Yet instead, Yoon’s dramatic self-immolation has left the Republic of Korea (ROK) essentially leaderless in advance of Trump’s arrival. Most likely, Yoon will be removed following a successful impeachment in the National Assembly. However, even if the Constitutional Court, acting rather like the U.S. Senate in an American impeachment, saves Yoon from ouster, his presidency will be effectively over—not least because his own party has pressured him to resign. As an ostentatious political loser, he would not attract Trump’s interest, let alone affection. No invitation to visit the United States would be likely—and definitely no karaoke sing-alongs.
The breakdown offers a welcome opportunity to reconsider a relationship gone stale. Washington has always preferred conservative hawks in Seoul. A succession of American presidents, Democrats as well as Republicans, dealt with long-time dictator Park Chung-hee. The George W. Bush administration was famously at odds with left-leaning president Kim Dae-jung, who favored a softer approach to North Korea.
And the Biden administration couldn’t have been happier with Yoon, who reviled the North, reconciled with Japan, and sang “American Pie” with aplomb. The Washington policy community has largely followed in the U.S. government’s wake. Although human rights concerns were expressed during decades of dictatorship, the maintenance of the alliance remained paramount.
This geopolitical pragmatism was on dramatic display in the reaction to Yoon’s attempted autogolpe. The Biden administration offered no criticism of the shocking events. Secretary of State Antony Blinken put out a banal statement: “We welcome President Yoon’s statement that he would rescind the order. … We continue to expect political disagreements to be resolved peacefully and in accordance with the rule of law.” Blinken might as well have been discussing a disagreement between Yoon and the National Assembly over the wording of a commemorative resolution.
Leading U.S. think tanks responded similarly. As Karl Friedhoff wrote in Foreign Policy, “Since his inauguration in May 2022, Yoon has been a darling of the Washington foreign-policy establishment.” The almost automatic hostility to South Korea’s left and near veneration of the right were reflected in the restrained reaction—or, in some cases, the lack of any reaction at all—to Yoon’s action. NK News’ Chad O’Carroll warned, “In prioritizing smooth relations over thorny questions of democratic erosion, as many key institutions and experts in D.C. appear to have done, Beltway Korea experts showed a disconnect with realities on the ground.” The Biden administration’s professed commitment to democracy vanished as surely as mention of its long forgotten democracy summit did.
However, Washington is now likely to face a new and much more liberal president backed by an overwhelming legislative majority. Yoon’s survival depends on the depleted Constitutional Court. With the court short three of nine members, some analysts believed that it might be unable to render a verdict, but the judges indicated that they would proceed. Conviction is the most likely outcome. Saving Yoon would be highly unpopular and leave the national government crippled.
Constitutionally, an election is required within two months of the president’s departure—and the left seems likely to win with ease. The candidate whom Yoon narrowly defeated, Lee Jae-myung, should win if able to run, but he faces criminal charges that could derail his candidacy. Given the toxicity of South Korean politics, whoever is elected is likely to engage in more than a little score-settling. The political convulsions aren’t likely to end any time soon.
Enter President Trump on Jan. 20. In contrast with 2017, when he took office after a chaotic transition following an election that he apparently didn’t expect to win, this time the Trump operation has shown surprising discipline in making appointments. If similar efforts are being put into policy development, Trump’s appointees may pick up his priorities from day one.
Center stage will be renegotiation of the Special Measures Agreement, which the Biden administration rushed through in an attempt to settle before Trump’s return. However, he is unlikely to be deterred, and the Yoon government appeared willing to give something in return.
While Yoon might have hoped he could temper Trump’s expectations, the latter spoke of charging $10 billion a year for America’s military presence. Lee, or another Democratic Party president, is less likely to find common ground with Trump and to pay more. If rebuffed by South Korea, Trump might reconsider America’s military presence. Even if initially advanced only as a negotiating tactic, he might go further, having raised the issue long before he was elected president.
Questioning the status quo horrifies almost everyone in both Seoul and Washington, as they cannot imagine a world in which the United States does not subsidize the South’s defense. Thus, any withdrawal proposal would face concerted opposition among U.S. policymakers as well as Koreans.
Yet advocates of the status quo have never satisfactorily explained why a prosperous, populous industrial state, which transcends its adversary on almost every measure of power, is unable to provide for its own defense—at least a non-nuclear one. South Korea surely is capable of overmatching whatever the North deploys.
At the same time, Washington is running deficits of around $2 trillion annually in peacetime and paying more than $1 trillion a year in interest on its debt. Uncle Sam’s debt-to-GDP ratio is approaching the record 106 percent set in 1946 and could double by mid-century. How can Washington continue paying for such generous defense subsidies to so many other nations? Withdrawing and demobilizing troops, like those currently deployed in South Korea, would ease both recruiting challenges and budget pressures.
Less contentious might be a renewed approach toward North Korea. Trump’s engagement with Kim was the most creative diplomatic initiative of his first term. He has mused that the North Korean leader “misses” him, though Kim’s response proved less than warm. Trump plans to appoint Richard Grenell, who held several positions in the first administration, as envoy for special missions, and he might lead such an effort.
Yoon, who has taken a hard line against North Korea, likely would resist such a policy. In contrast, progressive presidents have consistently sought to establish relations with Pyongyang; Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in all held summits with North Korean leaders. If a liberal replaces Yoon, Trump might find a willing partner for a new approach to Pyongyang.
An obvious starting offer would be to drop the ban on travel to the North and propose opening liaison offices, with the expectation of upgrading them to embassies in due course. It is in America’s interest to encourage North Korea to open to the world. Moreover, it would be useful to begin steady, even if limited, dialogue between the two governments. In fact, it is more important to talk with adversaries than it is with friends. Negotiation is not a concession; it’s good policy. The two governments might still fail to achieve much substantively, but at least there would be a greater possibility of progress.
Trump’s willingness to meet Kim remains underappreciated in Washington. For 76 years, the United States and North Korea have glowered at each other, fighting a terrible war and suffering through occasional firefights. Successive U.S. presidents grandly intoned that Pyongyang must not develop nuclear weapons. Yet today it possesses scores of them and is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles, with the intention of targeting the United States. Washington has succeeded in shielding South Korea but has failed in reforming North Korea and bringing the Korean cold war to an end. It is time to try something new.
Yoon’s presidency resembles the flaming aircraft wreckage after a bungled carrier landing. The only solution is to push it overboard. But what follows isn’t clear. Much will be on Trump’s mind when he takes office again. However, he should not allow the urgent to displace the important, such as the future of the Korean peninsula. The Koreas require his attention. If he follows his instincts, he could transform U.S. policy for the better.
