It’s not surprising. We’ve just experienced the first major burst of inflation since the early 1980s. American families are angry that grocery prices rose 21 percent in three years after January 2021, as interest rates for new mortgages and auto loans have surged. Politicians and central bankers have every incentive to blame external forces or greedy businesses, rather than their own macroeconomic stimulus, for these consequences of inflation.
Depressingly, the buck-passing is working. The public sees profit-seeking corporations as inflation’s foremost villain, according to a recent YouGov survey. Even among those skeptical that corporate America suddenly colluded to jack up prices, many still mistakenly believe that today’s high prices were entirely driven by the pandemic and Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine.
As a result, the public rarely chastises the Federal Reserve for recent price spikes, despite the central bank’s mandate to keep inflation in check. Republican voters often blame President Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, but even they fail to censure Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell and his team for the inflation surge. Indeed, YouGov didn’t even list the Federal Reserve among the possible answers as to who was to blame for inflation.
As a matter of economics, failing to note monetary policy’s role in inflation is incoherent. Pandemic-driven supply shocks and global energy price spikes undoubtedly increased prices by constraining the economy’s productive capacity. Had the central bank not pursued monetary accommodation, however, such forces would have caused a short, transitory inflation burst that ultimately would have receded. Instead, consumer prices remain 11 percent above where they’d be expected to be if annual inflation had stuck at 2 percent post-2019.
My new edited volume, The War on Prices: How Popular Misconceptions about Inflation, Prices, and Value Create Bad Policy, catalogues politicians’ faulty theories about inflation’s causes. Scholars Pierre Lemieux, Bryan Cutsinger, Brian Albrecht, David Beckworth, and Stan Veuger document that inflation wasn’t the product of greedy corporations, aggressive wage demands, or even primarily supply-shocks and bottlenecks. The best explanation was overly stimulatory macroeconomic policy.
The Fed oversaw $6 trillion of new money creation in two years that, alongside vast government borrowing, stimulated total spending on goods and services way above its pre-crisis trend—an excess demand that drove up the price level. Only when the Fed squeezed money growth again did spending growth and inflation start falling.