reward European weakness, adding US troops to the continent and underwriting Ukraine’s defense.

Still, almost universally, European officials talked tough, about the necessity of doing more, much more, to contain the barbarous hordes from the East. Most European governments also at least made some symbolic increases in military outlays, with closer proximity to Russia tending to intensify the effort. A chorus of European opinion leaders—political officials, military officers, think tankers, and media commentators—agreed that more needed to be done. But what? Explained The Economist:

The simplest way is for national governments, who after all oversee their armed forces and spend most of the tax levied in Europe, to cut larger cheques. A few already do. Poland says it will spend 4.7% of its GDP on defense next year, the most of any NATO member. But others are constrained by having maxed out their national credit card: France, Italy and Spain all have debt-to-GDP ratios of over 100%, and are under pressure from both markets and EU wallahs to improve their public finances. Apart from countries bordering Russia, voters clobbered by covid and then by soaring energy prices are in no mood for less social spending or higher taxes. Do not deprive us of butter, is the gist of Europe’s current politics.

Then along came Donald Trump, with variant 2.0 more radical than ever. With no unified philosophy other than imposing America on the world, barely three weeks in office and he has been busy launching trade wars on neighbors and adversaries alike, threatening Denmark and Panama with aggressive land grabs, considering radical changes in policy toward both Ukraine and Russia, and even turning Gaza into a veritable American-run wonderland, “a Riviera of the Middle East.”

He also wants the Europeans to spend five percent of GDP on the military. Even before taking the oath of office, he allowed: “I think NATO should have 5%.” After all, he added, “I’m the one that got them to pay 2%.” (Actually, Vladimir Putin probably did more inadvertently to achieve that end, though concern over Trump’s unpredictable stance certainly played a role.)

For most European countries that suggestion had the impact of a cross to a vampire. For instance, Italy’s Defense Minister Guido Crosetto complained: “I don’t think it will be 5 [percent], which at this time would be impossible for almost all the nations in the world.” Rome is one of Europe’s notable laggards, despite possessing a large economy. It devotes a risible 1.57 percent of its GDP to the military.

Most disappointing might be Germany, which possesses the continent’s largest economy and a storied (if terrible, at times) military heritage. Reported The Wall Street Journal last fall, as Russia continues to gain ground against Ukraine: “military bases are crumbling or have been converted to civilian use, including sports centers, old people’s homes and pension fund offices. The army, which numbered half a million in West Germany and 300,000 in East Germany during the Cold War, has today just 180,000. It now has a few hundred operational tanks, compared with more than 2,000 Leopard 2 main battle tanks its West German predecessor had in the late 1980s.”

Despite the current chancellor’s professed conversion to the cause of rearmament three years ago, there is broad and strong opposition, including within his own party, to trimming social spending to free up more funds. As a result, Moritz Schularick, president of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, complained that “The ‘Zeitenwende,’ or epochal shift, in military spending promised by the German government in 2022 has so far proved to be empty rhetoric.”

A recent Kiel Institute report described the failure in excruciating detail: “Meaningful increases in procurement activity did not begin until more than one year after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, orders have remained rather small in size. [Even if 123 tanks ordered] are delivered quickly, Germany would still have only 440 main battle tanks—compared to 2400 back in 2004. For other weapon systems, the numbers look even less favorable.” Overall, the study shockingly concludes: “Our findings show that it will take decades if not centuries to build up similar capacities to 2004 at current procurement speeds. When taking into account commitments to Ukraine, we even document that procurement for some weapon systems is insufficient to replace commitments and existing deterrence capabilities are actually falling.”

Trump was criticized because the US lags on this standard, at 3.4 percent of GDP. Leading members of the America’s bipartisan war party were quick to point out that the US would have to spend another $500 billion annually to hit five percent. The Wall Street Journal, which has endorsed every war fought, and some that were not, by the US over the last three decades, urged the president to “start at home.” No problem on finding the money: “the U.S. could free up cash by cutting wasteful spending and, dare to say it, reforming entitlements.” Of course, cut US social spending so the Europeans can increase theirs. That would be a political winner at home!

Trump had the obvious answer to the Journal: “We protect them. They don’t protect us.” He added ominously, “I’m not sure we should be spending anything at all.” After all, take a look at geography. “Europe is in for a tiny fraction of the money that we’re in [for],” declared Trump: “We have a thing called the ocean in between us, right? Why are we in for billions and billions of dollars more money than Europe?” Which is why the world, though seeming more dangerous and frightening than ever, is not particularly dangerous or frightening for America. Russia isn’t going to attack America. China isn’t going to attack America. Iran isn’t going to attack America. Nor is North Korea going to attack America. The chief responsibility to defend those who fear being attacked—European states, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and South Korea—falls on them. If they feel more vulnerable, they should be spending more, much more, than America on the military.

Of course, their circumstances vary dramatically. Ultimately, the best approach is to eschew any arbitrary number. Friedrich Merz, who leads the Christian Democrats and is likely to end up as German Chancellor after national elections later this month, argued: “The 2, 3 or 5 percent are basically irrelevant; what matters is that we do what is necessary to defend ourselves.” And he is right. Other nations should spend not what we want them to spend, but what they believe is necessary to ensure their defense. With the critical proviso that they no longer can leech off the US, expecting America to defend them anyway. As most do, or certainly long have.

America’s defense dependents almost uniformly have a welfare mindset, convinced that the American people owe them their defense. It is worth remembering the hysterical reaction to Trump’s story about one of Washington’s more shameless European security dependents: “Then, he said, the president of ‘a big country stood up and said, “Well, sir, if we don’t pay and we’re attacked by Russia, will you protect us?”’ Mr. Trump said he asked the other president if the country was ‘delinquent’ in its payments. The leader responded, ‘Yes. Let’s say that happened,’ Mr. Trump said. ‘No, I would not protect you,’ Mr. Trump recalled responding. ‘In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You’ve got to pay. You got to pay your bills’.” One suspects that Trump would not literally welcome Vlad’s invaders to conquer assorted European states, but European governments exhibited no shame in expecting that Americans would fight and die even if those they were defending couldn’t be bothered to do anything for themselves.

The administration should announce its policy—shifting, not sharing—the burden for the continent’s defense and then let the Europeans adjust. If they perceive a serious security threat, presumably from Russia, and believe only significant military outlays by their own governments can meet it, they will have an incentive to make tough decisions and embark upon a significant military buildup. If they feel secure for whatever reason, they can maintain or even reduce defense spending. It would be up to them.

In any case, Washington should provide a smooth transition. There is much that the Europeans could do on their own. They could spend more. They could jointly develop and/​or purchase weapons. They could create a continental procurement process, establishing a fund through the European Union or a “coalition of the willing.”

Whatever their inclination, Washington should facilitate the transition. The Cato Institute’s Justin Logan and University of Maryland’s Joshua Shifrinson wrote that the US “should recognize that it has achieved its main goal in Europe. Having successfully ensured that no country can dominate the continent, it should embrace a new approach to the region. Under a revised strategy, the United States would reduce its military presence on the continent, Europeanize NATO, and hand principal responsibility for European security back to its rightful owners: the Europeans.”

This process could be advanced by the creation of a European pillar of NATO intended to eventually subsume the whole, with Washington moving to associate membership status. Logan and Shifrinson offer a variety of other ideas, starting with an initial US troop withdrawal, aid for the allied states to fill critical “shortfalls,” such as “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.” They include considering German acquisition of nuclear weapons. The process should include turning NATO responsibilities over to European governments and encouraging creation of an indigenous European defense base.

Foreign policy should reflect circumstances. NATO served an obvious purpose in the aftermath of World War II. However, argued Eisenhower: “We cannot be a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions if for no other reason than that these are not, politically, our frontiers. What we must do is to assist these people [to] regain their confidence and get on their own military feet.”

Washington should have done that decades ago. First as Europe recovered from World War II. Certainly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And now, with a united Europe far outpacing Russia, which has dramatically demonstrated the practical limits on even a nuclear-armed great power. Especially with the United States facing fiscal Armageddon, and inevitable limits on its ability to continue policing the world.

Donald Trump already has been a consequential president. If he can turn his anti-European outbursts into a practical transfer of defense responsibility to Europe, he will have cemented an extraordinary legacy. And left a safer America.