The following year, the national intelligence officer Fiona Hill, who later served in the Trump administration, briefed President George W. Bush, predicting “that Mr. Putin would view steps to bring Ukraine and Georgia closer to NATO as a provocative move that would likely provoke preemptive Russian military action.” CIA Director William Burns, then U.S. ambassador to Russia, warned the Bush administration that “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin).” Such a step would “create fertile soil for Russian meddling in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.”
The allies knew the stakes when Putin increased military forces along Ukraine’s border. NATO’s then-Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg acknowledged, “The background was that President Putin declared in the autumn of 2021, and actually sent a draft treaty that they wanted NATO to sign, to promise no more NATO enlargement. That was what he sent us. And was a pre-condition for not invade [sic] Ukraine. Of course we didn’t sign that. … So he went to war to prevent NATO, more NATO, close to his borders.”
Even Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky admitted: “Security guarantees and neutrality, the nuclear-free status of our state. We are ready to agree to it. This is the most important point. This was the first fundamental point for the Russian Federation, as far as I remember. And as far as I remember, they started a war because of this.” Yet the U.S. then opposed a negotiated settlement.
In retrospect the allies’ decisions constitute vainglorious stupidity. Even the administration admits that Biden’s action won’t revive Kiev’s military fortunes. No allied Wunderwaffe is likely to bring victory. Although Russians as well as Ukrainians are suffering, the latter are much worse off. Ukraine, likely to run out of manpower well before Moscow, is resorting to desperate measures to round up new soldiers. The Zelensky government is seeking to embrace the incoming administration, hoping to turn Trump Kiev’s way.
Today allied governments are increasingly discussing the need to negotiate. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz controversially called Putin last week, for their first exchange in two years. Many Ukrainians acknowledge, however reluctantly, that the war is unlikely to be won and will require territorial concessions to end. Continued international support for Ukraine is increasingly being presented as a means to increase its “leverage” in expected talks. (Even some Trump advisers advocate hiking U.S. aid to Ukraine to pressure Russia.) Kiev’s situation is far worse today than before the war. All this probably could have been avoided had the U.S. simply announced that Kiev would not be joining NATO, not now and not ever.
What of Moscow’s response? Ukraine partisans dismiss fear of Russian retaliation and escalation, suggesting that Putin has proved to be a paper tiger, full of bluster rather than action. Yet prudence should not be confused with timidity. As long as Moscow appears to be winning, Putin has an incentive to avoid the vagaries of an expanded war. But he need not respond directly. Indeed, Russia already has answered asymmetrically.
Relatively minor so far are sabotage and other disruptive operations in Europe, which could be expanded to energy and electrical facilities, as well as other civilian infrastructure. (Two undersea cables linking Germany and Finland have just been cut, by unknown parties.) More serious is the possibility of Russia arming America’s and Europe’s enemies. Observed Putin: “we believe that if someone is thinking that it is possible to supply such weapons to a war zone in order to deliver strikes at our territory and to create problems for us, why can we not supply our weapons of the same class to those regions around the world where they will target sensitive facilities of the countries that are doing this to Russia? The response could be symmetrical.” He acknowledged that this was not ideal, but “Ultimately, if we see that these countries are being embroiled into a war against us, and this constitutes their direct involvement in the war against the Russian Federation, we reserve the right to respond in kind.”
Moscow is believed to be aiding Yemen’s Ansar Allah in targeting Western shipping in the Red Sea. Washington is spending billions and devoting significant naval resources in response. There may be more to come. Warned the Atlantic Council’s Elisabeth Braw: “Russia’s provision of targeting data may be followed by yet more support for the Houthis. According to Disruptive Industries (DI), a UK technology company that specializes in the closed-source discovery of global risks, there is extensive and unseen Russian activity in Houthi-held parts of Yemen, and there has been for some time.” William LaPlante, under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, allowed that the Houthis’ weapons “can do things that are just amazing,” which suggests the possibility that Moscow is already providing hardware as well.
Even more ominous is Russian cooperation with North Korea. It is unknown what Kim receives in return for his assistance; presumably enough money, food, and energy to relieve Pyongyang’s dependence on the PRC. Worse would be technical assistance as the North seeks to improve its nuclear arsenal and refine its ICBMs, with the ultimate goal of targeting American cities. Russia has much to offer, and its aid would be difficult to detect. Putin might see such assistance as appropriate payback for U.S. support to Ukraine that has killed thousands of Russians. If Washington can extend the range of its missiles, Moscow can do the same for North Korea’s missiles.
Unfortunately, Biden’s ill-considered move makes such a course more likely. Putin would like to discourage future allied escalation. Moreover, Kim can increase his price if the DPRK’s costs of intervention increase. And the impact of such assistance cannot be reversed. Extended deterrence might seem relatively costless against an adversary unable to reach the U.S. homeland. Once millions of Americans are at risk from a North Korean nuclear attack, Washington’s policy toward Northeast Asia will have to be reconsidered.
Donald Trump has the opportunity to play peacemaker after he takes office on January 20th. Biden has made his successor’s job more difficult, but also more essential. It is important to end a conflict that is literally destroying Ukraine. It is vital to end a proxy war-plus between nuclear powers.