increased since Medicare was created. But if he bothered to look at the long-run data, he would see that life expectancy for the elderly was increasing at the same rate in the decades before Medicare was created. This doesn't mean that Medicare didn't have some positive impact, but it certainly isn't obvious from life-expectancy data.

Let's close with one of the vignettes that make the book an interesting read. Wessel quotes Erskine Bowles, who served as President Clinton's chief of staff, saying that Social Security reform was virtually a done deal in the late 1990s: "Gingrich wanted to do it. Clinton wanted to do it. It was a real missed opportunity."

And in contrast to the undesirable options being discussed today, such as "chained CPI" or means testing, Gingrich and Clinton were looking at personal retirement accounts. So why didn't it happen? As Bowles noted, "Monica changed everything" by creating the conditions that led to impeachment and destroying bipartisanship.

So now we're stuck with an actuarially bankrupt Social Security system that is bad for workers and bad for taxpayers, thus making the incident with Monica the most costly intimate encounter that ever took place.

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The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion
Jonathan Haidt
New York: Pantheon, 2012, 419 pp.

The Righteous Mind offers a comprehensive and intriguing answer to that age-old political question, "Why do so many people disagree with me?" After all, I believe what I believe because I think the evidence and arguments are convincing. Otherwise, I wouldn't believe it. So why do others disagree?

According to Jonathan Haidt, the reason you and I can look at the same facts and come to different political conclusions is that we morally value different things. I may place much more weight on preventing harm than you do, while you have a stronger sense of fairness. Because what we value ultimately determines what we think the state ought to do, if our values differ significantly our political ideologies will too.

Haidt's written a book that's quite likely to color how many of its readers think about political differences. I know it did for me. Still, I have two concerns. First, Haidt overstates the explanatory power of his thesis by appearing to discount the role partisanship and tribalism play in voters' assessments of candidates and policies. Second, Haidt's research method, which depends on self-identification for categorizing people into political ideologies, may run into serious problems undermining its accuracy. Neither concern makes the book not worth reading, however. *The Righteous Mind* contains significant insights and ought to be studied by all of us who spend time trying to affect political change.

Haidt begins with the idea that "morality binds and blinds." He argues, based on studies he's conducted over many years, that our moral views are predominantly intuitive. Articulable justification comes only after intuition provides us with an answer. A striking example comes when he asks subjects to consider a dog killed by a car. Rather than bury it, the dog's owner takes the body home, butchers it, cleans it carefully, and eats it. Is that act immoral?

Haidt found that most people immediately answer yes. You just *can't* eat pets. Things get interesting when Haidt pushes back, asking them to articulate *why*. It can't be because of a moral prohibition on harm, because the owner didn't harm the dog. It can't be because this might upset the neighbors, because they didn't see it. It's not unhealthy, nor will it do psychological damage to the owner (who may find it the best way to cope with the loss of his friend). And so on.

Haidt argues that we can use these carefully contrived cases to expose a striking truth about human moral reasoning: "Each individual reasoner is really good at one thing: finding evidence to support the position he or she already holds, usually for intuitive reasons." Those intuitive reasons are largely unconscious.

Furthermore, the intuitive reasons we draw on differ from person to person. From those differences, Haidt identifies six "moral foundations": care/harm, fairness/cheating, liberty/oppression, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation.

When presented with a battery of moral questions, each designed to invoke a different foundation, Haidt finds that people's sensitivity to each foundation varies. I may become incensed when I encounter acts against authority, but just not notice—or not really care about—

violations of liberty. You may care not one jot about sanctity, but immediately see any harm as a moral issue.

Let's accept that Haidt's moral foundations are a roughly accurate account of how we think about moral questions. What then remains to be shown is how they relate to political questions and particularly the clash of political ideologies. Haidt claims they explain much if not all of it. We support candidates and parties who in turn support policies in sync with our individual moral schematics. The reason Republicans and Democrats disagree about social welfare programs is because for Republicans they trigger the fairness/cheating foundation (it's not fair for the lazy to get money from the hard-working), while for Democrats they trigger care/harm (it's not right that poor people suffer needlessly).

Yet it seems awfully easy to think of examples that disrupt this. I point out that a lot of people take drugs and thus harm themselves. I propose declaring drugs illegal. Does this trigger your care/harm foundation, and thus lead you to support my proposal? Well, if you're a Republican, likely yes. Banning drugs helps those (e.g., addicts) who cannot help themselves—and thus prevents harm. If you're a Democrat, you're more likely to reject such thinking on the grounds that criminalizing drug use will cause *more* harm than it prevents by locking addicts in prison instead of treating them, encouraging violent crime, and so on. So in the case of banning drugs, the care/harm foundation underdetermines the resulting policy preference. Which policy the care/harm foundation will lead you to depends greatly on which effects we focus on and what evidence we study or choose to believe. And in the case of drug prohibition, our party affiliation seems as big a determinant of policy preferences as do the moral foundations.

To see this in action, look at another harmful habit: cigarette smoking. Like taking drugs, smoking harms the health of the user. I propose to you that we thus ought to ban cigarettes. Here the results seem to flip: Many Republicans will say the harm from smoking is none of the government's business. People have a right to give themselves cancer if they want to. Democrats, on the other hand, will lean toward smoking bans.

Of course, Haidt would surely admit the moral foundations aren't the necessary and sufficient cause of all political opinion. Still, it's striking that he pays so little attention to tribalism—party/affiliation

loyalty—which seems to be the biggest barrier to moral foundations actually doing most of the work. And this is frustrating because he has such high praise, early in the book, for Adam Smith and David Hume, whose moral sentiments seem a quite plausible way to explain the scope and power of partisanship in a way that also leaves considerable room for the moral foundations.

Take a story he tells of fraternal twins: "During their nine months together in their mother's womb, the brother's genes were busy constructing a brain that was a bit higher than average in its sensitivity to threats, a bit lower than average in its tendency to feel pleasure when exposed to radically new experiences. The sister's genes were busy making a brain with opposite settings." These traits lead them to weigh the moral foundations differently. Haidt goes on to say that the sister's traits lead her to associate with similar people, "a moral matrix based primarily on the care/harm foundation. In 2008, she is electrified by Barack Obama's concern for the poor and his promise of change." The brother, on the other hand, finds that "the most common moral themes in his life are personal responsibility (based on the fairness foundation—not being a free rider or a burden on others) and loyalty to the many groups and teams to which he belongs. He resonates with John McCain's campaign slogan, 'Country First.'"

Of course, Haidt says, genes didn't predestine either sibling to vote for a particular candidate. "But their different sets of genes gave them different first drafts of their minds, which led them down different paths, through different life experiences, and into different moral subcultures."

On this view, then, our choice of candidate flows from our particular weighting of the moral foundations. If we're sensitive to care/harm, we pick a Democrat, because Democrats tend to focus on what excites their care/harm foundation when choosing policies. If we're sensitive to loyalty/betrayal, we pick Republicans, because their rhetoric puts country first.

But as my drugs versus cigarettes example above illustrates, the relationship between policies—and, even more so, candidates—and moral foundations seems rather often arbitrary. And that moral foundations wholly determine political views looks nearly incoherent when we look at the dominance of partisan thinking. Haidt writes that, "Political parties and interest groups strive to make their concerns become triggers of your moral modules. To get your vote, your money, or your time, they must activate at least one of your moral

foundations." This is true, but unless we have some explanation for why we only listen to our favored party when it comes to policies and their relation to moral triggers, it's not clear why Americans are so terribly inconsistent in their moral support and outrage.

Democrats may have supported candidate Obama because his pledge to end the wars in the Middle East triggered their care/harm foundations. But wouldn't that mean they'd now have good reason to reject president Obama as he runs away from that foundation in pursuit of ever more drone attacks? Moral foundations seem, for many, a distant second to tribal loyalty.

This is where Haidt should have drawn more on Adam Smith. One of Smith's insights is that we tend to adjust our interests, tastes, and moral views to better match those of our peers. "But whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast," Smith wrote. If everyone in your community supports McCain over Obama, it may be more pleasurable for you to do the same rather than be the odd man out. We want common ground with our peers. And this desire for common ground is equally strong, if not stronger, when it comes to picking someone or some group to despise. "We are not half so anxious that our friends should adopt our friendships, as that they should enter into our resentments," Smith noted. Moral foundations are, without doubt, bound up with all this, including playing an early role in determining who you associate with—though obviously luck, and particularly the luck of birth, play an enormous role too. But once we have our peer and party loyalty in place, the urge for "fellow-feeling" often takes over, trumping real moral evaluation.

Another problem, and potentially a much more serious one, is Haidt's reliance on self-identification for associating moral foundations with political ideologies. Remember, all the conclusions he draws about the moral foundations of different political groups depend entirely on which group people *say* they are members of. What this means is that if an ideologically conservative person takes Haidt's test, but (for whatever reason) identifies himself as a liberal, then Haidt will end up drawing the wrong conclusions about liberals from that person's results. Such confusion turns out to be a good deal more common than we might think. James Stimson at the University of North Carolina found that a rather large number of people who identify as "conservative" actually support quite liberal policies.

When it comes to libertarians, the problem's even bigger. Research by David Boaz and David Kirby found that, while only 2–4 percent of Americans self-identify as libertarian, 15–20 percent hold broadly libertarian policy views. Thus, Haidt's theory seems to underexplain the libertarian moral character. It's like asking what liberals believe by visiting only a university English department.

It is unclear why self-identification is even necessary. Why not instead give people a list of policies, ask them to approve or disapprove of each, and from that extract a rough ideological profile of liberal, conservative, or libertarian? Then, with that identification in hand, move on to the moral questions.

These criticisms, while troubling, don't strip the value from Haidt's book. *The Righteous Mind* no doubt gets at important truths about human moral reasoning and its relation to politics. It may not get at the whole truth, but the whole truth has always been notoriously difficult to come by in either descriptive or normative ethics. Anything that moves us closer to it—and Haidt's book certainly does—deserves praise.

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Curbing Campaign Cash: Henry Ford, Truman Newberry, and the Politics of Progressive Reform
Paula Baker
Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2012, 190 pp.

No one has yet written a detailed history of campaign finance regulation, even limited to the United States. In 1988, Robert E. Mutch published *Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law*. He then embarked on research seeking to fill out that story in the late 19th century. My own *The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform* combines public choice analysis with political theory in a way that historians might not recognize. Ray LaRaja's excellent *Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform* examines a larger historical tableau from a political science perspective. Paula Baker is apparently at work on a broader history of campaign finance and its regulation. This work began as a case study in that project and grew into a book. I look forward to the broader history, but I am happy to have this work.