Another day, another threat from North Korea, backed (as it often is) by a ballistic missile launch. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been increasing the frequency of provocations and drawing closer to Russia. Kim Jong-un continues to augment his arsenal at a breakneck pace, recently identifying “the launch of three new spy satellites as well as the building of drones and strengthening of the country’s nuclear weaponry as goals for this year.”

Perhaps even more menacing is the North’s dramatic U‑turn on peaceful reunification with South Korea. Kim proposed revising his country’s constitution to define the Republic of Korea as Pyongyang’s “primary foe and invariable principal enemy.” Last week Kim set “as a national policy to occupy their territory in the event of” an undefined “contingency.”

So much for the onetime presidential friend who passed his time penning “beautiful” and “great” love letters to Donald Trump. Kim recently turned 40. Unfortunately, the older he gets, the less open the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea becomes to the world.

On December 17, 2011, a callow, ill-prepared Kim succeeded his father, Kim Jong Il. Surrounded by older mentors selected by his father to guide him, Kim fils could have ended up as little more than an empty frontman. Instead, he soon consolidated his hold on power, replacing military and political officials. Most dramatically, he executed his uncle. Contra expectations, Kim was not to be trifled with.

His time at school in Switzerland created some hope that he would liberalize his country. He evidently was different from his father and grandfather. Disney figures cavorted at an official event, and former NBA star Dennis Rodman serenaded the Supreme Leader on the latter’s birthday. Kim hosted a concert with South Korean K‑pop artists and showcased his attractive wife, Ri Sol-ju, at home and abroad. More serious were his limited economic reforms and two overseas meetings with Trump.

Then came the 2019 summit crash in Hanoi. Kim responded by turning inward, a course reinforced by the Covid pandemic. He reversed economic reforms while seeking cultural isolation. In his party report two years ago, he “put an emphasis on the issue of effecting a revolutionary change in the mental and moral life of the people by pushing ahead with the eradication of non-socialist, anti-socialist practices and thorough establishment of socialist lifestyle throughout the country.” Singing or watching K‑pop, which Kim labeled “a vicious cancer,” now lands teens in prison or on the execution block.

Similarly dramatic has been Pyongyang’s foreign policy shift. Kim abandoned engagement with South Korea and the U.S. He highlighted his contemptuous view of Seoul with the destruction of the Kaeson liaison building erected for inter-Korean exchanges. He recently dismissed what he termed the South’s plans for “unification by absorption” and “unification under liberal democracy.” Inter-Korean contact, Kim declared, is now “fixed into the relations between two states hostile to each other,” a dramatic repudiation of previous unification rhetoric and significant policy change.

Kim has similarly rejected Biden administration overtures. His rhetoric toward the U.S. has gotten ever-more truculent. At December’s party plenum, he stated:

The U.S. and its vassal forces have still perpetrated vicious anti-DPRK confrontational moves and the desperate efforts of the enemies have reached the extremes unprecedented in history in their reckless, provocative and dangerous nature. The U.S., which has caused instability and continued to aggravate the situation in the Korean peninsula, is exposing various forms of military threat to our state even at this moment when the year is falling. The U.S. has more persistently instigated the South Korean puppets and Japs, who are playing the role as the most faithful stooge and ‘running-dog’ in carrying out its hostile policy towards our Republic.

Thus, he instructed North Koreans, from soldiers to farmers, to “further accelerate the war preparations.” Amid this acceleration, he has threatened the first use of nuclear weapons. In September 2022, Kim said that the North’s nuclear status was “irreversible” and “there can be no bargaining over our nuclear weapons” despite economic sanctions. In the most recent plenum, he ordered the military to prepare plans for using nukes against the South in the event of war.

The DPRK is a nuclear power with sufficient fissile material to make at least 45 to 55 nuclear weapons, and perhaps many more. Although preparing for the North’s expected nuclear test has been a bit like watching the play Waiting for Godot, Pyongyang has advanced an expansive nuclear agenda. For instance, three years ago, “Kim announced North Korea would field a new nuclear-capable submarine, develop its tactical nuclear weapons, deploy multiple warheads on a single missile, and improve its ICBMs’ accuracy, among other goals.”

Unfortunately, when the North intends to stop expanding its arsenal is anyone’s guess. The RAND Corporation and Asan Institute for Policy Studies warned that the DPRK might build as many as 242 nuclear weapons, which would place Pyongyang among second-rank nuclear powers. That forecast is controversial, but even half as many nukes would provide a meaningful deterrent. Moreover, the North’s missile testing program has been active. Kim celebrated last year’s end with another ICBM test. The development of solid-fuel ICBMs is particularly threatening for the US.

As the DPRK’s capabilities advance, the likelihood of convincing—or coercing—him to relinquish his nation’s nukes diminishes. Of all the nuclear-armed powers, only South Africa abandoned a functioning arsenal, and Pretoria possessed just six completed weapons. The People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation offer Pyongyang two additional reasons for retaining its deterrent. Throughout the Cold War, North Korea carefully protected its independence and played its giant communist patrons against one another. Even a reunited Korea would be “a shrimp among whales” compared to Russia and the PRC, but nuclear weapons would ensure a very well-armed shrimp.

Nevertheless, neither Beijing nor Moscow has much reason to assist the U.S. against the North. Neither wanted the DPRK to have nuclear weapons, let alone the ability to send them far and wide. Russia long had little influence in Pyongyang, however, while China valued stability above denuclearization, opposing international pressure that it feared might undermine the regime.

Today, both have another reason to remain aloof—hostility toward Washington. Russia recently played the North Korea card, turning to the latter to augment its supply of munitions in the Ukraine war. What Moscow is providing in return is unknown, but Russia could assist Pyongyang with conventional weapons, including missiles, and even nuclear technology. Despite the obvious risks of doing so, American aid to Ukraine, which has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Russian military personnel, might persuade the Putin government that turnabout is fair play.

The PRC, though probably uncomfortable with Moscow’s newfound influence in the North, is more concerned with its increasingly fractious relationship with the U.S., and especially the potential for conflict over Taiwan, in which the DPRK would be a useful tool. The mere possibility of a North Korean invasion in response to South Korean support for the U.S. might help keep Seoul out of any Sino-American war.

Some observers fear that Kim might even now be planning to launch a war. Kim’s past behavior is inconsistent with such a wild gamble. Neither Moscow nor Beijing would be likely to backstop Pyongyang. He could not count on being saved if the U.S. delivered “fire and fury like the world has never seen,” as once promised by Trump.

Nevertheless, an increasingly threatening North Korea cannot help but unsettle Northeast Asia. An active response seems essential, but what? Preventive military strikes weren’t worth the risk of war in the 1990s, when a major conventional attack was the North’s potential response; they are impossible today, when North Korea could strike South Korea, Japan, and such American territories as Guam with nuclear weapons. Soon, the DPRK may be able to credibly threaten U.S. cities.

Sanctions look no more effective. American policymakers commonly call for tightening restrictions and toughening enforcement. That is no longer a viable option with Moscow and Beijing opposing U.S. policy, vetoing United Nations measures, and covertly opening their borders to Pyongyang. American policymakers insist that denuclearization is in China’s interest, but the PRC evidently believes other interests, such as thwarting American containment efforts, to be more important.

Which leaves diplomacy. That, however, is a dead-end until the North says otherwise. When it does, it is unlikely to welcome discussion of denuclearization. Most likely, Kim is developing a credible nuclear deterrent for America to increase his leverage. When he eventually comes calling, he will set terms for any deal, likely offering to trade a program cap for meaningful sanctions relief. The result would not be the preferred outcome, but it might be the best achievable outcome.

Suggesting that Washington switch to arms control, whether formally or informally, triggers the worst wailing, gnashing of teeth, and rending of garments imaginable. The possibility has received greater attention, but most policymakers still reject any change. Nevertheless, if the only realistic alternatives are a steadily growing illicit nuclear capability supplemented by regular threats of war, and a sharply limited nuclear arsenal but recognized nuclear status, the price of ideological purity seems much too high. A refusal to negotiate on Kim’s terms will mean a refusal to negotiate.

Indeed, it should be possible to square the circle. John Carl Baker of the U.S. Institute of Peace argued on behalf of pursuing “a realistic policy toward North Korea without rejecting commitments to nonproliferation and disarmament. A revised policy should not accept North Korea’s nuclear program but must acknowledge it in order to secure pragmatic constraints that, in the long run, will put the peninsula and the world back on the path to disarmament.” It is essential to try.

When Kim took over in December 2011, he looked nervous and uncertain, because his and the regime’s survival were uncertain. A dozen years later, North Korea is very different. Although his health remains an issue, he is in firm control at home and increasingly assertive abroad. And, he has turned the DPRK into a serious nuclear state. In 2021 he declared, “As long as nuclear weapons exist on Earth, and imperialism and the anti-North Korean maneuvers of the U.S. and its followers remain, our road to strengthening our nuclear force will never end.”

Kim has become one of the most consequential people in Northeast Asia. Washington must deal with him as he is, not as it wishes he was. If not, North Korea will soon have a viable nuclear deterrent threatening the American homeland with destruction, which could ultimately upend security structures throughout Asia and beyond.