Despite our dismal record at nation-building, we marched forward in Afghanistan, repeatedly reaching for the foreign-aid checkbook. What makes this so shocking is that professionals of all stripes know that government-to-government foreign-aid schemes typically fail and are often little more than poster children for waste, fraud, and abuse. As a House Foreign Affairs Committee put it back in 1989, U.S. foreign-aid programs “no longer either advance U.S. interests abroad or promote economic development.” A Clinton administration task force rendered a similar conclusion on the efficacy of foreign aid: “Despite decades of foreign assistance, most of Africa, and parts of Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East are economically worse off today than they were 20 years ago.”
In Afghanistan, none of the mountains of evidence pointing to the failures of foreign aid and nation-building were ever allowed to see the light of day. As it turns out, the professional elites who live off the “delivery” of foreign aid are a tightly knit epistemic community that promotes and runs the foreign-aid show. For them, the show must go on. In Afghanistan, it did, and what an extravaganza it was.
To get a handle on the magnitude of waste, fraud, and abuse in Afghanistan, I use the figures reported for Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA includes both humanitarian and reconstruction aid, mostly in the form of grants and other assistance on concessional terms. ODA excludes military, counter-narcotics, and a plethora of other transfers.